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Abstract 
 
This thesis seeks to examine the use of air power during Operation JUBILEE. In recent 
revisionist accounts, the role of the Royal Air Force has come in for criticism. Therefore, 
this thesis seeks to examine why the RAF fought the battle in the manner that it did. It 
examines both the doctrinal and operational context of the forces involved in JUBILEE 
and in doing so examines their effectiveness. This thesis contends that Combined 
Operations doctrine argued that the key role for air power was to maintain air superiority 
in order to protect assaulting force. It then examines this alongside the development of 
the offensive use of RAF Fighter Command in the battle for air superiority in the period 
1940-1942. In understanding, these twin pillars of doctrine and operations this thesis 
challenges the perceived failure of the RAF during the raid by arguing that in seeking to 
battle the Luftwaffe in the manner that it did during JUBILEE it provided the most 
appropriate protection that it could for the assault forces. The thesis then examines the 
impact that JUBILEE had upon Fighter Command strategy and various aspects of 
Combined Operations development in 1943 thesis in order to assess its effectiveness. 
This thesis argues that while there may not be a direct link to Operation OVERLORD in 
1944 operations at Dieppe had an impact during 1943 and needs to be considered as one 
line of development in parallel with those from other theatres of war. 
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Introduction 
 
I.1 Outline of Operation JUBILEE 
 
At 04:45 on 19 August 1942, Allied forces landed on the French coast eight miles from 
Dieppe.1 This was the first wave in a raid against the town Dieppe with the aim of: 
limited military and air objectives, embracing the destruction of local defences, power 
stations, harbour installations, rolling stock, etc., in Jubilee, the capture of prisoners, the 
destruction of an aerodrome near the town and the capture and removal of German 
invasion barges and other craft in the harbour.2 
 
JUBILEE was the largest raid launched by Combined Operations Headquarters (COHQ) 
and the culmination of a strategy that began in 1940. The force comprised of troops 
from 2nd Canadian Infantry Division, the British Army’s No. 3 and 4 Commando and the 
Royal Marine’s ‘A’ Commando. Included was a small detachment of French and 
American troops, notably fifty Rangers who were the first American soldiers to see 
combat in Europe.3 The ground commander was Major General J H Roberts, General 
Officer Commanding (GOC) 2nd Canadian Infantry Division, a curious choice for such a 
difficult mission as he lacked operational experience.4 These were supported by 
substantial forces from the Royal Air Force (RAF) under the command of Air Marshal 
Trafford Leigh-Mallory and from the Royal Navy (RN) under the command of Captain 
                                                 
1 All times given are in British summer time (one hour behind Continental time). 
2 Department of Heritage and History (DHH), Canadian Military Headquarters (CMHQ) Historical Report 
No. 83 – Preliminary Report on Operation “JUBILEE” (The Raid on Dieppe), 19 August 1942, 19 
September 1942, p. A-1. It was noted in this report that while attempts were made to mask the name of 
JUBILEE’s target on the last page of the operational order the map reference for Dieppe was given. 
3 On the participation of the Rangers see Jim DeFelice, Rangers at Dieppe: The First Combat Action of U.S. 
Army Rangers in World War II (New York: Berkley Caliber, 2008). 
4 The process of choosing both the Canadians as the main force for the assault and Roberts as commander 
is examined in, Brian Loring Villa Unauthorized Action: Mountbatten and the Dieppe Raid, 1942 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1989) pp. 212-231; Peter Henshaw, ‘The Dieppe Raid: A Product of Misplaced 
Canadian Nationalism’ The Canadian Historical Review, Vol. 77, No. 2 (June 1996) pp. 250-266. 
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James Hughes-Hallett; the RN provided paltry forces for the support of the operations. 
The heaviest ships involved in the operation were eight Hunt Class destroyers of which 
two of were command ships. In total, there were two hundred thirty-seven vessels in 
various roles for the operation.5 By the end of the operation, some four thousand two 
and fifty-two service members were casualties.6 
The RAF supplied substantial forces for JUBILEE. In total, some seventy RAF 
squadrons and four United States Eighth Army Air Force (8AAF) squadrons were tasked 
to support JUBILEE; the type of squadrons deployed in support of JUBILEE is 
illustrated in Chart I.1.7  
                                                 
5 Stephen Roskill, The War at Sea, Volume II: The Period of Balance (London: HMSO, 1954) p. 243. 
6 Charles Stacey, Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War: Volume I – Six Years of War: The 
Army in Canada, Britain and the Pacific (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1955) pp. 387-388. 
7 The National Archives (TNA), AIR 20/5186, Report by the Air Force Commander on the Combined 
Operation against Dieppe, 5 September 1942, p. 2. The number of squadrons tasked to JUBILEE has 
caused some confusion amongst historians with John Terraine citing sixty-one and the RAF’s quasi-official 
history citing fifty-six: John Terraine, The Right of the Line: The Royal Air Force in the European War, 1939-1945 
(London: Wordsworth Edition, 1997; Hodder and Stoughton, 1985) p. 560; Denis Richards and Hillary St 
George Saunders, Royal Air Force, 1939-1945 – Volume 2: The Fight Avails (London: HMSO, 1953) p. 143. 
For a breakdown of the squadrons, see Appendix 1. 
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Chart I.1 - No. of Squadrons and Mission Profile of Aircraft deployed in support 
of Operation JUBILEE, 19 August 1942
48 6 
4 
4 
4 
3 2 2 1
Air Cover - Supermarine Spitfire (All Marks) Close Support - Hawker Hurricane 
Bomber - Douglas Boston Diversionary Bombing - Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress 
Tac R - North American Mustang Air Cover - Hawker Typhoon
Smoke Laying - Bristol Blenheim Direct Air Support - Hawker Hurricane 
Smoke Laying - Douglas Boston 
 
(Source: TNA, AIR 20/5186, Appendix A to Report by the Air Force Commander; Franks, The Greatest 
Air Battle, pp. 222-225; Franks, Fighter Command Losses, pp. 56-62) 
Command was exercised through the mechanism of Fighter Command’s No. 11 Group.8 
RAF operations during JUBILEE were split into five distinct phases with air operation 
starting at 04:45 and finishing at 22:45.9 The first phase, 04:45 to 05:50, saw attacks on 
the beaches and defences with Douglas Bostons laying smoke while escorted bombers 
attacked the beachfront.10 At the same time Hawker Hurricane fighter-bombers and 
Supermarine Spitfires attacked gun batteries on the headlands, which were to be 
assaulted by No. 3 and 4 Commando.11 In the second phase, 05:50 to 07:30, air cover 
                                                 
8 In later years, a great deal of controversy would surround his role in the ‘Big Wing’ controversy of 1940 
and his choice as commander of the tactical air forces for OVERLORD that has clouded any reasonable 
analysis of his effectiveness as a leader. The only biography of Leigh-Mallory is one produced by his great 
nephew, Bill Newton Dunn, Liberal Democrat MEP for the East Midlands. Unfortunately, the book has 
many factual inaccuracies and is often defensive about criticisms made of Leigh-Mallory: Bill Newton 
Dunn, Big Wing: A Biography of ACM Trafford Leigh-Mallory (Shrewsbury: Airlife, 1992). 
9 TNA, AIR 20/5186, Report by the Air Force Commander, pp. 6-10. 
10 TNA, AIR 20/5186, Report by the Air Force Commander, p. 6. 
11 TNA, AIR 20/5186, Report by the Air Force Commander, p. 6. On the attacks by No. 3 and 4 
Commando see, Will Fowler, The Commandos at Dieppe: Rehearsal for D-Day (London: Collins, 2003); 
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and ad hoc direct support were provided. For example, at 0645, the Rommel battery at 
Puys behind Blue Beach was causing problems for the Royal Regiment of Canada (RRC), 
therefore, orders were sent to No. 88 Squadron to attack the battery.12 Within an hour, 
the squadron was en route when a recall order was received.13 As the unit had gone too 
far to turn back, the attack went in suffering heavy casualties from German fighters.14 
The third phase of operations, 07:30 to 10:30, saw the RAF tasked primarily with 
providing air cover for operations on the ground. This was the greatest period of activity 
for the RAF with ‘20 to 30 fighters being constantly in the area’15 The penultimate phase, 
10:30 to 14:10, saw the RAF continue to provide air cover while the withdrawal from the 
beaches was undertaken. In addition limited direct air support was provided for the 
withdrawing forces.16 During this phase Luftwaffe tactics against the attacking forces 
changed with larger mixed formations of fighters, fighter-bombers and bombers being 
utilised.17 The final phase, 14:10 to 22:45, saw air cover provided for the fleet returning 
to Britain.18 Active operations were curtailed by deteriorating weather. 
                                                                                                                                           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Brereton Greenhous, ‘Operation Flodden: The Sea Fight off Berneval and the Suppression of the 
Goebbels Battery, 19 August 1942’ Canadian Military Journal, Vol. 4, No. 3 (Autumn 2003) pp. 47 – 57. 
12 TNA, AIR 20/5186, Report by the Air Force Commander, p. 7; Norman Franks, The Greatest Air Battle: 
Dieppe, 9th August 1942 (London: Grub Street, 1992), p. 70. 
13 TNA, AIR 20/5186, Report by the Air Force Commander, p. 8. 
14 Franks, The Greatest Air Battle pp. 70-71. 
15 TNA, AIR 20/5186, Report by the Air Force Commander, p. 8. 
16 TNA, AIR 20/5186, Report by the Air Force Commander, p. 9. 
17 TNA, AIR 20/5186, Report by the Air Force Commander, p. 9. 
18 TNA, AIR 20/5186, Report by the Air Force Commander, p. 9. 
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Map I.1 – Outline of Operation JUBILEE, 19 August 1942 
 
 
Map 1.1 outlines the locations assaulted during JUBILEE. The first unit to land 
was No. 3 Commando at Berneval and out of twenty-three landing craft, only six made it 
to shore. However, despite losses the attack went in and managed to suppress fire from 
the Goebbels battery.19 At 04:54, No. 4 Commando landed at Varangeville-sur-Mer to 
attack the Hess battery. This attack, Operation CAULDRON, has been considered the 
only successful aspect of JUBILEE as the battery was destroyed. However, there was an 
element of luck with shells left in open pits around the battery, which were blown-up by 
a single mortar round.20 However, the operation became the basis for a British Army 
doctrinal pamphlet on attacking gun positions and was described as a ‘model of bold 
action and successful synchronisation.’21 
                                                 
19 Greenhous, ‘Operation FLODDEN’, pp. 47-57. 
20 Fowler, Commandos at Dieppe, passim. 
21 DHH, CMHQ Report No. 101 – Operation “JUBILEE”: The Raid on Dieppe, 19 August 1942, Part II: 
The Execution of the Operation. Section 1: General Outline and Flank Attacks, 11 August 1943, p. 21; 
TNA, WO 208/3108, Notes from Theatres of War No. 11: Destruction of a German Battery by No. 4 
Commando during the Dieppe Raid (1943). 
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On the inner flanks, the RRC and the Black Watch of Canada (BWC) landed on 
Blue Beach at Puys. Unfortunately, they landed fifteen minutes behind schedule and of 
five hundred troops landed, just six returned unscathed.22 At Pourville, Green Beach, the 
South Saskatchewan Regiment (SSR) and the Queen’s Own Cameron Highlanders of 
Canada (QOCHC) were to take the high ground above Dieppe. The SSR was to outflank 
Dieppe while the QOCHC were to link up with the 14th Canadian Army Tank Regiment 
(The Calgary Tanks) and attack the airfield at St Aubin, this proved fruitless because of 
the problems encountered in Dieppe itself.23 A secondary mission attached to the landing 
at Pourville was the attempt by the RAF to capture or examine the Freya radar that was 
stationed in the area.24 The SSR quickly entered Pourville and had reinforcement been 
available they may have pushed onto their objectives, however, they become bogged 
down despite support from destroyers offshore. 
In the main assault at Dieppe, the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry (RHLI) and the 
Essex Scottish landed on Red and White Beaches. Their attack had been preceded by 
attacks by fighter-bombers and bombers, which had dazed the defenders, however, the 
strength of the positions in Dieppe made progress difficult. Lieutenant Fred Woodcock 
of the RHLI recalled that all he could remember was ‘the sound, because I was blinded. 
The boat filled with water and I was soon up to my neck.’25 The assault was to be 
                                                 
22 Villa, Unauthorized Action, p. 14; Ronald Atkin, Dieppe, 1942: The Jubilee Disaster (London: Macmillan, 
1980), pp. 113-133. 
23 Atkin, Dieppe, 1942, pp. 134-149. 
24 The role of Flight Sergeant Jack Nissenthall is dealt with in John Campbell, Dieppe Revisited: A 
Documentary Investigation (London: Frank Cass, 1993) passim. Originally published in 1975, James Leasor 
offers a dramatic version of Nissenthall’s mission in Green Beach (London: House of Stratus, 2001). 
Nissenthall published his own memoirs in 1987 as Winning the Radar War: A Memoir by Jack Nissen and A W 
Cockerell (Toronto: Macmillan, 1987). 
25 Atkin Dieppe 1942, p. 153. 
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supported by twenty-nine Churchill MkIII tanks from the Calgary Tanks.26 However, 
from the start of the operation conditions deteriorated as tanks were bogged down in the 
chert beach and became prominent targets for antitank guns. The tanks were fifteen 
minutes late arriving at the beaches and this had ‘unfortunate results for the general 
fortunes of the operation on the main beaches.’27 Eventually all of the tanks were 
destroyed and only three remained on the esplanade.28 Due to the deteriorating situation 
at Dieppe, Roberts decided at 06:30 to commit his reserve, the Fusiliers Mont-Royal 
(FMR). Roberts claimed that after:  
About one hour after touch down, information received indicated that “Red” Beach was 
sufficiently cleared to permit the landing of the floating reserve.29  
 
Roberts was wrong. At 08:00, Roberts, having been deceived by intelligence again, 
decided to commit RM ‘A’ Commando to White Beach to force a breakthrough. This 
necessitated a quick rethink on the way into the beach and as it moved parallel to the 
beach it become what has been described as the ‘sea parallel of the Charge of the Light 
Brigade’, ‘A’ Commando came under a hail of artillery fire and its intended effect became 
negligible.30  
By 09:30, it became clear that the operation was a failure and landing craft started 
taking wounded off the beach. At the same time both Roberts and Hughes-Hallet 
contended that, withdrawal was necessary and that it should begin at 11:00.31 By 12:50, 
all troops that could be evacuated had been removed from the beaches. The casualty rate 
                                                 
26 DHH, CMHQ Report No. 108 - ‘Operation “Jubilee”: The Raid on Dieppe, 19 Aug 42. Part II: The 
Execution of the Operation. Section 2: The Attack on the Main Beaches, 17 December 43, Amended on 
12 July 1950, Para. 137  
27 DHH, CMHQ Report No. 108, Para. 80.  
28 DHH, CMHQ Report No. 108, Paras. 84-88. Hugh G. Henry has dealt with the failure of the Calgary 
Tanks in Dieppe: Through the Lens of the German War Photographer (London: Battle of Britain Prints, 1993). 
29  DHH, CMHQ Report No. 108, Para. 142. 
30 DHH, CMHQ Report No. 108, Para. 174. 
31 DHH, CMHQ Report No. 108, Paras. 225-230. 
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for the ground force reached almost sixty percent. As one historian has commented, it 
was a cruel fate for a country, Canada, who had waited: 
over two and a half years for combat and be  killed, maimed, or captured within a single 
morning one of the undeniable tragedies of the Second World War.32 
 
I.2 Thesis Rationale, Aims and Limitations 
 
Considering the amount of ink that has been spilt over JUBILEE, it could be queried 
whether there is a need for another examination of a raid that in the context of the 
Second World War was a small operation.33 However, much of the historiography has 
been driven by Canadian nationalism in trying to explain the problems that faced their 
troops at Dieppe. Research on Dieppe has been varied from early journalistic accounts to 
thorough scholarly explanations and subjects have been just as diverse with recent 
research being conducted into how JUBILEE was reported.34  
However, there has been a distinct lack of analysis of how Dieppe fitted into 
prevailing Combined Operations doctrine and how effective were the various elements 
of JUBILEE. There has been some attempt to shift the focus of the historiography away 
from the contentious issues of blame to a discussion of effectiveness with Hugh G. 
Henry’s work on the Calgary Tanks and Will Fowler’s work on CAULDRON, however, 
this needs to be taken further.35 Therefore, there is a need to shift the historiography to 
an analysis of effectiveness in order to assess whether or not any lessons were truly learnt 
                                                 
32 Villa Unauthorized Action, p. 2. 
33 See Villa, Unauthorized Action; Campbell, Dieppe Revisited; Atkin, Dieppe, 1942; Hugh Henry, ‘The Planning, 
Intelligence, Execution and Aftermath of the Dieppe raid, 19 August 1942’ PhD Thesis (University of 
Cambridge, 1996). 
34 Timothy Balzer, ‘ ‘In Case the Raid is Unsuccessful...’: Selling Dieppe to Canadians’ The Canadian 
Historical Review, Vol. 87, No. 3 (September 2006) pp. 409-430. 
35 Henry, Dieppe; Hugh G. Henry, ‘The Calgary Tanks at Dieppe’ Canadian Military History, Vol. 4, No. 1 
(1995) pp. 61-74; Fowler, Commandos at Dieppe 
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from JUBILEE. The role of air power during JUBILEE has received little serious 
attention about the role it actually played on the day; much has centred on higher 
strategic discussions, for example, in his despatch on the operation, Hughes-Hallett spent 
only ten lines describing the role of the RAF.36 Norman Franks’ narrative of the 
operation did little to attempt to analyse the effectiveness of the forces deployed.37 Thus, 
it is the rationale of this thesis to seek to re-contextualise the debate about Dieppe and 
concentrate on its relevance as a military operation by examining the place of air power 
in its doctrinal and operational context. In doing this it will analyse the effectiveness of 
the forces deployed and the links between JUBILEE and subsequent operations. 
In analysing the role of air power during JUBILEE there are several research 
questions that will be explored. First is an exploration of the RAF’s role in the 
development of Combined Operations doctrine during the inter-war years and how the 
RAF saw the use of air power in this type of operations. Second is an examination of the 
operational context of the RAF in the period 1940-1942 and an assessment of the role 
the RAF played in the planning for JUBILEE. A key aspect of this is an examination of 
how the RAF viewed the operation and how support for a Combined Operations fitted 
in with the RAF’s offensive fighter strategy of the period. Third, the thesis will seek to 
examine the impact of JUBILEE by examining the effectiveness of the support provided 
through both qualitative and quantitative sources. It will examine the usefulness of air 
power on the day of JUBILEE and the costly nature of providing offensive air cover 
over enemy territory. In examining its impact, the thesis will examine the role JUBILEE 
had in shaping discussion on the command and control of air power in Combined 
Operations and the on the issue of fire support. Overall, by placing Dieppe into its 
                                                 
36 Captain J. Hughes-Hallett, ‘Dieppe Raid: Despatch on the Raid, 18-19 August 1942’ The London Gazette, 
12 August 1942, p. 3823. The dispatch was originally submitted on 30 August 1942 and published after the 
war. Villa, Unauthorized Action, passim. 
37 Franks, The Greatest Air Battle, passim. 
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doctrinal and operational context the impact of air power operations can be examined 
and compared to the lessons learnt in other theatres of war, therefore, contextualising its 
effectiveness in the short-term rather than long-term, as was suggested by Earl 
Mountbatten of Burma.38 Thus, at its centre this thesis seeks to examine why the RAF 
fights the air battle in the manner it did over Dieppe and how effective it was. 
In order to examine these research questions this thesis will utilise a 
chronological conceptual model in order to frame the discussion. This will roughly split 
the thesis into three key periods, first, 1918-1939, second, 1940-1942 and finally, 1942-
1944. Framing the discussion in this manner has aided in the assessment of JUBILEE’s 
effectiveness by producing an understanding of what came before and after JUBILEE. 
Primarily the research has drawn upon archival sources at the National Archives, 
Kew, the RAF Museum, Hendon and the Canadian Military Headquarters Reports 
(CHMQ) from the Department of History and Heritage, Ottawa Canada.39 Thanks to 
poor historical records that remain on the Dieppe operation it has been necessary to 
widen the scope of records examined by seeking out records from a variety of 
departments; a full list of documents consulted can be found in the bibliography. This 
plurality of archival material has aided in strengthening the conclusions reached. They 
have been backed up by a variety on non-contemporary sources on issues such as the 
development of Combined Operations doctrine and air power theory.  
For example, archival sources have included an examination of the papers of the 
RAF Staff College in order to assess the RAF’s thinking on the subject backed up by Air 
Ministry files on the writing of the Manual of Combined Operations (MCO). These are 
backed up with key work on Combined Operations doctrine such as David Massam’s 
                                                 
38 Earl Mountbatten of Burma, ‘Operation Jubilee: The Place of the Dieppe Raid in History’ Journal of the 
Royal United Service Institution for Defence Studies Vol. 119 No. 1 (1974) 
39 The CMHQ Reports, and its successor the Army Headquarters Reports (AHQ) are available online at 
http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/dhh-dhp/his/rep-rap/index-eng.asp 
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1996 doctoral thesis.40 In addition to Massam’s thesis, key non-contemporary sources on 
Combined Operations have included Kenneth Clifford’s Amphibious Warfare Development 
in Britain and America from 1920 and Bernard Fergusson’s The Watery Maze, though these 
must be treated with caution as Clifford was a former US Marine Corps officer and 
Fergusson was the former Director of Combined Operations (DCO).41  
In addition to key works on Combined Operations there are also several 
important works on air power that have helped inform the interpretations present in this 
thesis. Most important has been Ian Gooderson’s work on tactical air power, Air Power at 
the Battlefront.42 Gooderson’s work has been important in re-focussing the debate about 
the effectiveness of bombers as a tactical support weapon; one of the key arguments 
present in revisionist accounts of JUBILEE. David Ian Hall’s work on British tactical air 
doctrine, Strategy for Victory, is important for shifting interpretations away from the 
perception of the RAF being a force that concentrated solely of aerial bombardment; it is 
within this revisionist interpretation that this thesis falls.43 
Despite the scope of research undertaken there are several areas that, because of 
limitations of time and the span of the work, have been avoided due to the focus on 
operational and tactical issues. First, strategic level discussions surrounding the RAF’s 
role, in particular the argument that the RAF was not interested in providing its full 
                                                 
40 David Massam, ‘British Maritime Strategy and Amphibious Capability, 1900 – 40’ DPhil Thesis (Oxford 
University, 1996). 
41 Kenneth Clifford, Amphibious Warfare Development in Britain and America from 1920 (New York: Edgewood, 
1983); Bernard Fergusson, The Watery Maze: The Story of Combined Operations (London: Collins, 1961). 
42 Ian Gooderson, Air Power at the Battlefront: Allied Close Air Support, 1943-1945 (London: Frank Cass, 
1998); Ian Gooderson, 'Heavy and Medium Bombers: How Successful Were They in the Tactical Close Air 
Support Role During World War II?' Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 15, No.3, (September 1992) pp. 367-399 
43 David Ian Hall, Strategy for Victory: The Development of British Tactical Air Power, 1919-1943 (Greenwood, 
CT: Praeger, 2007); David Ian Hall, ‘The Long Gestation and Difficult Birth of the 2nd Tactical Air Force 
(RAF)’ Royal Air Force Air Power Review, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Autumn 2002) pp. 20-33; David Ian Hall, ‘Creating 
the 2nd Tactical Air Force RAF: Inter-Service and Anglo-Canadian Co-Operation in the Second World 
War’ Canadian Military Journal, Vol. 3, No. 4 (Winter 2003) pp. 39-45. 
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weight of support due to its desire to prosecute the strategic bomber offensive, though 
by default this thesis does show that this is not a clear as some historians have argued.44 
Second, it does not explore the importance of radar to JUBILEE as John Campbell in 
Dieppe Revisited has dealt with this effectively.45 It also does not explore the diversionary 
raid on Boulogne by the 8AAF, which has little bearing on the general thesis of this 
work. Research also opened several areas that could not be explored because of the word 
limit; this included the use of balloons in Combined Operations and the RAF’s 
participations in providing meteorological advice for Combined Operations.46 If this 
work were expanded, it would be envisaged that the scope of archival sources would be 
increased to include various personal papers at assorted institutions and to expand the 
German perspective using the Bundesarchiv at Freiburg. 
 
I.3 The Historiography of Operation JUBILEE 
 
Writing about JUBILEE began almost as soon as the dust had settled with journalistic 
accounts appearing in 1943.47 Timothy Balzer has gone as far as to suggest that reporting 
of JUBILEE was shaped by a communiqué given out by COHQ in advance of 
JUBILEE, which suggested that all reporting be positive.48 Early accounts by journalists 
certainly follow this line of reasoning with both Austin and Reynolds’s books being 
optimistic and espousing the COHQ line that important lessons were learnt during 
                                                 
44 See Villa, Unauthorised Action, pp. 127-162 
45 Campbell, Dieppe Revisited, passim. 
46 TNA, AIR 2/7999, Balloons for Combined Operations; AIR 2/4833, Combined Operations: Co-
Ordination of Meteorological Advice; AIR 2/4845, Combined Operations Organisation: Meteorological 
Services. 
47 Alexander Austin, We Landed at Dawn (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1942); Quentin Reynolds, Dress 
Rehearsal: The Story of Dieppe (London: Angus & Robertson, 1943). 
48 Balzer, ‘ ‘In Case the Raid in Unsuccessful’, passim. 
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JUBILEE.49 This interpretation was supported by the production of a pamphlet by the 
Ministry of Information entitled Combined Operations.50 This booklet detailed the exploits 
of the COHQ between 1940 and 1942 and a large portion of the book is given over to 
JUBILEE. Many of the arguments given in these works are based around the findings 
prevalent in the Combined Report on Dieppe and the Lessons Learnt document compiled by 
Hughes-Hallett.51 
However, critical accounts emerged soon after the end of the war when Colonel 
C P Stacey began writing the official history of the Canadian Army. During the war, 
Stacey had been the head of the CMHQ Historical Section and had been responsible for 
compiling numerous reports on Dieppe. Stacey’s role was to collate reports that served a 
didactic purpose for the Canadian military. Stacey was a vital link in framing Canadian 
national and military history.52 He produced a ‘White Paper’ on JUBILEE that angered 
Mountbatten as it challenged the veracity of the claims then being made by COHQ; 
Mountbatten’s official biographer has described Dieppe as his one of two key regrets, the 
other being the partition of India in 1947.53 The arguments made by Stacey would filter 
into the official history. While critical, Stacey provided a balanced account of JUBILEE, 
though he did examine some of the key issues that contributed to JUBILEE’s failure 
such as command issues, the Canadian desire to fight, and bombardment.54  
                                                 
49 Reynolds was associate editor for Collier’s Weekly while Austin worked for The Daily Herald. Both were 
present during the raid. Michael Roth,  Historical Dictionary of War Journalism (Greenwood, CT: Greenwood 
Press, 1997) p. 17 and pp. 257-258 
50 Anon, Combined Operations, 1940-1942 (London: HMSO, 1943). 
51 TNA, ADM 239/350, Raid on Dieppe: Lessons Learnt. 
52 Tim Cook, ‘Clio’s Soldiers: Charles Stacey and the Army Historical Section in the Second World War’ 
The Canadian Historical Review, Vol. 83, No. 1 (March 2002) pp. 29-57. 
53 Cook, ‘Clio’s Soldiers’ pp. 41-42; Philip Ziegler, Mountbatten: The Official Biography (London: Collins, 1985) 
p. 186. 
54 Stacey, Six Years of War, pp. 308-412. 
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Writing on Dieppe lay dormant until in the early 1960s when the question of 
German foreknowledge led to a re-examination of sources.55 This question emerged 
when David Irving, in a series of articles in the Evening Standard in 1963, argued that 
Hitler had foreknowledge of JUBILEE, thus opening up an explanation for JUBILEE’s 
failure.56 This led to renewed interest in JUBILEE with the publication of Eric Maguire’s 
work and Stephen Roskill’s article in the Journal of the Royal United Services Institute that 
effectively refuted Irving’s claims.57 However, with the exception of Stacey, and to a 
degree Roskill in his writings, most historians until the late 1960s accepted the view 
espoused by Mountbatten. Mountbatten’s views on JUBILEE’s role and importance can 
be summed up in his 1974 paper in the Journal of the Royal United Services Institution, which 
argued that despite JUBILEE’s failure it was a necessary pre-requisite for Operation 
OVERLORD.58 However, the gradual release of information that occurred in the 1970s, 
in particular the release of ULTRA decrypts began to open up contrary views on the 
operation; this was aided by the sudden death of Mountbatten in 1979. 
The opening up of sources led historians to question previously accepted views 
about JUBILEE. Notable amongst these revisionists is Brian Loring Villa whose work, 
Unauthorized Action, has laid the blame for JUBILEE’s failure at Mountbatten’s door. 
However, the author’s nationalistic defence of Canadian involvement biases it. However, 
it has opened up many interesting question about JUBILEE.59 Villa’s work has aroused 
much criticism from some historians for relying far too heavily on political science 
                                                 
55 Stephen Roskill, ‘The Dieppe Raid and the Question of German Foreknowledge’ Journal of the Royal 
United Service Institute, Vol. 109 (Feb: 1964) p. 27. 
56 David Irving, ‘Dieppe: Hitler knew it was coming’ Evening Standard, 1 October 1963; ‘Roskill, ‘German 
Foreknowledge’ p. 27; Campbell, Dieppe Revisited, pp. 13-20 
57 Maguire, Eric Dieppe, August 19th 1942 (London: Jonathon Cape, 1963: Corgi Books, 1974); Roskill, ‘The 
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58 Earl Mountbatten of Burma, ‘Operation JUBILEE’; Roskill, Stephen The War at Sea, Volume II: The Period 
of Balance (London: HMSO, 1954). 
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techniques and his conclusion is considered too conspiratorial to be accepted.60 Peter 
Henshaw has refuted Villa’s claims by linking the issue of authorisation to Mountbatten’s 
desire for power as Chief of Combined Operations (CCO).61 This led to a debate 
between Villa and Henshaw in a 1998 article in the The Canadian Historical Review.62 Villa is 
also heavily critical of the role of the Chiefs of Staffs, notably Portal and Pound, both of 
whom he views as not supporting the operation enough, and thus contributing to its 
failure.63 James Campbell and Denis Whitaker have produced more balanced and 
considered accounts with Campbell’s work being thoroughly researched and effectively 
examining some of the intelligence questions about Dieppe.64 Recent research has tended 
to concentrate on lower unit action such as that of the commandos, in particular 
Fowler’s work, or has started to examine some of the doctrinal background to Combined 
Operations.65 
Analysis of air power during JUBILEE can be described as poor at best with little 
serious scholarship on the subject. On the one hand, there are Franks' narrative accounts, 
and sycophantic early accounts that describe the use of air power an unqualified success 
such as the Ministry of Information’s Combined Operations pamphlet, which uses the term 
the ‘Triumph of the Air’. This portrayal is prevalent in the early histories of JUBILEE.66 
                                                 
60 Hall, Strategy for Victory, p. 211, fn. 36. 
61 Peter J Henshaw, ‘The British Chiefs of Staff Committee and the Preparation of the Dieppe Raid, 
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64 Campbell, Dieppe Revisited, passim; Denis Whitaker and Sheila Whitaker, Dieppe: Tragedy to Triumph 
(Ontario: McGraw-Hill, 1992) passim. 
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At the opposite end of the spectrum is Villa’s work, which is especially critical of the 
RAF. Villa claims that ‘There was a degree of callousness in Portal’s allowing a largely 
Canadian force to go in without the bomber support they needed.’67  A key revisionist 
argument is that for JUBILEE to have succeeded it needed bomber support. Villa is 
especially critical of the decision to withdraw this support.68 However, this interpretation 
misunderstands the nature of air support for Combined Operations, something that this 
thesis seeks to examine. It also ignores the difficulty of utilising heavy bombers in 
support of land operations. For example, Ian Gooderson has noted that the ‘Operational 
results of employing the strategic air weapon in a tactical role were mixed.’69Arguably, if 
used over Dieppe the results would have been near disastrous as the rubble and 
destroyed buildings would have made an already difficult position worse; results that 
would be illustrated two years later during the bombing of Caen during Operation 
CHARNWOOD.70 This thesis, thus, seeks to push our understanding of JUBILEE 
further by critically examine a hitherto little explored aspect of JUBILEE. 
 
I.4 Definitions 
 
This thesis deals with several distinct but interrelated terms in order to explain the 
performance and impact of the RAF during JUBILEE. However, before moving on to 
examine the key areas of debate it is worth defining these terms. First, is doctrine, in the 
case of this thesis the MCO. Doctrine can be defined as that which is taught and 
                                                 
67 Villa Unauthorized Action p. 162. 
68 Villa is also critical of the bombardment problems that emerged from poor naval support. The question 
of naval gun fire support has been examined in Brian Begbie, ‘Naval Gunfire Support for the Dieppe Raid’ 
MA Thesis (University of Ottawa, 1999). 
69 Gooderson, Air Power at the Battlefront, p. 157. 
70 Gooderson, Air Power, pp. 133-136; Peter Gray ‘Caen - The Martyred City’ in John Buckley, (ed.) The 
Normandy Campaign: Sixty Years On (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006) pp. 164 -166.  
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disseminated.71 Doctrine derives its information from the formative experience of a 
service in a didactic attempt to distil the lessons of history into guidance for future 
operations. It is hoped that doctrine will guide the course of military operations at all 
levels, though it has been noted that for the British, doctrine is often viewed as guidance 
and not a strict set of rules.72 Within the doctrinal framework the MCO can be 
considered operational level doctrine as it deal with distinct objectives within a common 
framework, this is unlike modern ‘joint’ doctrine, which is at the strategic level.73 This is 
because the MCO does not deal with all forms of Combined Operations; in particular, it 
only deals with operations involving all three services. The RAF’s strategic doctrine of 
the time was AP1300, the War Manual.74 Thus, this thesis deals with the RAF’s 
involvement with an operational doctrine intended to inform on how to perform a 
specific type of operation. The key RAF idea in the MCO was the attainment of air 
superiority and this is discussed in Chapter One. 
The second area for definitions is Combined Operations. This is a confusing area 
as modern doctrine views Combined Operations as operations between nations.75 
However, during the Second World War Combined Operations described what modern 
observers would describe as joint warfare. AP 1300 defined Combined Operations as: 
 
                                                 
71 Anon, AP3000: British Air Power Doctrine, 3rd Edition (London: The Stationary Office, 1999) p. 3.11.1; 
Neville Parton, ‘The Development of Early RAF Doctrine’ The Journal of Military History, Vol. 72, No. 4 
(October 2008) p. 1155. 
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the term to de-scribe those forms of operations where naval, military or air forces in any 
combination are co-operating with each other, working separately under their respective 
commanders, but with a common aim.76 
 
Thus, if Combined Operation were to be discussed in the modern military the vernacular 
to be used would be one of Joint Operations77 Therefore, Combined Operations in this 
context involves more than one service operating together to achieve a common aim. 
However, this definition can be taken further, as does the doctrine of the time, as there 
are several forms of combined operations that can be taken into consideration, for 
example, raids, invasion, demonstrations and withdrawals.78 The revised MCO of 1938 
defined Combined Operations as: 
forms of operations where, naval, military, or air forces in combination are co-operating 
with each other, working independently under their respective commanders, but with a 
common strategical object.79 
 
While this definition does not offer a satisfactory definition for the topic of this thesis, it 
is what the British military understood by the term as they went into the Second World 
War. However, within the context of this thesis Combined Operations can be refined as 
discussing a raid against a hostile shore utilising forces from each of the three services 
operating independently under the command of their respective service chiefs but with 
common tactical, operational and strategic aim as laid down by the supreme commander. 
This contains the key tenets of the 1938 definition under which Mountbatten and his 
force commanders, including Leigh-Mallory, were operating. 
The final area is military effectiveness. At its most basic level, effectiveness relates 
to the conversion of energy through a process of change and this can be applied to a 
military system by examining how doctrine was applied and what changes come out at 
                                                 
76 TNA, AIR 10/1910, Royal Air Force War Manual Part I – Chapter 13: Combined Operations, para. 1.  
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78 TNA, DEFE 2/709, Manual of Combined Operations, 1938; Ian Speller and Christopher Tuck 
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the end of an operation. Allan Millett, Williamson Murray and Kenneth Watmann 
stimulated work on effectiveness in their 1986 essay in International Security.80 They 
described four levels of effectiveness in the military system, political, strategic, 
operational and tactical.81 Numerous factors affect effectiveness, for example, a lack of 
resources, the effect of doctrine to various socio-economic factors, thus, effectiveness 
can also be split into organisational and sociological effectiveness of military forces.82 For 
the purpose of this thesis it is organisational effectiveness is considered at the operational 
level of war. This refers to the analysis, selection, and development of doctrine to achieve 
objectives where decisions for specific operations are taken and where the development 
of doctrine is transferred into practice and post-operation analysis takes place in order to 
assess and learn lessons from the operation. 83  
In order to assess this several key issues will be examined and linked to the 
research question in order to evaluate effectiveness. First, how well did the RAF’s 
integrate with the other services before, during and after the operation? Second, how 
flexible was the RAF in dealing with changes during the operation? Third, how did the 
RAF’s operational objectives fit into strategic objectives laid out for Fighter Command? 
Finally, how did the RAF evaluate its own performance during and after the operation 
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and were appropriate lessons drawn from the experience? These issues will be revisited in 
the conclusion. 
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Chapter 1 
Air Power and Combined Operations Doctrine from 1914 to the Second World 
War 
 
This chapter examines the inter-war context and development of Combined Operations 
doctrine from the perspective of the RAF in order to contextualise RAF operations 
during JUBILEE. It illustrates that while Combined Operations may not have been at 
the top of the service’s list of priorities it did involve itself in the theoretical development 
of Combined Operations doctrine and in the administrative arrangement surrounding the 
writing and improvement of doctrine.84 The chapter starts with an examination of the 
lessons learnt from the First World War, namely during the Gallipoli campaign. It then 
summarises the problems that the RAF faced during the inter-war years such as the 
financial issues that plagued the service and the problem of misperception of the new 
service. The chapter then examines the role that the various staff colleges, and in 
particular the RAF Staff College at Andover, played in the discussion and development 
of Combined Operations doctrine. It then examines the RAF’s role in Combined 
Operations exercises of the period and the lessons taken from these. It then discusses the 
RAF’s participation in the writing of doctrine, of which there were several revisions in 
the period, and how the lessons from the First World War, staff college exercises and 
Combined Operation exercises shaped the writing of it. Thus this chapter attempts to 
show how the RAF viewed Combined Operations and how this affected the nature of 
the RAF’s involvement with JUBILEE. It will in particular draw out two important 
differences between the RAF and the other services. First, the importance of air 
                                                 
84 For a fuller and more comprehensive analysis of the development of Combined Operations from the 
perspective of all the services during the inter-war years see: Massam, ‘British Maritime Strategy’ and 
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superiority to the RAF as the key priority for air power in Combined Operations and in 
general; second, how the RAF’s view of Combined Operations was at variance with the 
RN and the Army. 
 
1.1 Lessons of the First World War 
 
The First World War had a significant impact on the development of doctrine in the 
British military.85 For Combined Operations, it brought to the fore the impact of air 
power. Major General Anderson, Commandant of the Army Staff College, Camberley, 
observed at the first Combined Operations staff exercise in 1919 that all future 
operations would have to take account of all three of the services.86 This view was 
supported by the Mitchell Report on the Dardanelles campaign and by Major General Sir 
George Aston, a leading amphibious expert of the time, who considered air power’s 
impact decisive in this area.87 The experience of the Dardanelles campaign in 1915 and 
the raids along the Flanders coast in 1918 form the context to inter-war developments.88 
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Clifford has argued that Gallipoli was more than just an experience but that it formed the 
core of thinking during the inter-war years in guiding developments.89 
The Dardanelles Commission set up to examine the failure of the campaign 
overlooked the contribution of air power to the campaign as a factor to its failure.90 
However, Eric Ash has noted that the senior airman during the campaign, Colonel 
Frederick Sykes, failed to recognise the technological limits of air power.91 During the 
campaign, air power performed many of the roles familiar to First World War air power 
such as tactical reconnaissance (Tac R) and air cover.92 However, a degree of 
experimentation occurred, for example, in late 1915 interdiction raids were conducted 
against logistical centres and railheads such as Ferejik in order to dislocate the battlefield 
from in supplies.93 Most notably during the withdrawal phase, the Royal Naval Air 
Service (RNAS) was responsible for providing air cover in order to stop Turkish aircraft 
from interfering in the process. This was a significant lesson for Combined Operations 
doctrine that was important for inter-war developments.94 
By the end of the campaign, the importance of air cover in Combined 
Operations had been identified. However, during the operation many problems had 
occurred. The problem began with a fractious command relationship between Sykes and 
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Wing Commander C R Samson, a man described as uncooperative and tactless.95 Vice 
Admiral de Robeck described the relationship as having got off to a bad start due to ‘an 
unfortunate publication’ that had criticised Sykes.96 Despite early problems, relations did 
improve although Sykes’ dealings with other naval officers remained difficult despite 
being giving the naval rank of Wing Captain. The main problem during the campaign 
was logistical. The first unit deployed, No. 3 Squadron RNAS, was a conglomeration of 
types tasked with different missions that caused logistical problems for spares.97 Added 
to this was the unsuitability of the squadrons’ base at Tenedos. The base moved to 
Imbros where a more effective logistical system emerged. At the same time the types 
used by the squadron was rationalised.98 Sykes recognised that air power had two primary 
functions during the campaign. First, was to provide intelligence and communication 
over the battlefield, second, to prevent reinforcements reaching the front. In order to 
achieve this it was accepted that air superiority was required in order to support 
operations in the region. This meant that concentration of air power was needed to fight 
for control of the air at the operational level in order to meet regional tactical objectives, 
however, the campaign ended before this realisation could have a decisive impact. This 
would be a key lesson for the future.99 
Gallipoli provided many lessons for future Combined Operations. For example, 
in planning operations along the Flanders coast in 1917 it was recognised that the 
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maintenance of air cover would be vital to success.100 This would become a key attribute 
of Combined Operation doctrine with the MCO noting that ‘The main aim of air 
strategy…is therefore to assert the superiority of our air forces over…the enemy…as to 
prohibit any sustained attack on the expedition.’101 In addition to the recognition of the 
importance of air cover to the success of Combined Operations, it was identified that a 
secure base was vital. In order to provide direct air support it was recognised that 
effective command and control, in conjunction with air cover, was required. Gallipoli 
provided the context for the development of doctrine in the inter-war years and it 
importance was noted in the RAF’s official history, which stated that ‘For the first time a 
campaign was conducted on, under and over the sea, and on and over the land.’102 
 
1.2 The Royal Air Force and the Problems of the Inter-War Years 
 
The RAF finished the First World War as the world’s first independent air force with 
strength of 293,532 officers and men and a self-confidence of its own capabilities as 
shown by its actions during the final campaigns of the war.103 Despite this early 
confidence, the RAF faced numerable problems in the early post-war years where it had 
to cope with both inter-service and financial constraints.104 In January 1919 Air Marshal 
Sir Hugh Trenchard, now Chief of the Air Staff (CAS), had the Air Ministry produce a 
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synopsis of the role that the air force had played in the First World War.105 This piece 
laid out four principles that were to form the core of RAF thinking for much of the 
inter-war period. The most important of these was the argument that central to the 
effective application of air power in the battlespace was the attainment of ‘Command of 
the Air’ or air superiority.106 
                                                
However, before Trenchard could forge a future for the newly formed RAF he 
first had to defend it from budgetary constraints that were placed upon each of the 
services in the early post-war years. The RAF’s budget fell from £52.5 million in 1920 to 
£9.4 million in 1923, a drop of some eighty-three percent, and in the same period it saw 
its strength drop to some 27,000 officers and men and just twenty-five squadrons.107 
Each of the services had to contend with a smaller pot of money and deal with the 
Treasury’s imposition of the ten-year rule as a basis for military spending that caused 
serious issues for the planners of each the services.108 The rule also did not help the 
already prevalent hostility that existed between the newborn RAF and the older branches 
of the military. Both the Army and RN argued that they should have control of their own 
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air assets and for much of the inter-war period both branches made concerted efforts to 
bring their assets back into their respective folds.109  
Alongside budgetary figures, it is useful to examine the expenditure of the various 
services in this period, table 1.1 shows that RAF expenditure on armaments and various 
war stores compared favourably with the army but not so well in comparison to the RN 
and its capital ship building programme.  
Chart 1.1 - Expenditure on Armaments and Warlike Stores, 1923 - 1933 
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(Source: David Edgerton, Warfare State: Britain, 1920 – 1970 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2006) table 1.1, p. 22 and M Postan, British War Production (London: HMSO, 1952) table 1, p. 2). 
 
David Edgerton has suggested that the fall in overall naval expenditure and in the naval-
industrial complex was because of the rise of a new military-industrial complex, the aero 
industry and its major recipient, the RAF, a service that Edgerton describes as a 
‘procurement intensive force.’110 For example, in 1923 the RAF’s expenditure on 
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airframes equalled fifty-two percent of its annual budget.111 This expenditure helped 
finance a growing aircraft industry in Britain. However, despite the growing expenditure 
of the RAF it did not overtake the overall budget of the Army until 1937 and the Navy in 
1938, a period when the British government became more reliant on the promise of air 
power.112 Edgerton notes that in the inter-war period, the RAF re-equipped itself several 
times with new airframes and that by the early 1930s RAF expenditure on airframes 
exceeded the RN’s spending on capital ships.113 Despite providing an apparent picture of 
a service able to spend freely on new aircraft, the figures do not take into account the 
pace of technological change in aircraft design during the inter-war years and the 
constantly changing operational requirements of the RAF, which forced it to spend such 
a high proportion of the its budget on airframes.114 For example, in terms of engine 
horsepower, output increased from around 225 hp in 1918 to 500 hp in the early 1930’s 
and then finally to a figure in excess of 1,000 hp in the RAF latest monoplane fighters, 
the Hawker Hurricane and the Supermarine Spitfire.115 Thus, there was a service dealing 
with financial constraints and, as described below, ever-changing operational 
requirements parallel to technological change. 
The issue of perception was to trouble the RAF throughout the inter-war years as 
well as in much of the post war historiography. In reality, Trenchard’s and the RAF’s 
perceived infatuation with strategic bombing provided the backdrop for many of the 
discussions that took place on tactical matters during the period. Williamson Murray has 
gone so far as to suggest that ‘senior [RAF] air leaders held fast to Trenchard’s 
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ideological belief in the bomber. This approach rejected co-operation with the other 
services.’116 John Terraine has supported this view by echoing similar sentiments noting 
that: 
It may be said, without straining verity, that bombing was what the RAF was all 
about…It is chiefly for that reason…that cooperating with the army and navy went right 
out of fashion between the wars.117  
 
These interpretations are not helped by the elucidation of serving RAF officers. Marshal 
of the Royal Air Force Sir John Slessor wrote in his memoirs, The Central Blue, that ‘Our 
belief in the bomber, in fact, was intuitive – a matter of faith.’118 Many historians down 
the years have echoed this comment and it has produced what Tami Davis Biddle has 
described as the ‘Seeds of later troubles.’119 Air Commodore Philip Joubert de la Ferte, 
Commandant at Andover, in a debate on war aims at a staff exercise at the Wessex 
Bombing Area Headquarters of the Air Defence Great Britain in 1933, noted that there 
were five main misconceptions about the RAF and he argued that these needed to be 
rectified. Key was: 
4. that the RAF will not direct its effort to what the other services argue should be the 
common aim: the attack on the enemy armed forces 
5. that the RAF is advocating a form of military action that no,…government will…put 
into effect…120 
 
He was willing to confess that the RAF may have been to blame for this but it does 
highlight the lack of understanding between the services that characterised this period.121 
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However, this interpretation does not give the RAF and its leaders their due as 
there is evidence that they attempted to think about the nature of war and how air power 
could be applied to warfare. A considerable amount of time was placed upon thinking 
about how the RAF could apply air power to other facets of warfare. Slessor, while 
serving on the staff of the Army Staff College, Camberley, spent time writing on the 
inter-relationship between air and land power and this eventual found its way into written 
form in his treatise Air Power and Armies.122 Slessor earned a well-deserved reputation as a 
tactical expert at Camberley as the RAF instructor, primarily because the previous holder 
of his position had not been able to discuss the broader aspects of air power and 
Trenchard had promised the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS), Field Marshal 
Sir George Milne a more capable officer.123 Previously Slessor had been tasked to re-
write the RAF’s manual on co-operation with land forces. His work was forward-
thinking for the time, for example, in thinking about how to isolate enemy forces on the 
battlefield he concluded that a ‘carefully organized attack on the enemy system of supply’ 
would produced positive results as this is where they are ‘vulnerable’ especially if the 
enemy is a highly organised force.124 Slessor was not the only officer to make arguments 
for the use of air power in support of the other services. Much important work appeared 
in the pages of the Journal of the Royal United Services Institute in the inter-war period; for 
example, Leigh-Mallory spent considerable time writing about the relationship between 
the services and in particular, the importance of air superiority over the battlefield, his 
work advocated that this was key in any operation.125  
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Apart from the issues of financial constraints and perception, the RAF faced 
another problem in the inter-war years, operational priorities. The RAF, in line with all 
the services, had less money to spend and it had to decide how to spend that money in 
the face of ongoing operations. Slessor in a 1931 essay on the development of the RAF 
outlined the key roles that the RAF had been called on to perform since its formation in 
1918.126 He outlined several key developments that he saw as vitally important to the 
RAF. Notable amongst these were the relations with the navy and army, home defence, 
imperial air reserves, the Fleet Air Arm (FAA), army co-operation squadrons and 
regional control.127 The latter development, otherwise referred to as air policing, was an 
important role for the RAF’s role in the period.128 It emerged in the wake of the 
budgetary constraints of the early post-war years as an attempt to provide an alternative 
and cheaper option to the issue of imperial policing. The best example of this policy were 
the actions of the RAF in Iraq between 1922 and 1925 when Trenchard formulated a 
plan for controlling a rebellion that had broken out in the aftermath of the First World 
War. The plan was a success in both operational and financial terms as the policy 
eventually restored control to Iraq and did it with considerably less expense than 
previous attempts. By 1923, expenditure had reduced to £7.81 million from a figure of 
£23.36 million in 1921 and by 1927; this figure had shrunk even further to £3.9 
million.129 The success of operations in Iraq led to the use of aerial policing in other areas 
                                                                                                                                            
Superiority in a Land Campaign’ Royal Air Force Air Power Review, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Spring 2003) pp. 152-159 
(Reprinted from the Royal Air Force Quarterly, Vol. 2, No. 2 (April 1931) pp. 245–52). 
126 John C Slessor, ‘The Development of the Royal Air Force’ Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, 
Vol. 76 (Feb/Nov: 1931) pp. 324-334 
127 Slessor, ‘The Development of the Royal Air Force’ passim 
128 For the best treatment of the policy of aerial policing see; David Omissi, Air Power and Colonial Control: 
The RAF, 1919-1939 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990) .  
129 Buckley, Air Power, p. 103. 
 43
of the Empire and many future high-ranking RAF officers of the Second World War 
would spend their early careers serving in the imperial policing role within the empire.130 
The RAF also had to deal with the gradually changing geo-strategic situation in 
Europe. For example, in the mid-twenties, in a period of deteriorating relations with 
France, the RAF had to deal with the potential threat of what has been described as the 
French air menace.131 This, coupled with the emergence of the threat of Germany in the 
1930s, led to the materialisation of a distinct home fighter force based around the 
concept of strategic air defence. This force had its origins in the Home Defence Air 
Force of 1923 with a projected strength of fifty-two squadrons, which would eventually 
emerge as Fighter Command.132 Fighter Command would eventually take on the role of 
the defence of the United Kingdom and deploy a sophisticated command and control 
network that would come to fruition by 1940. Changing relations in Europe also led to a 
considerable degree of reorganisation for the RAF in the late 1930s. The need to expand 
and re-arm in this period led to the formation of four functional commands in 1936: 
Fighter, Bomber, Coastal and Training Command, and the introduction of modern 
aircraft.133 
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As well as major operational issues such as rearmament and preparation for war, 
the service also had other issues to deal with. For example, the formation of the RAF in 
1918 had left the service in command of naval aviation and this led to the need for 
effective relations with the navy who had command of the aircraft carriers. However, this 
co-operation was not always friendly and became a contentious issue in 1923 when the 
RN began to fight for the return of the FAA.134 Had the RN been successful in this 
respect it could well have led to the return of army co-operation squadrons to the 
army.135 Despite these inter-service rivalries, the RAF did attempt to think about the 
issue of co-operation as exemplified by Slessor’s Air Power and Armies.136 Eventually the 
issue of control of the FAA was solved in 1937 when its operational control was handed 
over to the Admiralty when Coastal Command was formed. Despite operational and 
strategic considerations, discussion did occur on various issues such as maritime aviation 
and direct air support, though at times their development was patchy because of issues 
already discussed.137  
Thus, in the inter-war years the RAF faced major issues surrounding the problem 
of perceptions (contemporary and historical), and financial and operational dilemmas. 
While the financial problems were not insurmountable, despite constantly changing 
technological and operational factors, the major problem facing the RAF was its 
operational conditions. For a service that in its early years struggled for survival it 
eventual developed into a service with many varied roles, which while not all receiving 
                                                 
134 On the development of naval air power in the inter-war period see Philip Weir, ‘The Development of 
Naval Air Warfare by the Royal Navy and Fleet Air Arm between the Two World Wars’ PhD Thesis 
(University of Exeter, 2006). 
135 Anon, A Short History of the Royal Air Force, p. 59. 
136 Slessor, Air Power and Armies, passim. 
137 On the problems and discussion surrounding the role of maritime aviation see; John Buckley, The RAF 
and Trade Defence, 1919-45: Constant Endeavour (Keele: Keele University Press, 1995) passim; Christina 
Goulter, A Forgotten Offensive: Royal Air Force Coastal Command’s Anti-Shipping Campaign, 1939-1945 (London: 
Frank Cass, 1995) esp. Chap. 1-3; Hall, Strategy for Victory, passim. 
 45
the same priorities, did push it in many varied directions. It is within this context the 
RAF’s involvement with the Combined Operations doctrine should be understood. A 
major development for the RAF in developing its operational thinking was the 
emergence of the Staff College and the role its officers played in both the RAF’s 
institution and the other services establishments especially within the realms of 
Combined Operations. 
 
1.3 The Role of the Staff Colleges and Combined Operations Exercises 
 
Trenchard was aware of the lack of tradition that the RAF faced when compare to the 
Army and RN. In order to rectify this position Trenchard made strident efforts to make 
the RAF as professional as possible with an effective theoretical and technical 
underpinning. To this end, plans emerged in the autumn of 1919 for the formation of a 
Staff College at Andover as a ‘School of Thought’ for the service, although it did not 
come to fruition until 1922.138 Once Andover opened, however, it was to become 
important in helping the RAF develop and evaluate its doctrine. Slessor, who attended its 
third course in 1924, noted that under the tutelage of Air Commodore Sir Robert 
Brooke-Popham ‘we had to feel our way towards a doctrine of air warfare…based on the 
supremacy of the air offensive.’139 The RAF’s strategic doctrine, AP1300, was developed 
and discussed at the College, thus, it played a vitally important role in the development of 
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the service.140 Until the creation of Andover, officers still attended Camberley and the 
RN Staff College, Greenwich. Some would continue to serve on their staffs up until the 
Second World War, notably both Slessor and Leigh-Mallory served on the Staff at 
Camberley. Within the scope of Combined Operations, this is an important factor to 
note, as the RAF was keen for its officers to learn what they could from each service. 
Thus, all of the Staff Colleges became important think tanks for Combined Operations. 
The Staff Colleges were also vitally important in providing the theoretical and practical 
basis for the writing of the MCO as each spent a month of their courses dealing with 
issues surrounding the problems of inter-service cooperation. This then culminated in a 
week’s staff exercise at Camberley.141 
As already seen the Commandant of Camberley noted the importance of air 
power after the combined staff exercise between the Army and RN at Camberley in 
November 1919. The purpose of this exercise and subsequent similar ventures was to 
analyse the need to revise the current doctrine that had came into existence in 1912. 
Anderson claimed that after studying the Combined Operations of the First World War 
the impact of air power could not be ignored.142 He argued that in its present form the 
doctrine was out of date and in dire need of revision to take account of the RAF. He 
argued that any new manual, which was due for revision, needed to take note of the 
‘views and requirements’ of the RAF who ‘must of course be included in it.’143 Anderson 
went on to note that Chapter III of the Manual, which dealt with plans for Combined 
Operations, required considerable revision.144 Anderson’s two primary concerns with the 
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current system then in place were, first, that there was no effective system in place with 
which to train personnel from the services with the skills to oversee effective planning 
for Combined Operations. Second, that as it stood staff for Combined Operations were 
only drawn from the two senior services. For Anderson this situation was unacceptable 
as putting together disparate officers from then disparate services he noted did not create 
‘a combined staff’ that could ensure ‘sufficiently close co-operation.’145 He also argued 
that this situation was further exacerbated by the lack of inclusion of RAF officers. He 
suggested that in order to solve these pertinent problems and bridge the gap between the 
services a dedicated group of officers from each service should come together in order to 
study and solve the problems that faced the military within the context of Combined 
Operations. This would eventually come about with the formation of the Inter-Service 
Training and Development Centre in 1936.146 
These views were echoed by Anderson’s successor at Camberley, Major General 
Edmund Ironside, who conducted a staff exercise in 1922 to examine the problem of 
defending Singapore from an assault by the Japanese Empire.147 It should be noted that 
for much of the inter-war period discussions surrounding Combined Operations and 
their conduct often reflected the imposition of the ‘Singapore Strategy’ in the Far East 
and how limited Empire forces would deal with this threat.148 Singapore was to become a 
contentious and long-running issue between the RAF and RN. For example, in 1928 the 
Air Staff drafted a paper that claimed that Japanese forces would not be able to reach 
Singapore in order to undertake any sustained bombardment of the base area, thus, 
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precluding the need for major naval forces in the area.149 Thus, while this thesis deals 
with the use of air power in support of offensive Combined Operations its use in 
preventing them was much discussed with similar principles of the efficacy of air 
superiority being noted. In the staff exercises that were conducted, the defending forces 
of the RAF amounted to one squadron of aeroplanes and one of flying boats. It was 
assumed for the purpose of the exercise that two squadrons from India would reinforce 
these forces within twenty-two days of war breaking out.150 It was assumed that forces 
defending Singapore would be facing the power projection of the Imperial Japanese 
Navy (IJN) and it two aircraft carriers the ANAGI, AKAGI, and their complement of 
approximately 100 aircraft.151 It was argued that with the use of these forces, the IJN 
would achieve air superiority and the report goes on to note the problems this would 
cause for the reinforcement and defence of Singapore.152 The report suggested that 
because of Japanese air superiority it would not be possible to reinforce Singapore with 
the troops available in India.153 As a solution to the problem of contesting Japanese air 
superiority, the report suggested that sufficient aircraft be based on Singapore Island in 
order to achieve this objective. However, the main consideration for the army was that 
these air bases be free from ‘a “coup de main” operation by the civil population or to sea 
bombardment.’154 For the army this meant dispersion, something that was an anathema 
to the RAF who considered concentration of force at the decisive point as key for 
gaining air superiority. Despite this, the report did concede the importance of air 
superiority in the defence of the island in order to defeat the Japanese intention to assault 
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Singapore. To this end, the report suggested that four squadrons, fifty-five aircraft, 
operate out of Singapore. There is, however, no discussion of the application of air 
power and the force suggested was of mixed types with not enough recognition of the 
importance of fighters to achieve air superiority with only one of the squadrons being of 
‘Fighter Reconnaissance’ types.155 
The importance of staff exercises was to continue during the 1920s, and in 1929 
at Camberley, a Combined Operations Exercise was convened to explore the problems 
facing an expedition sent to the Baltic in order to intervene if needed.  As with all such 
exercises of the period it was a joint effort by the three Colleges with Directing Staff 
producing appreciations of the exercise. In the case of the RAF, the Directing Staff in 
charge of the air appreciation was Air Commodore Ludlow-Hewitt, Group Captain 
Barrett and Major Lock, an army officer.156 In the appreciation, they pointed out that the 
key roles that the RAF may provide in attaining the combined aim was: 
(a) By delaying the Russian concentration of troops and aircraft 
(b) By gaining and maintaining air superiority at the point of landing157 
 
Thus, the RAF saw as its role at this time as one of battlefield aerial interdiction and 
providing local air superiority. This view was in line with contemporary thinking on the 
use of air power on the battlefield and based upon ideas in the 1925 edition of the 
Manual of Combined Naval, Military and Air Force Operations.158 The Directing Staff 
concluded that of the two overriding consideration the second, the attainment of air 
superiority, was of paramount importance as without the latter the former could not be 
successful.159 Having decided the primary aim of the RAF in support of the 
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expeditionary forces the appreciation then went into detail some of the problems that 
would face the RAF in the operation. The key problem foreseen was the calculation of 
Russian (sic) air strength in the region and the problems this could cause to the British 
fleet.160 It assumed that the Russians could reinforce defending forces with up to one 
hundred and thirty-one aircraft in order to challenge the aim of achieving air 
superiority.161 Thus, three methods were discussed as a means of reducing enemy air 
strength: first, preliminary air operations; second, by diversion; finally, by an attack on 
the Polish front. The first possibility was not considered practical because of the lack of 
Russian air units in the region and the fact that it would require the establishment of an 
advanced air base and a week of air operations before the main attack, therefore, 
denuding the attacking forces of their main advantage; surprise, an issue noted in the 
planning for JUBILEE. It also argued that it would also give them the opportunity to 
reinforce the region, and therefore contest air superiority.162 As to the other two 
possibilities, both were considered too unwieldy to be effective and it was concluded that 
the RAF ‘should be prepared to meet Russian air forces’ in order to defend the 
expedition.163 Another issue for the Directing Staff to deal with was the problem of 
deploying the necessary forces in support of the operation. This was exacerbated by the 
lack of airfields and, thus, the use of floatplanes was discussed.164 This would continue to 
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be a technological and theoretical dead end that both the RAF and RN pursued in the 
inter-war years and up to the Norwegian campaign.165 
                                                
Into the 1930s Combined Operations remained an important form of exercise  at 
Andover and as Air Vice-Marshal Peirse noted to a meeting of the Deputy Chief of Staff 
Committee in 1938 the ‘Staff Colleges now spend over a month every year – in our case 
one-eighth of the whole course’ examining Combined Operations.166 Clifford has argued 
that Peirse felt that too much time was being spent on the subject and that he was 
unwilling to extend the scope of study on amphibious warfare at Andover. While this 
might appear to paint the RAF in an unfavourable light, it fails to comprehend the scope 
of study already undertaken by the Staff College into the nature and application of air 
power in war.167 Alongside the various staff exercises time was spent lecturing on the 
nature of Combined Operations during the month given over to this form of operation 
on the RAF Staff Course. For example, during the 15th Staff Course at Andover 
discussion took place on the importance of providing air support for Combined 
Operations. During a lecture on The Army in Combined Operations on 3 November 1937, 
one of the students, Squadron Leader Sharp, raised the issue of air attack and asked why 
this had not be mentioned.168 Lieutenant Colonel Collingwood responded by noting that 
the army would want to defend itself from this threat by the use of AA guns and that 
protection of the force until the army had established itself in the bridgehead was the 
responsibility of the RN.169 Collingwood, thus, did not comprehend the role that the 
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RAF could play in defending the attacking forces from air attack. During the same 
course, Commander J W Cuthbert delivered a lecture on The Naval Aspect of Combined 
Operations and in this lecture; Cuthbert discussed some of the issues of providing air 
support from aircraft carriers.170 Aircraft Carriers and their use in Combined Operations 
had been one of the key issues during the inter-war years. The key reason for this was 
that many of the exercises and planning for Combined Operations had surrounded 
operations that were outside of the range of land-based air power as the Navy were 
planning against the possibility of an amphibious campaign against Japan, though air 
superiority was viewed as important in carrier-based operations.171 Wing Commander 
Musgrove-Whitham again brought up the issue of aircraft and their potential effect. 
Much of Cuthbert’s lecture had been a comparison between the landings at Cape Helles 
at the start of Gallipoli and the situation as it stood in 1937. Cuthbert’s reply to 
Musgrove-Whitham noted that now the Army and RN now had to accept the help of the 
RAF. He noted that at Cape Helles in 1915 the problem of submarines during the 
landings had led to the need for heightened protection and that had better aircraft 
defence been available this would have helped the situation.172 During the discussion 
period, Wing Commander Lohitham noted the importance of both ‘mastery of the sea 
and air’ and that without these prerequisites, the army’s aspect would not be possible and 
Cuthbert agreed that there was the importance of ‘priority of tasks.’173 As well as the 
importance of air superiority, the issue of command and control was raised and Cuthbert 
noted that this had been a major source of contention for the services. Cuthbert noted 
that experience had been garnered during the 1934 Combined Operations exercise in 
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Yorkshire that had been designed primarily to test out the system of command and 
control in Combined Operations and that its findings were to be integrated into future 
doctrine.174 He also noted that the findings had led to the formation of a Combined 
Signals Board in order to examine the problem of effective communication. Again the 
issue of communication from ships to aircraft was noted as one the concerns that needed 
to be dealt with; indeed problem here would still be a concern in 1942.175  
During the 16th Staff Course at the RAF Staff College Group-Captain Ronald 
Graham delivered a lecture on the Introduction to Combined Operations. This lecture, 
delivered after the draft copy of the 1938 MCO had been approved for publication, 
sought to outline some of the key developments that had taken place in Combined 
Operations.176 Graham drew out the importance of the Staff Colleges and their role in 
improving and refining the manual and that the improvements made to the 1938 manual 
was due to their input.177 He also noted that the new manual would be more 
comprehensive in scope than previous manuals as had been advocated by Air Vice-
Marshal Higgins as early as 1922.178 For the RAF the reasoning for this had been that the 
application of air power in all Combined Operations was the same as they sought to use 
the strategic application of air power to affect operational and tactical outcomes. 
However, Graham admitted that the addition of air power had complicated the problems 
of Combined Operations.179 The Air Ministry and the RAF have been criticised for 
arguing that opposed landings, the main scope of this study, were not possible in the face 
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of strong aerial opposition.180 While in some quarters this may be true, overall this point 
is debatable and Graham argued that, it is was worth studying the problems of opposed 
amphibious landings and ‘we should not allow the question of air opposition to obscure 
the value of the exercise.’181 Much of the lecture concentrated on the issue of command 
in such operations and Graham took great pains to explain the advantages and 
disadvantages of the various methods for a joint operation.182  
Graham, as one the RAF’s leading authorities on Combined Operations, was 
required to deliver lectures at Camberley on the subject of Aircraft in Seaborne Expeditions 
and Landings on Hostile Shores during the preparation for the 1938 Combined Operations 
exercise.183 Graham would go on to chair an inter-service committee that in 1943 would 
examine the issue of bombardment in support of Combined Operations. It is useful to 
examine this lecture for two important reasons. First, Graham was, as already stated, one 
the service’s leading lights in Combined Operations doctrine; and second, it encapsulated 
the service’s view of Combined Operations on the eve of war in Europe. The main 
theme of the lecture stressed the importance of air superiority over the battlespace in 
order to achieve the combined strategic aim of the operation in question. Graham did, 
however, despite his previous contentions on the subject; note that the advantage lay 
with the defender and that this was especially true in the realms of air power.184 
However, this apparent reversal of opinion is not as strange, as it may seem. Air power 
theorists of the inter-war years were keen to stress the importance of command of the 
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air, be it with either bombers or fighters, though most importantly using offensive air 
power. By the last years of the 1930s, the importance of command of the air was 
especially important for the RAF who had been spending significant sums of money 
developing an integrated command and control system in order to defend Britain.185 To 
stress the weakness of air power in defence would have been at variance with the 
prevalent thinking of the time. However, Graham did not claim, as Massam has, that 
achieving command of the air through offensive action over the landing area is 
impossible.186 In his conclusion, he noted that the key role of air power is to see to the 
‘destruction or neutralisation of the defender’s air forces’, thus achieving air 
superiority.187 Graham noted the conditions under which aerial action in order to gain air 
superiority should be undertaken for fear of losing surprise in the operation. He noted 
three key factors that would, in his view limit the success of air action, first, the extent to 
which enemy forces could be neutralised, second, the value of strategic surprise and 
finally, the extent to which that surprise could be sacrificed in order to achieve air 
superiority.188 Thus, it appears that Graham was willing to accept that during such 
operations air superiority, while from the RAF’s point of view desirable, would not 
always be possible and that air action would have to take place under the strain of enemy 
air actio
doctrine. Among the most notable of these were the 1928 exercise in the Moray Firth, 
                                                
n. This actually occurred during JUBILEE. 
Alongside the debates and staff exercises conducted at the three staff colleges the 
students and directing staff were involved in the conduct of practical exercises to test 
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the 1935 exercise in the Malta Command and, finally, the 1937 exercise in Singapore.189 
The Moray Firth exercise dealt with the very real problem for the RAF of naval-air co-
operation and the problems that posed for the RAF. It categorised the main support 
operations into reconnaissance and bombing operations with no mention of counter air 
operations in order to achieve air superiority.190 The reason for this was the question of 
how to provide fighter support when no effective force existed; the carrier used in this 
operation was HMS Furious, a ship of limited tactical value. This problem was to persist 
until the Norway campaign in 1940. For many the solution was the utilisation of 
floatplane fighters.191 For example, the use of floatplanes was recommended although 
extracts dealing with the 1927 Baltic exercise did note that practical problems were 
significant and refuelling and effective re-armament handicapped them.192 Primarily, the 
use of seaplanes had arisen because of the RN’s concern over its aircraft carriers when 
the RAF could not supply land-based air cover. As early as 1923 the RAF had argued 
that air cover be provided from carriers until bases could be established ashore.193 
However, the Admiralty held its views on the application of air power in Combined 
Operation with a degree of intransigence and did not wish to see its carriers brought into 
the range of an enemy’s fleet and possibly lost.194 Due to this position, the RAF Staff 
College suggested the design of aircraft able to operate with or with out floats and based 
improvements on experience gained in the period 1928 to 1931.195 However, as noted 
earlier this was a technological dead end. In both 1935 and 1937, exercises took place in 
                                                 
189 TNA, ADM 203/89, Combined Naval and Military landing operation, Moray Firth, 11-12 June 1928; 
AIR 2/1679, Malta Command Combined Operations, 1935; AIR 2/1886, Singapore Combined Exercise, 
January 1937. 
190 TNA, ADM 203/89, Moray Firth, 11-12 June 1928, passim. 
191 Massam, ‘British Maritime Strategy’ p. 286. 
192 TNA, AIR 9/1, File 10, p. 1. 
193 TNA, AIR 2/1061, Minute 31, Steele to Air Commodore T C R Higgins, DTSD, 6 December 1923. 
194 TNA, AIR 2/1061, Draft Minutes of the 4th Meeting of CCSDCO, 11 October 1923. 
195 TNA, AIR 9/1, File 10, passim. 
 57
Malta and Singapore in order to test their defences from possible assaults.196 In order to 
denude Malta of the ability to interfere with the assaulting force air raids were planned to 
destroy any aircraft on the ground.197 It was noted that the efficacy of surprise knocked 
out defences on Malta with only a few aircraft picked up by the island’s AA defences and 
that this allowed the attacking forces to gain air superiority.198 The Singapore exercise 
sought to test the applicability of reinforcing the island when facing an attack by Japanese 
forces.199 During the course of both of these exercises, the problem of gaining and 
maintaining air superiority through various means was explored and it was recognised 
that these conditions were of importance to the success of either the attacking or 
defending forces during a Combined Operation. Thus, using the Staff Colleges and the 
various Combined Operations exercises the theory and practice of the use of air power 
on the outcome of Combined Operations was explored. 
  
1.4 The Royal Air Force and the Manual of Combined Operations 
 
While the Staff Colleges and the various Combined Operation exercises of the inter-war 
years built up a body of experience and thinking on the subject of Combined Operations 
their central importance was in shaping doctrine. The MCO went through four updates, 
first, in 1922 as a provisional manual, then again in 1925, 1931 and 1938. The various 
staff and practical exercises were designed to test the principles laid out in the manuals 
and to feedback on improvements for the manual and aid in the body of knowledge 
being provided by the Staff Colleges. These revisions were especially important in the 
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early post-war years as the 1913 Manual of Combined Naval and Military Operations was 
shown to be clearly out of date because of the experiences of the First World War. In the 
staff exercise held at Camberley in October 1919 it became clear to the students and 
Directing Staff of the limitations of the 1913 manual. The most pertinent of these was 
that the manual had been written before the effect of the air power could be properly 
ascertained.200 In fact, the staff exercise at Camberley had been convened for that very 
purpose. The recommendations of the commandants of both Camberley, Anderson, and 
the RN Staff College, Captain E E Drax, went on to form the basis of the provisional 
manual of 1922 through the mechanism of the Altham Committee.201 The Altham 
Committee, and its successor the Co-ordination Committee for Staff Duties for 
Combined Operations (CCSDCO), became responsible for the production of Combined 
Operations doctrine. These committees’ formalised much of the work then going on in 
the Staff Colleges. Thus, they became important in the formal production of the manual 
and its various updates and the Staff Colleges were there to test and recommend 
revisions to the manual.202 As Massam has noted there existed a symbiotic relationship 
between the Staff Colleges and the committee as the ‘staff colleges were the chief 
resource available’ as cost precluded regular major exercises. Therefore, the annual 
theoretical exercise hosted at Camberley was the only real alternative.203 Thus, the annual 
staff exercises provided the necessary revision to the provisional manual up until 1925. 
The Air Staff produced a series of memoranda and notes that helped to inform the role 
their staffs were to play in exercises.204 This illustrates that despite the appearance given 
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by the Air Staff, the RAF was able to consider its role outside of the confines of what it 
saw as its primary role, strategic bombing. 
In producing the provisional 1922 manual Air Vice-Marshal J F Higgins, the RAF 
representative on the Altham Committee, was tasked with producing the chapters dealing 
with air power. Higgins began with a criticism of the 1921 Combined Operations staff 
exercise at Camberley where he noted that the ‘scheme’ had shown a ‘complete 
misapprehension…as to the status of the Royal Air Force and its relations with the other 
services.’205 Higgins then went on to work on what he described as ‘Some Aspects of 
Combined Operations in so far as they affect the Royal Air Force.’206 The first, and 
possibly most important, aspect that Higgins discussed was the RAF’s view of Combined 
Operations; he took issue with the view that Combined Operations could include RAF 
units subordinate to either service. In addition, Higgins pointed out that to the RAF 
Combined Operations could, and did, include operations involving more than one of the 
services, thus, for the RAF this meant something that was outside of the scope of the 
terms of reference for the Manual as it stood.207 Therefore, what Higgins was suggesting 
was a holistic approach to the subject of Combined Operations, something akin to 
modern joint warfare. This was something that was unlikely to find favour with the RN 
who was paying for the publication of the manual. Thus, the terms of reference would 
stay firmly in the realms of assaults on an enemy shore. Higgins then sought to explain 
the relationship between the commanders involved and external commanders who may 
have an influence on the operation. Higgins was adamant on the need for co-operation 
between the commanders and the need to subordinate command to those who were the 
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predominant partner in the operation. However, it was noted that this might not be the 
case for the whole operation and that the system set up must be one that is flexible 
enough to react to the demands of the operation.208 Thus, while at sea the predominant 
partner would by the navy but in the land phase, that role would pass to the army. 
Higgins, however, stresses the point that the Air Officer Commander in Chief (AOC-in-
C) should always be an RAF officer and that while he may answer to the predominant 
partner they must be willing to co-ordinate their actions; an issue not always understood 
by the other services.209 Higgins also expounded what he saw as the primary aim of the 
air power in support of Combined Operation, namely the attainment of air superiority. 
The secondary role of the RAF was interdiction of the battlefield.210 These 
recommendations went on to form the basis of the chapters dealing with air power in the 
Manual of Combined Naval, Military and Air Operations in 1925.211 The CCSDCO, which 
superseded the Altham Committee, reaffirmed the views espoused by Higgins. The 
RAF’s member in 1923, Air Commodore Higgins, confirmed that the RAF’s primary aim 
was to achieve air superiority.212 Both the committees were inter-departmental and inter-
service and represented a plurality of ideas and acceptance of them. However, financial 
constraints limited their scope and reliance on the staff colleges.213 Distribution of the 
manual within the RAF was widespread with over four hundred copies distributed 
amongst staff division and the various commands, another two hundred and thirty were 
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kept as a war reserve, and thus, it can be assumed that these principles were widely 
read.214 The setting up of the Chiefs of Staff Committee in 1923 led to a re-evaluation of 
many of the principles of the 1925 manual and saw the publication of a new edition in 
1931.215 However, concerning the application of air power the views established by 
Higgins remained valid and constant.  
By the time that the 1938 edition of the MCO had been published, the general 
principles on the utilisation of air power initially laid out by Higgins in 1922 had become 
accepted by the other services. It became accepted by all three services the threat that air 
power could cause to any potential offensive Combined Operation and that defence 
against this threat was paramount to the success of operations and, therefore, in order to 
combat this threat any landing force must be prepared to defend itself.216 However, the 
MCO also took account of the greater role of fighter aircraft in the attainment and 
maintenance of air superiority in assaults.217 The new manual also represented a new 
change in direction for the manual, one that the RAF had long proposed, in that it now 
took account of more than one type of operation as being combined in nature. The new 
manual now considered eight types of operations as combined.218 One of the key reasons 
for this change in definition was the effect of the reports coming out of the Staff 
Colleges and in particular, the RAF Staff College, which had deliberated over the issue of 
command and control and the nature it, should take.219 This was duly considered by the 
Drafting Committee that had been formed in 1936 on the suggestion of Air Vice-
Marshal Courtney, the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff (DCAS).220 By the time the manual 
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was produced, it became accepted that the term combined meant ‘all-service 
representative’ that is encompassing each service.221 The RAF member on the Drafting 
Committee was Squadron Leader Fairweather and it was noted that the problem with the 
current manual was its narrow scope and that it either required expanding to encompass 
all forms of war or narrowing further to minor opposed landings.222 During the 
preparation of the manual consideration was given to the issue of a Headquarters Ship 
(HQS) for operations.223 However, it was noted that these vessels would be specific to 
the form of operation they were undertaking, prefiguring a debate that occurred in 1943 
over the use of HQS in long or short-range operations.224  
Due to the expansion in the scope of the MCO, the issue of command became 
contentious with both the Army and RAF viewing any war as a Combined Operation.225 
This led to the belief that other systems of command other than the previous proscribed 
joint system be considered. Eventually the manual three key systems of command as 
appropriate to Combined Operations. First, joint command with force commanders of 
equal standing, second, unified command with a combined commander and finally, 
command by one service that had the most stake in the operation.226 This would become 
a contentious area of JUBILEE and is discussed in Chapter Two.  
Thus, by the time of the publication of the MCO the key principle of air 
superiority was accepted as the main role of the RAF in Combined Operations. While 
debate did exist over the ability of Combined Operations to succeed in the face in air 
power, it was also recognised that if air superiority were achieved then it would aid in the 
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success of that operation. For example, in 1938 Peirse argued that ‘One of the greatest 
difficulties in this form of operation will be the need for establishing a favourable air 
situation.’227 Indeed Clifford admits that by 1938 air superiority was an essential 
consideration for all Combined Operations.228 This theoretical construct in line with 
developments at Fighter Command in 1940 provide the context for JUBILEE. The RAF 
also aided in pushing Combined Operations doctrine closer to joint vision that it had of 
warfare as it viewed the use of air power as a strategic weapon that aided the success of 
operations. As noted below the need for air superiority was not restricted to Combined 
Operations but was also applied to other areas of air power operations. 
 
1.5 The Royal Air Force and Air Superiority Missions 
 
This chapter has discussed the primary aim on the RAF during Combined Operations as 
being the attainment of air superiority. It is worth considering the methods used to gain 
this aim. AP3000 describes air superiority as a degree of dominance that allows the 
conduct of operations on air, land and sea free from enemy interference.229 The term air 
cover is used in an interchangeable manner with air superiority and is used when 
describing attempts to wrest air superiority, as was seen over Dieppe. The RAF’s War 
Manual also described air superiority as having a ‘moral, physical and material superiority’ 
over the enemy in order to deprive flexible actions against an operations aim.230 Thus, it 
is linked to the offensive nature of RAF doctrine and the weakening of an enemy’s 
opposition through air action.  
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Air superiority is inexorably linked to the Douhetian concept of ‘Command of 
the Air’ and Trenchard’s views of offensive air power. Early in the RAF’s history, this 
was linked to the efficacy of the bomber; however, in the face of the rise of the Luftwaffe 
and effective fighter aircraft in the late 1930s this view became more nuanced.231 Indeed 
Slessor in Air Power and Armies espoused the importance of air superiority and Air 
Marshal Sir Arthur Conningham argued its importance in the land campaign.232 
Undeniably by late 1940 Fighter Command role included offensive fighter operations as 
will be discussed in Chapter Two.233 
The nuanced view of air superiority can be viewed in the Combined Operations 
doctrine of the inter-war years. As already noted as early as 1922 air superiority was 
considered the RAF’s primary role in Combined Operations.234 However, in the various 
editions of Combined Operations doctrine various methods were noted. The 1925 
manual accepted the need for air superiority but in a period of belief in the superiority of 
the bomber, it noted various methods of achieving that aim.235 It discusses the use of 
aircraft in the destruction of enemy air forces, lines of communication, demoralisation of 
personnel and the civilian population and destruction of material.236 These missions were 
to be undertaken by bomber aircraft. The use of fighters was relegated to air cover in the 
defence of the landing area and it summarised the various duties they may be called upon 
such as defeating aircraft involved in supporting bombardment.237 In line with the 
changes mentioned above the 1938 MCO went further on the use of fighters by 
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maintaining their vital use due to the possibility of counter-air attacks by the enemy.238 
Indeed air cover became one of three methods of supporting an assault on a hostile 
shore alongside bombardment and smoke screens.239 Thus, once the offensive use of 
fighters became policy in 1940 the provision of air cover for JUBILEE and the battle for 
air superiority became inevitable linked.  
 
1.6 Conclusion 
 
While Massam has portrayed the inter-war years as one of struggle in the development of 
Combined Operations doctrine, this chapter has attempted to illustrate and contextualise 
some of the developments and discussions that occurred in the period with particular 
reference to the implications that the growth of air power brought to the subject.240 A 
cursory glance at some of the primary sources and a wider understanding of some of the 
strategic and domestic issues facing the RAF shows that despite some of the significant 
problems facing the service, most notably those of a financial nature, the RAF did take 
time to consider its role in Combined Operations. It is wrong to be too critical of a 
service, which due to its various commitments and attempts to stay independent was 
being pulled in many directions and, therefore, had few resources to spare. That it did 
consider its role in Combined Operations is to be commended and the fact that it did 
add knowledge and expertise to the doctrine of Combined Operations should be noted. 
The RAF’s key contribution to the emerging doctrine was to think about its role in both 
strategic and operational terms and show that its primary aim was to be the attainment of 
air superiority and that without that general condition Combined Operations could not 
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succeed in the modern era. That this thinking was in line with the general doctrine of the 
RAF should not be viewed critically, as the RAF and its leaders were well aware of the 
role they had to play in the country’s war effort. They also understood that for the other 
two dimensions of warfare, land and sea, to be decisive control of the third dimension, 
air, had to be mastered. Thus, this shows a service thinking about the long-range 
implications of its purpose. It is within this context the development of Combined 
Operations doctrine, and the subsequent utilisation of air power during JUBILEE must 
be understood. 
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Chapter 2 
The RAF, the Battle for Air Superiority and Planning Operation JUBILEE 
 
Chapter one examined the development of Combined Operations doctrine from the 
viewpoint of air power. It showed that the RAF during the inter-war years took the issue 
of Combined Operations seriously. While aerial bombardment may have been a matter 
of faith for the Air Staff, at an operational level the RAF’s view of air power was more 
nuanced than often assumed. The RAF, through the mechanism of the Staff College, 
worked with the other services in examining the role of air power in Combined 
Operations. It also made great pains, despite serious inter-service issues and budgetary 
constraints, to work with the other services in writing and implementing the MCO. Thus, 
by 1939 the RAF had a theoretical understanding about the use of air power in 
supporting Combined Operations backed up with limited practical experience. It had a 
doctrine that stressed the strategic use of air power in order to achieve tactical and 
operational objectives. For the RAF air superiority was its primary role in supporting 
Combined Operations. It argued that this condition was necessary for any Combined 
Operation to succeed and that in achieving air superiority over the battle area the RAF 
could then further utilise air power to support operations on the ground. 
This chapter seeks to take this doctrinal context and apply it to JUBILEE. It does 
this by first examining the application of air power in three early examples of Combined 
Operations, both successful and unsuccessful, the Norway campaign, and the evacuation 
from Dunkirk and the Battle of Britain. Each of these examples highlights some of the 
difficulties of launching Combined Operations in the face of air superiority. It will then 
discuss the RAF’s own strategic fighter offensive and how the need to gain air superiority 
over Europe fits in to the context of Combined Operations doctrine and JUBILEE. An 
understanding of these medium-term factors will help to explain why the RAF sought an 
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aerial battle over Dieppe. The chapter will then examine the training of RAF units in 
Combined Operations at the Combined Training Centre (CTC) at Acnacharry. The 
chapter will then delve into the contentious area of planning for operation 
RUTTER/JUBILEE and examine some of the key issues raised and how these problems 
were dealt with. Notable amongst these key issues is the decision to remove the use of 
pre-bombardment from the operation.  
 
2.1 The Battle for Air Superiority, 1940-1942  
 
Nineteen forty to 1942 saw the RAF battle the Luftwaffe for air superiority in numerous 
campaigns over France, the Low Countries, Norway and Britain. Each illustrates the 
necessity for air superiority in Combined Operations. Air Vice-Marshal Robb, Deputy 
Chief of Combined Operations (DCCO), noted in a 1941 lecture that the primary 
concern of air power was the need to gain air superiority.241 Robb admitted that until the 
outbreak of war the use of air power in support of Combined Operations had been 
primarily a theoretical problem, however, the experience of Dunkirk and the Norwegian 
campaign had changed this and proven that air superiority was vital.242 He noted that ‘If 
the enemy has a powerful air force, we must prevent him somehow or other from 
interfering with our landing and our lines of communications’, thus highlighting the need 
for the strong application of air power in Combined Operations.243 
The German invasion of Norway, Operation Weserübung, led to what James 
Corum describes as the first modern joint campaign where ‘mastery of the air translated 
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into mastery of the sea.’244 Long lines of communications, a constant point of discussion 
during the inter-war period, hampered British forces. This point allowed the Luftwaffe to 
build up forces rapidly when compared to the RAF. This allowed them to gain air 
superiority in theatre. This effected initial operations at Andalsnes where the Luftwaffe 
delayed the landings, as there had been no provision for air support.245 General Paget, 
the commander at Andalsnes, noted that ‘all the lessons of peacetime exercises’ had been 
forgotten as no forward air bases were established.246 The RAF attempted to find 
solutions based upon pre-war theory such as basing No. 263 Squadron on the frozen lake 
at Andalsnes, however, the unit lasted one day in the face of Luftwaffe air superiority.247 
Discussion also returned to the use of fighters fitted with floats, though the campaign 
ended before it was tested.248 Long lines of communication also hindered the problem of 
defending bases in order to provide air support. The RAF attempted an interdiction 
campaign against Luftwaffe air bases, however, problems of command and control made it 
ineffective, as there was no unified command set-up for the campaign, which led to a 
lack of co-ordination between the services.249 
The battle for air superiority remained the key role with the RN carriers HMS 
Glorious and HMS Ark Royal delivering a reformed No. 263 Squadron and No. 46 
                                                 
244 James Corum, ‘Uncharted Waters: Information in the First Modern Joint Campaign – Norway 1940’ 
Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 27, No. 2 (June 2004) p. 345. 
245 James Corum, ‘The German Campaign in Norway, 1940, as a Joint Operation’ Journal of Strategic Studies, 
Vol. 21, No. 4 (December 1998) p. 74. 
246 TNA, WO 106/1904, General Paget’s Report of Operation SICKLEFORCE Part II. 
247 Denis Richards, The Royal Air Force, 1939-1945 – Volume 1: The Fight at Odds (London: HMSO, 1953) pp. 
89-93. 
248 TNA, CAB 54/13, DCOS (IT) 13 Enclosure A: Memorandum on Landing Operations, p. 37. It is 
interesting to note that the idea of a fighter floatplane persisted until 1942 when a prototype Supermarine 
Spitfire floatplane was tested based upon the MkV airframe. Alfred Price, The Spitfire Story (London: Jane’s, 
1982) p. 195. 
249 Corum, ‘Uncharted Waters’ p. 357. 
 70
Squadron to the Narvik area.250 Here they battled the Luftwaffe and covered the allied 
withdrawal. However, losses and concentrated Luftwaffe air strength neutralised their 
effectiveness. After covering the withdrawal, RAF units withdrew to HMS Glorious.251 
Norway illustrated to the RAF the need for the concentrated use of air power in order to 
achieve air superiority over the battlespace. The campaign illustrated many of the key 
tenets discussed in pre-war doctrine and while at Narvik the RAF had managed to 
achieve a degree of air cover it failed to achieve superiority due to failures in intelligence 
and the Luftwaffe’s ability to concentrate more quickly. The RAF’s failure to concentrate 
effectively hampered the army’s ability to operate. This was a lesson soon to be 
reinforced over Dunkirk where, conversely, the RAF’s ability to concentrate forces 
would hinder German operations. 
The invasion of Western Europe in May 1940 led to a significant defeat for 
British force that was forced to evacuate. Air action is often split into three phases and 
the final phase illustrated important lessons for the use of air power.252 The period 21 
May to 17 June saw the RAF cover the army’s evacuation from Europe, in particular 
Operation DYNAMO, the withdrawal at Dunkirk. The DCCO described DYNAMO as 
a Combined Operation in reverse and the applicability and importance of air superiority 
to its success.253 Primarily Dunkirk was a fighter battle due to the Luftwaffe’s attempt to 
reduce forces in the bridgehead.254 However, due the counter air operations that the RAF 
undertook out of view of the bridgehead it earned itself the epithet the ‘Royal Absent 
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Force’.255 This misperception of air operations forced the new CIGS, General Sir John 
Dill, to inform the army the RAF was going all out to support them.256 Air Vice-Marshal 
Keith Park at No. 11 Group provided command for the air operations with fighter 
sweeps of four squadrons being provided. This was later increased to eight.257 Seventy-
five percent of the air operations over Dunkirk were fighter operations aimed at 
providing air cover for the evacuation, thus, providing much needed support for both 
the RN and army.258 However, despite the weight of support provided the Luftwaffe was 
still able to sink three RN destroyers. Charts 2.1 and 2.2 illustrate the nature and cost of 
air operations during DYNAMO. The crescendo of operations undertaken reached a 
peak during 26 May and 4 June during the most important period of the evacuation. 
Chart 2.2 illustrates the aircraft lost. It was the Supermarine Spitfires and Hawker 
Hurricanes of No. 11 Group that bore the brunt of the air battle. 
Chart 2.1 - No. 11 Group Combat Statistics
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Chart 2.2 - German Fighter Claims by Type Destroyed
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DYNAMO illustrated the importance of air cover in Combined Operations. The 
RAF’s attempt to battle for air superiority ultimately led to the Luftwaffe’s inability to 
reduce the bridgehead. However, German aircraft were still able to inflict damage when 
they got through the air cover provided. This provision of air cover aided the success of 
this Combined Operation in reverse and Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsey, who was in charge 
of DYNAMO, signaled Fighter Command on 29 May stating ‘I am most grateful for 
your splendid cooperation. It alone has given us a chance of success’.259 
The German decision to launch air operations against Britain after the Fall of 
France may not at first appear to be relevant to a study of Combined Operations. 
However, this is because the Battle of Britain has become clouded with the mythology of 
‘the few’ and the defence of Britain in 1940.260 However, it is this very defence that 
makes it relevant to this study. German plans for the future campaign against Britain had 
at its centre the decision by Hitler to plan an invasion of Britain in the aftermath of the 
campaign in France.261 This invasion, Operation Seelowe, was a planned Combined 
                                                 
259 Richards, The Fight at Odds, p. 138. 
260 See Gary Campion, The Good Fight: Battle of Britain Propaganda and the Few (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2009). 
261 In recent years, the importance of the role of Fighter Command has become a major point of 
contention with the emergence of a more nuanced view of the Battle of Britain. In particular, see the 
 73
Operation and on 16 July, Hitler issued Directive No. 16 for preparations to begin.262 
The directive ordered German forces to prepare for an invasion of Britain. However, the 
first priority in the planning process was the defeat of the RAF as a prerequisite for the 
invasion. The directive read that preparations included: 
the creation of those conditions which can make invasion possible; 
(a) The English Air Force must be beaten physically and morally to a point that they 
cannot put up any show of attacking force worth mentioning.263 
 
This highlights that the Germans considered air superiority necessary for any successful 
Combined Operation. The German High Command (OKW) had issued an earlier 
directive on 2 July with regard to planning for further operations against Britain and this 
stated that the: 
Invasion of England is quite possible under certain conditions of which the most important 
is the gaining of air superiority. For the present, therefore, the time at which it will take 
place remains an open question.264 
 
Thus, OKW were aware of the importance of air power in the success for any possible 
invasion. Vice Admiral Assman, who was involved in planning for Seelowe, reinforces this 
view in a report prepared by the RN’s Naval Intelligence Division in 1947. The report 
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based on extensive captured documents noted that air superiority was the most 
important prerequisite for a successful landing.265  
The Air Staff shared this view on the importance of maintaining air superiority. It 
issued a memorandum that states that Fighter Command’s priority was deemed the 
struggle for air superiority and that the initial phase of the battle was: 
likely to be heavy bomber and fighter attacks directed against aerodromes and aircraft 
factories…designed to destroy the fighter squadrons on the ground and to draw them in the 
air into engagements against superior numbers.266 
 
Critics of the RAF and their participation in Combined Operations have argued that in 
the late 1930s the RAF stressed that opposed landings were not possible in the face of 
concentrated air power.267 However, the Luftwaffe’s attempt to gain air superiority during 
the August and September 1940 as a precondition to invasion and the fact that they 
failed in this effort clearly shows that the Air Staff’s position on the importance of air 
superiority was the correct one. Throughout the period of the battle Air Chief-Marshal 
Sir Hugh Dowding, AOC-in-C Fighter Command, was aware of the importance of the 
role that his command was playing in the prevention of the invasion of Britain. As his 
most recent biographer has noted Dowding was aware that the task facing Fighter 
Command was simple; ‘All he had to do was avoid defeat until bad weather made 
invasion impossible in 1940.’268 This was a position that remained with Dowding 
throughout the battle. This contention was shared by the Air Staff and the then Air Vice-
Marshal Sholto Douglas, DCAS, who stated in his autobiography that ‘The Battle of 
Britain was fought against the immediate threat of a German invasion’ and that ‘Having 
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failed to smash the R.A.F. as a necessary perquisite to invasion, they embarked upon a 
war from the air.’269  
One of the key factors in the defeat of the Luftwaffe was their inability concentrate 
on a specific set of targets in order to cause attrition on Fighter Command, thus, 
whittling down its strength and attaining air superiority. For example, in the second 
phase of the battle, 8-18 August, the Luftwaffe concentrated on a target set that included 
airfields and radar stations. The purpose of these attacks had been to neutralise airfields 
and defences in the area of a likely invasion.270 However, poor planning and the inability 
to overcome the RAF’s integrated command and control system eventually led to a 
change of tactics for the Luftwaffe. The decision to shift target sets during the fourth 
phase of the battle, 7-30 September 1940, marked an important turning point in the 
battle for air superiority in terms of the German attempt at invasion. The inability of the 
Luftwaffe to destroy the RAF’s fighter force allowed it to contest air superiority and 
prevent invasion. The Battle of Britain highlights the need for effective command of the 
air for any major Combined Operation to be seriously considered and launched. Hitler’s 
decision in early September 1940 to postpone Seelowe clearly illustrates that the RAF’s 
victory not only defeated the Luftwaffe but that it also led to concerns about the ability of 
the German military to launch a successful Combined Operation when their first 
prerequisite not been achieved. It illustrates that they would not launch an invasion in the 
face of concentrated air power and the impact it would have upon the operations ability 
to succeed. 
Having achieved victory Fighter Command now faced a two-fold mission, first, it 
was required to defend British cities during the Blitz of 1940 and 1941 and, second, it 
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was now required to take the offensive against the Luftwaffe over occupied territory. It is 
this second mission that is important to this thesis as it illustrates the importance of the 
battle for air superiority in the west. As early as 21 October 1940 Park received orders to 
take the offensive when weather and enemy activity warranted it.271 This policy became 
more prominent once Douglas took over at Fighter Command and Leigh-Mallory 
replaced Park at No. 11 Group in late 1940 when they adopted a strategy of ‘leaning 
forward into France.’272 During the course of 1941 and 1942, Fighter Command would 
launch a variety of offensive operations over Northern Europe, initially consisting of 
RHUBARB and CIRCUS operations. These were offensive fighter sweeps either with or 
without bombers. However, by the end of 1941 a variety of missions emerged with the 
singular purpose of bringing the Luftwaffe to battle, notably RODEO and RAMROD 
missions.273 At an operational level, these operations had as their aim the destruction of 
enemy targets on the ground, sea and air.274 Also from June 1941, they had a political aim 
of drawing German forces away from the Eastern Front.275 Until June 1941 many of the 
operation were taken at opportune moments, however, their political importance saw an 
increase in their use from June onwards. Despite this, factors outside of Douglas’ control 
saw their utilisation vary during 1941, for example, by October, the number and scale of 
operations were cut back due to the short days, and varying weather conditions.276 There 
has been controversy over the effectiveness of the operations in drawing down Luftwaffe 
fighter strength. For example, the Air Historical Branch (AHB) narrative is forced to 
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admit that the planned impact was not realised.277 However, while there is a degree of 
truth to this assertion it must be understood that by the time the daytime threat to Britain 
had been dealt with, there was a need to find a new role for Fighter Command. Another 
factor that caused problems for Fighter Command was the fact that it had been formed 
around the concept of aerial defence and by its very nature the primary equipment of the 
command were short-range aircraft, which caused operational difficulties.  
During 1942, operations continued with the same aims as in 1941. However, 
because of the wastage in Fighter Command, Douglas’ operational policy was amended 
twice in light of lessons being learnt. On 13 March, Douglas was ordered to resume 
CIRCUS operations and supplement these with fighter sweeps in order to draw down 
Luftwaffe strength, though he was to conserve strength where possible.278 This was a 
seemingly contradictory order. Therefore, to deal with the issue of wastage, Leigh-
Mallory received amended instructions on 13 April that ordered his operations: 
(a) To pick targets right on the coast, and not try to penetrate. 
(b) To carry out a proportion of…operations without bombers at all, since the Hun [was] 
apparently ready to react even though no bombers [were] present. 
(c) To employ large numbers of squadrons with a view to out-numbering the Hun.279 
 
These revised orders help to contextualise the nature of the force used at Dieppe. For 
example, the force disposition utilised fits these orders as, firstly, Dieppe is on the coast, 
second, few bombers were used except for smoke laying and close support operations, 
finally, the largest numbers of squadrons assembled since 1940 were used. With these 
revised orders, the Air Ministry hoped to draw down German strength by as much as 
two hundred airframes per month.280 This was found wanting and by June Fighter 
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Command’s operational policy was yet again amended in light of increasing casualties.281 
This change was caused primarily because of the introduction of the Focke-Wulf FW190 
into Luftwaffe units, which was qualitatively superior to Fighter Command’s primary 
aircraft, the Spitfire MkV. This situation would only be solved with the introduction of 
the Spitfire MkIX during the latter part of 1942. Thus, the fighter operations of 1941 and 
1942 have drawn criticism, principally for not inflicting as many casualties as had been 
supposed. Even during the course of the operations, discussions took place as to the best 
method of conducting the missions. For example, in March 1941 there was an exchange 
of views between Douglas and his Senior Air Staff Officer (SASO), Air Commodore Sir 
Douglas Evill. Evill contended that the CIRCUS operations at the time were ineffective 
and needed to be curtailed or stopped until a new method was found for their 
employment.282 However, Douglas argued that a curtailment of operations would not be 
advantageous, though he did agree that there was need for further training.283 However, 
while the offensive provided Fighter Command with the opportunity to ‘lean forward 
into France’, by mid-1942, it had been virtual stalemated thanks to the tactical advantage 
enjoyed by the Luftwaffe. It does, however, illustrate the importance of air superiority to 
the RAF and that the orders issued to Leigh-Mallory on 13 April, when viewed in 
conjunction with an appreciation of Combined Operation doctrine, provide the 
operational context for No. 11 Group’s operations over Dieppe. 
The period, 1940 to 1942, saw Fighter Command involved in a series of 
operations that have been viewed in isolation and from a specific service perspective, for 
example, the Battle of Britain has often been viewed purely from the viewpoint of 
Fighter Command. However, an understanding of Combined Operations doctrine, in 
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particular air power’s importance to their outcome, these operations can be viewed in 
different light. Overall, they illustrate the importance of air superiority to the success of 
Combined Operations. For example, recent shifts in the historiography of the Battle of 
Britain, as provided by the likes of Anthony Cummings, have increasingly provided the 
historian with a more nuanced view of the battle. An awareness of the possible roles of 
the both the RN and Army in any potential German Combined Operation shifts our 
understanding of the importance of Fighter Command’s role by forcing historians to 
view the battle as a Combined Operation. By understanding Combined Operations 
doctrine it is no longer enough simply to regard it as a case of Fighter Command 
defeating the Luftwaffe. It shows that the wider implication denying air superiority to the 
Germans Fighter Command was to shape the nature of any possible Combined 
Operation by deny the Germans the ability to conduct it. Therefore, by viewing 
operations from the viewpoint of Combined Operations doctrine and the importance of 
air superiority the campaigns of the this period can be seen as testing the MCO, which, 
as seen in Chapter One, argued that this mission was the primary role for air power. This 
both sets the scene for JUBILEE and provides an explanation for the nature of air 
power used during JUBILEE. 
 
2.2 Training for Combined Operations 
 
Bernard Fergusson, a retired general, in his history of Combined Operations, The Watery 
Maze, described the RAF as having a nonchalant attitude towards the subject of 
Combined Operations by stating that they were inclined to take the view that ‘there was 
nothing particularly tricky in supporting an amphibious operation.’284 As has already been 
illustrated there is little evidence of this being true, however, due to the pressures of the 
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war effort the RAF did have problems in preparing units for possible Combined 
Operations. It took until November 1941 for COHQ to be provided with a permanent 
advisor on air operations; though it should be noted that until this point Combined 
Operations had been small and required minimal air support. Mountbatten wrote to Air 
Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal, CAS, requesting the posting of an officer of the rank of 
Group Captain to fill the post of Assistant Advisor on Combined Operations (Air) 
(AACO) in order to allow him to carry out his duties as Advisor on Combined 
Operations (ACO).285 Portal replied on 5 November agreeing to release Group Captain 
Willetts to serve on Mountbatten’s staff.286At the same time as this appointment, 
Mountbatten chaired the first meeting of an Inter-Service Committee that was charged 
with examining questions of training, equipment, inspection and administration for 
Combined Operation. From an air power perspective, the key conclusion of the first 
meeting of this committee was that there was a need for greater RAF participation in 
order for COHQ’s training programme to be met. In response to this meeting 
Mountbatten again wrote to Portal to request suitable officers and equipment be 
seconded to COHQ. Mountbatten stated that ‘At present we have no tested 
doctrine…for the employment of air forces in combined operations’. The key word here 
was tested, as there certainly already existed a doctrine on the use of air power Combined 
Operations as laid out in the 1938 MCO and in the RAF’s War Manual AP1300.287 He 
argued that in order to rectify the situation the only suitable solution was the posting of a 
‘competent and representative body of airmen’ to work alongside officers from the RN 
and Army.288 Mountbatten in this letter pointed out that there were some key issues that 
the RAF had not yet grappled with. These included practical matters such as the capture 
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and defence of aerodromes, which had been discussed though not yet analysed and 
competently examined. However, it was noted that the primary aim of air power, as laid 
out in pre-war doctrine, was the maintenance of air superiority. In a reply to this letter, 
Portal vigorously picked up the issue and requested that the Director of Plans (D of P) 
examine the issue forthwith.289 The decision was taken initially to appoint a senior staff 
officer, Air Commodore Walker, a signals officer and administrative officer.290 
While a nucleus staff was being set up the more pressing question of equipment 
and the role of the unit based Inverary was being raised by December 1941. The question 
of the formation of a development flight was dealt with by a meeting of relevant 
personnel on 24 December 1941.291 It was at this meeting that the decision was taking to 
form No. 1441 Combined Operations Development Flight. The unit’s remit was to act 
as an experimental establishment that was to explore aerial problems inherent to 
Combined Operations and to take part in exercises with the Commando units at 
Inverary. Initially the unit was to be equipped with Westland Lysanders but it was 
envisaged that these would be replaced as soon as possible with more suitable fighter 
types, specifically the Hawker Hurricane.292 
At the same time as the formation of No. 1441 Flight there was raised the 
question of control of air operations in any Combined Operation by Mountbatten. In a 
letter to Air Marshal Sir Richard Peck, Assistant Chief of the Air Staff (G) (ACAS (G)), 
of 7 February 1942, Mountbatten queried a directive issued to Air Commodore Fullard 
reference the appointment of force commanders for the air aspect of a Combined 
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Operation.293 Mountbatten referred to a decision taken at a meeting on 28 December 
1941 where it had been decided that until any foothold had been gained on the continent 
command of any air contingent would fall on the Air Advisor on Combined Operations 
(AACO) and then afterward it would devolve onto a force commander.294 Mountbatten 
argued that the directive to Fullard was at variance with his role and the role initially 
given to the AACO in a directive of 6 February 1942 and required clarification of the 
procedure for the appointment of a force commander from the RAF.295 The issue of 
force commanders and the role of Mountbatten’s air advisor were clarified in a memo 
from DCAS to the D of P. It stated that in the opinion of CAS the force commander 
should be the AOC-in-C of the predominant command involved in the operation and 
not the AACO; thus in JUBILEE command would devolve onto Leigh-Mallory rather 
than the AACO.296 
With the appointment of an air staff to the COHQ set-up, attention turned to the 
issue of training the appropriate RAF units in preparation for their participation in 
projected Combined Operations. A meeting planned for 9 February 1942 was arranged 
to discuss the training of RAF units in Combined Operations; however, the meeting was 
pushed back to 16 February. At the top of the agenda of this meeting was which type of 
training was to be the priority of No. 1441 Flight. These included, first, fighter support 
and control, second, smoke laying, third, close support and finally, recognition of 
ships.297 The meeting agreed that in meeting the first method of training the methods 
utilised by No. 1441 Flight should match those of Fighter Command as closely as 
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possible in order to ease interoperability for training considering that in any future 
operation they would provide the bulk of squadrons.298 Portal stated that ‘The RAF will 
make available in turn six fighter squadrons for training with the Expeditionary Force.’, 
therefore, discussions took place exploring the efficacy of rotating squadrons from 
operational commands in order to take part in training.299 Air Commodore Whitworth-
Jones, the Director of Fighter Operations (DFO), noted that up to fifteen squadrons had 
been earmarked for exercises and experiments with the then forming expeditionary force 
and that initially it would be from these squadrons that the initial training units would 
come from. He noted that there was a need for Bomber Command squadrons; in 
particularly those from No. 2 Group, to train and that, the matter was to be discussed 
with Air Chief Marshal Harris, AOC-in-C Bomber Command.300 
By the end of March the D of P, Air Marshal Dickson, had issued operational 
orders to the C-in-C’s of the functional commands involved with Combined Operations; 
Fighter, Bomber and Army Co-Operation Commands, and took up the issue of 
supplying appropriate squadrons for training vigorously. The orders, sent out under the 
aegis of DCAS, Air Vice-Marshal Bottomley, noted that it was the intention of the Air 
Ministry to ‘press forward as rapidly as possible with training and preparation for 
combined operations.’301 Douglas was instructed that the intention to train all fighter 
squadrons in army air support had now been extended to include the ‘special conditions 
of Combined Operations.’302 It was made clear to Douglas that the Air Staff were aware 
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that his command was under sever operational pressures and that the system of rotation 
being implemented in order to affect the training of units was to be worked out in 
conjunction with Mountbatten. Douglas was also ordered to aid Army Co-Operation 
Command by providing battle experience for three fighter-reconnaissance squadrons.303 
It was also made clear that RAF participation in Combined Operation fell into two 
categories: first, air cover over the area of the operation and, second, support of ground 
troops in the land phase of the battle.304 DCAS, in his minute to the Deputy DFO 
(DDFO) reference the extent of Douglas’ knowledge, makes it clear that it is his opinion 
that it is in the second category that he believes that the greatest degree of training is 
required and that if it makes training more economical and effective then a wing of six 
squadrons should be made available at any one time depending on operational 
requirements.305 
A similar operational order was issued to the AOC-in-C of Army Co-Operation 
Command.306 In response to this directive Barrett responded by noting that he had 
already earmarked three squadron, No. 225, No. 239 and No. 241, to take part in 
Combined Operations training exercises.307 However, Barratt raised the issue of the 
equipment of his squadrons and argued that the current equipment of his units was not 
appropriate for the task it was being asked to perform.308 A similar issue effected No. 
1441 Flight. Barrett believed that if this issue were not dealt with it would seriously 
impair their training. No. 239 Squadron was to take part in JUBILEE and at the time of 
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this communication, it was equipped with Curtiss Tomahawks, which Barrett deemed 
unacceptable; however, by the time of the operation it had been re-equipped with North 
American Mustang MkIAs.309 
A draft directive was prepared for Bomber Command but not issued. The draft 
letter directed Harris to provide squadrons from No. 2 Group for training particularly 
with reference to smoke laying operations.310 However, D of P sent the letter to Vice-
Chief of the Air Staff (VCAS), Air Chief Marshal Freeman, for verification due to the 
wide-ranging operations, which No. 2 Group was then undertaking, and it was felt that 
the addition of another operational requirement could cause problems.311 At this point, 
the light bombers of No. 2 Group were involved in a wide range of activities, both 
operational and training. In terms of operations, the group was involved in CIRCUS, 
Intruder and Channel Stop operations with Fighter Command.312 The key issue for 
DCAS was to avoid interference in Bomber Commands operations while meeting the 
requirements for training in Combined Operations and he directed that this be included 
in any directive to Harris.313 At the same time, the draft letter was sent to the Director of 
Bomber Operations (DBO) who was concerned that certain assurances would have to be 
given to Harris in particular with reference to the re-equipment of No. 2 Group.314 
Subsequently VCAS wrote to Harris directing him to provide squadrons for training but 
noting that this activity should not influence operations unnecessarily.315 Freeman’s letter, 
and a letter sent on 15 April by Air Commodore Lewis-Roberts, the Director of 
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Operation Training (D of T), who outlined the RAF’s training policy with regards to 
Combined Operations, received a swift reply from Harris who was characteristic in his 
forthright delivery of his opinion on the plans to provide squadrons for operations that 
he described as a ‘hypothetical operation.’316 The training policy outlined that Bomber 
Command must train four light bomber squadrons in Combined Operations and that in 
particular they must familiarise themselves with recognition techniques, close support 
bombing and smoke laying.317 Harris noted that this policy was wasteful and that he 
thought that given the turnover in crews it would be ineffective. Harris suggested that 
the most effective means of providing training for his crews in these forms of operation 
would be in the Operational Training Units.318 Harris received a reply from DCAS who 
re-iterated that the semi-official directive given to him by VCAS on 7 April stood firm 
and that it was the intention of the Air Staff to proceed promptly with this policy.319 
Thus, Harris was expected to implement the policy despite his objections. 
However, despite the objection of Harris, the decision to train units in support of 
Combined Operations was in the main received positively by the operational heads of the 
commands responsible for possible operations. On 1 May 1942, Douglas at Fighter 
Command received a directive from DCAS on his priority of tasks for future operations. 
The letter referred to the recent discussions that had taken place on the subject of 
training for Combined Operations. DCAS prioritised the operations of Fighter 
Command as: 
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(a) The intensification of the day fighter offensive which calls for reinforcement of 11 Group 
with Spitfire squadrons. 
(b) Maintenance of a proper state of readiness of squadrons ear-marked for operation 
“Region” 
(c) The training of fighter squadrons in rotation in Combined Operation320 
 
Thus, by May 1942, training for a ‘hypothetical’ operation had clearly become one of the 
primary tasks of Fighter Command in particular, and the other functional commands in 
general. It was noted that units earmarked for Operation BLAZING should be the first 
to rotate through the training programme.321 No. 239 Squadron was the first squadron to 
go through the training at RAF Abbotsinch and would later serve during JUBILEE. 
Thus, by the time planning and training was moving forward the RAF had in place a 
policy and doctrine that not only took account of the need of Combined Operations but 
that also made it a leading priority in the training tasks of the appropriate functional 
commands. 
 
2.3 Planning JUBILEE 
 
The genesis of JUBILEE lay in a decision on 14 June 1940 to appoint Lieutenant-
General Alan Bourne as ‘Commander of Raiding Operations on coasts in enemy 
occupation and Advisor to the Chiefs of Staff on Combined Operations.’322 This 
appointment was made in the aftermath of a series of memorandum written by the Prime 
Minister, Winston Churchill, to his Chief of Staff, Major General Ismay on 4 and 6 June 
1940. In these memorandums, Churchill called for the ‘joint Chiefs of Staff to propose 
me measures for a vigorous, enterprising and ceaseless offensive’ against German held 
territory.323 Bourne had under his command six independent commando companies that 
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had been formed for the Norway campaign. Unfortunately, for Bourne, Churchill 
described the first raids under his command as a ‘silly fiasco’.324 Churchill, displeased 
with these early failures, replaced Bourne with Admiral of the Fleet Sir Roger Keyes as 
DCO on 17 July 1940.325 Keyes had been the architect of the raids on Zeebrugge and 
Ostend in 1918.326 
                                                
Over the next year, raiding became an inherent part of British strategy in the war 
against Germany and a series of raids were launched against enemy held territory. 
However, Keyes faced problems in the planning and implementation of operations and 
on many occasions during 1941 these problem came to a head with the Chiefs of Staff 
Committee.327 Eventually in the aftermath of a disastrous exercise in August 1941, he 
brought his concerns to the attention of the Chiefs of Staff; especially his concern over 
who was to issue orders to force commanders. In the ensuing debate, Keyes had a new 
directive drafted for his role and he was re-titled ACO.328 However, Keyes could not 
accept this and on 27 October 1941, Commodore Lord Louis Mountbatten replaced 
him.329 Mountbatten, with the backing of Churchill, began to conduct larger and larger 
raids against the enemy coasts, most notable at St Nazaire and Bruneval.330 Thus, by early 
1942, despite a tumultuous background, raiding and combined operations had become a 
distinct part of British military operations against the Axis powers. 
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The origins of JUBILEE lay in an Anglo-American strategic decision taken in 
April 1942 to increase the scale and frequency of raids.331 The decision had a clear impact 
upon the RAF as it meant that as operations increased in scale they would require greater 
support, specifically in the form of air cover. The increase in scale also had the advantage 
of allowing the Fighter Command to continue its policy of offensive air operations 
against the Luftwaffe. While this may at first appear a selfish decision the motive can be 
viewed, through an understanding of Combined Operation doctrine, as altruistic, because 
if the RAF sought an aerial battle it would aid it in the aim of providing air cover for the 
assaulting forces. However, even before this decision was made raids had in general 
become larger in scale. For example, at the end of 1941 Operation ARCHERY, the raid 
on Vaagso Island, had seen the first truly combined operation undertaken by COHQ.332 
In terms of RAF participation, the operation had the support of bomber and fighter 
aircraft. In terms of forces structure, much like at Dieppe, fighters were predominant 
with five squadrons of long range Bristol Beaufighters and Blenheims being utilised. In 
terms of bombers there were twenty-nine Handley Page Hampdens supplied by Bomber 
Command.333 The key role during the operation was to cover the operation and maintain 
air cover over the battlespace. ARCHERY illustrated the importance of air cover to the 
success of Combined Operations and that attrition in providing cover could be expensive 
for fighters, as eleven aircraft were lost.334 Thus by March/April 1942 raids on the 
continent were becoming ever larger in size and scope of their objectives. It is in this 
context that JUBILEE emerged. 
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Lieutenant General Sir Bernard Montgomery, in 1942 GOC Southern Command 
and involved in the planning for RUTTER, the precursor to JUBILEE, later noted about 
the planning of JUBILEE that: 
My own feeling about the Dieppe raid is that there were far too many authorities with a 
hand in it; there was no single operational commander who was solely responsible for the 
operation from start to finish, a Task Force Commander in fact.335 
 
Montgomery’s view on the planning of the Dieppe Raid was seen through his experience 
of OVERLORD, which had an overall commander. Unfortunately, this teleological view 
of the planning of Dieppe has persisted in the historiography of JUBILEE and has 
distorted our understanding of some of the key issues raised during the planning 
process.336 While the MCO discussed the merits of three systems of command in 
Combined Operations, it was early on in the planning process that the system of 
command would by either ‘Joint Command’ or ‘Command by One Service’.337 While 
Montgomery perhaps saw this decision as having been the root cause of the problems at 
Dieppe it does highlight the difficulty of planning for larger raids that faced COHQ in 
early 1942. Up until this point, the majority of raids had been small and there was little 
experience on which to make a decision on the system of command. Thus, by early May, 
Leigh-Mallory was appointed the RAF commander in a joint system of command 
alongside Major General Roberts as military commander and Vice Admiral Baille-
Grohman was proposed as naval commander.338 With the exception of the change of 
Captain Hughes-Hallett for Baille-Grohman, this would be the command structure in 
place when JUBILEE was remounted in late July. It is interesting to note the disparity in 
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rank between the force commanders. It can be argued that Hughes-Hallett was brought 
in due to his willingness to work with Mountbatten. 
The planning for RUTTER/JUBILEE has opened up several issues concerning 
air power, as there were two key changes to the plan between the cancellation of 
RUTTER and the mounting of JUBILEE; namely the use of a preliminary bombing raid 
and the use of airborne force to attack gun batteries on the flanks of the assault. The lack 
of Bomber Command involvement has becoming a major point of contention with Brian 
Loring Villa noting that, ‘Without heavy air bombardment, the disparity in fire-power 
proved fatal to the Canadian and British invaders.’339 This theme has continued with 
Robin Neillands claiming that Leigh-Mallory’s decision to remove the support of 
bombardment was the result of loyalty that pressed him ‘…to accept a decision that 
fundamentally undermined the possibilities of success at Dieppe.’340 However, both of 
these accounts view JUBILEE through the prism of the invasion of Normandy and they 
fail to appreciate the implication of utilising heavy strategic bombers for what amounted 
to a small-scale operation within the context of the Second World War. They also do not 
take account of the prevailing doctrinal view on the use of aerial bombardment in the 
support of Combined Operations. The MCO noted that only ‘Under certain conditions 
support of the landing by air bombardment will be of value.’341 However, it also noted 
that: 
To what extent this support can be provided will depend on the number of aircraft 
available and other operations required of them. In most cases the general struggle for air 
superiority, local operations in defence of the landing against enemy aircraft, and spotting 
and reconnaissance duties will have prior claims.342 
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Thus, even before the war began it was laid down in Combined Operations doctrine that 
while it would be advantageous to have access to the use of aerial bombardment it 
should not be counted on due to other ongoing operations. Before RUTTER/JUBILEE, 
aircraft from Bomber Command had been utilised in both the raid on St Nazaire, 
Operation CHARIOT, and Vaagso, ARCHERY. For example, at St Nazaire aircraft had 
been used to try to divert attention away from the assault. However, their strange action 
over St Nazaire, where they circled and dropped single bombs, alerted the garrison to a 
possible attack on the town, and at midnight the garrison received orders to repel a 
possible parachute attack.343 Thus, the use of Bomber Command in diversionary 
operations may have compromised the success of this operation. Also as already noted 
above bomber operations during ARCHERY were expensive in terms of effort given 
and results achieved. It is, therefore, more surprising that in the initial planning for 
RUTTER that bombing appeared. It should be considered that given the nature of 
operations that were to occur over Dieppe and the order Leigh-Mallory received from 
Douglas on 13 April the decision not to include bombers did not divert attention from 
the primary aim of air cover during JUBILEE; the provision of effective air cover. As 
early, as 14 April aerial bombardment was planned as a precursor to the landings with it 
being noted that the target would be the town generally.344 However, it was noted in 
Mountbatten’s appreciation given to the Chiefs of Staff that the approval for 
bombardment was required from the War Cabinet because of the standing directive that 
covered the use of bombers over occupied territory.345 However, by the planning 
meeting of 5 June Leigh-Mallory argued that bombing would not add anything to the 
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operation and it would denude the element of tactical surprise.346 Another factor leading 
to this decision was Harris’ contention that bombers could not be used before twilight, 
thus, leaving only a window of five minutes for bombers before the start of the 
operation.347 Leigh-Mallory’s decision was also affected by the conclusion of the War 
Cabinet concerning the use of aerial bombardment, which stated that it should only be 
used when accurate attacks could be guaranteed.348 Mountbatten would attempt to 
modify this directive but as seen by the meeting of 5 June Leigh-Mallory had concluded 
that it would not be effective anyway.349 While Villa has contended that Leigh-Mallory’s 
decision to cancel the bombing was based upon prescient analysis of its effect upon the 
landing force and Harris’ intransigence, it is clear that Leigh-Mallory stated his objection 
to its effectiveness at the 5 June meeting.350  Villa also points out on the issue of surprise 
that Dieppe had been bombed several times earlier; however, it is difficult to see how 
this relates to the issue of support for a Combined Operation.351 Villa relies on the 
analysis of the official historians, C P Stacey and Stephen Roskill, who stated that the 
problems were difficult but not insurmountable. However, this raises the question of 
Stacey’s and Roskill’s understanding of the use of air power in support of Combined 
Operations.352 Prevailing doctrine clearly stated that bombing should be used where 
possible but this was not the overriding concern of the RAF commander during 
operations.353 In addition, research has explored the problems of using aerial 
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bombardment in support of ground operations, which clearly recognises the problems 
inherent with their use; therefore, while Villa has made a case for its use, it does not 
stand up well to scrutiny.354 Thus, while there has been much written over the lack of 
bombing support it can be argued that this decision was taken four months before 
JUBILEE took place and three months before RUTTER was due to occur and that the 
decision was based upon sound advice from the relevant commanders with experience of 
air power. When combined with Leigh-Mallory’s standing orders from Douglas, the issue 
of tactical surprise and Harris’ orders on bombing occupied territories it is 
understandable to that bombing of Dieppe was cancelled. 
                                                
The other key area that requires some explanation is the decision to replace the 
airborne assault on the flanks with commandos. This was, in hindsight, the right decision 
as both No. 3 and 4 Commando achieved the most success on the ground during 
JUBILEE. Indeed, No. 4 Commando’s success would form the basis of a British army 
doctrinal pamphlet on attacking gun positions.355 However, the reasons for this change 
lay in the state of Britain’s airborne forces in 1942 and their lack of effective means to 
deploy a sizable force accurately.356 From the very start, it was envisaged that airborne 
troops were to be used to protect the flanks of the operation and cut enemy 
communications.357 It was intended that the 1st Parachute Battalion, reinforced to the 
strength of one and a half battalions, be dropped near Beneval-le-Grand in order to 
 
354 See Gooderson, 'Heavy and Medium Bombers’ passim. 
355 TNA, WO 208/3108, Notes from Theatres of War No. 11. 
356 On the early years of Britain’s airborne force and the various institutional and organisational problems 
that faced them see William Buckingham, Paras: The Birth of British Airborne Forces from Churchill’s Raiders to 1st 
Parachute Brigade (Stroud: Tempus, 2005). 
357 TNA, DEFE 2/546, Minutes of Meeting held at COHQ at 1100 Hours 14.4.42 to Discuss Operation 
“RUTTER”, 16 April 1942. 
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neutralise gun batteries either side of Dieppe.358 However, even at this stage questions 
were raised by Mountbatten’s AACO about the advisability of using parachute troops in 
this manner.359 Army Co-Operation Command was responsible for the control of 
squadrons tasked with dropping airborne forces and during May and June, the problem 
of squadron allocation and usage become an operational issue for RUTTER. At a staff 
meeting on 11 May Harris informed Mountbatten that due to overriding operational 
requirements Nos. 12 and 142 Squadrons were required by Bomber Command.360 Much 
of this is set against the background of Operation MILLENIUM, the planned thousand-
bomber raid against Cologne, and Harris’ large raids of mid-1942. The loss of these 
squadrons led to a reduction in the size of the airborne force for RUTTER, in particular 
the loss of glider troops. The loss of squadrons was a key issue of concern for 
Mountbatten who appealed to Portal on 26 May to release the squadrons. Mountbatten 
was particularly concerned that if the squadrons suffered heavy casualties during 
MILLENIUM then this would put at risk the use of these squadrons for the lack of 
experienced aircrew.361 Portal urged Mountbatten to discuss the issue with Barrett at 
Army Co-Operation Command, as no commander was obliged by the Air Ministry to 
support Bomber Command’s operations.362 Barrett, who had been on leave, wrote to 
Portal to state that that he was exercising his prerogative outlined in Portal’s reply to 
Mountbatten on 27 May, and recalling the two Whitley squadrons from the planned 
Bomber Command operation. He states that he loaned two Blenheim squadrons and the 
Whitleys to Harris on the advice of DBO. However, the prospect of jeopardising 
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RUTTER meant they would be recalled from operations.363 However, the lack of 
effective airframes continued to hamper the use of airborne troops in light of the 
operational needs of other commands. Thus, by 1 June the planned force was reduced to 
one battalion.364 Considering the operational difficulties, facing Britain’s nascent airborne 
force it is understandable that when RUTTER was re-launched as JUBILEE the decision 
was taken to replace them with commandos. In the light of their success, the switch 
seems inspired. The decision enabled a concentrated force, rather than a possibly 
dispersed force, to be landed and assault the position with success.365 The problem of 
timings would also have made concentration difficult for airborne force to complete the 
task successfully. However, the saga of squadron allocation does highlight the difficulties 
inherent in Combined Operations and the need to prioritise operations. 
In preparation for RUTTER two exercises, YUKON I and II, were planned to 
take place during June. Both of these exercises were deemed failures and must rank as 
one of the contributing factors in the cancellation of RUTTER.366 Due to operational 
commitments there was little involvement from the RAF in YUKON I, however, for 
YUKON II seven fighter squadrons were tasked with participating in the exercise.367 The 
squadrons were to replicate the proposed actions of the RAF during the operation; 
fighter cover and Tac R. Leigh-Mallory was anxious for the RAF to play its part and to 
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test the process of calling up air cover during the course of the operation.368 The key 
concern for Leigh-Mallory in the aftermath of YUKON II was issues of communication 
between Uxbridge and the area headquarters at Portsmouth. For Leigh-Mallory, this gave 
concern over communication with the force headquarters during JUBILEE.369 He was 
assured that this was being looked into; in fact, earlier in the year at inter-service 
committee had been formed to examine the issue of communications during Combined 
Operations.370 
Despite this concern and the two prominent issues of bombing and airborne 
troops, planning for JUBILEE ran into few problems from an air power perspective. By 
the time of JUBILEE, the plan had been simplified to concentrate on air cover with 
close support a secondary consideration and in this respect, it closely followed the 
principle outlined in Combined Operations doctrine. The plan called for fighter cover 
and general protection to the landing force to be provided all through the daylight hours 
with the most intensive operations coming during the landing and withdrawal. While air 
cover was provided, low-level fighter and bomber attacks would support the landing 
troops and provide smoke laying where appropriate. Tac R was to be provided by aircraft 
from Army Co-Operation Command within both the battle area and the lines of 
approach to Dieppe. While no bombing was to be used on the town, diversionary raids 
were planned to attack the airfield at Abbeville by aircraft of the US 8th Air Force.371 It 
was estimated that in the area of Northern France the Germans could deploy 
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approximately two-hundred and sixty fighters and one-hundred and twenty bombers. 
Against this Leigh-Mallory was able to deploy seventy squadrons, thus allowing him to 
deploy overwhelming superior numbers as laid out in his operational orders of 13 
April.372 Control of the air battle was to be exercised from No. 11 Group headquarters at 
Uxbridge and through the normal command and control system of sector control.373 The 
HQ Ships HMS Fernie and Calpe provided control of close support aircraft with links to 
Leigh-Mallory at Uxbridge; Air Commodore Cole on the Calpe represented Leigh-
Mallory.374 Cole was instructed to liaise with the other force commanders and direct 
operation at low-level, for example, Tac R aircraft from RAF Gatwick that performed 
reconnaissance along the approaching roads. The system utilised for control of low-level 
aircraft was the system developed by Army Co-Operation command and based upon 
forward and rear air links with a tentacle controlling aircraft from the HQS. 
Reconnaissance was one area where air power aided in both the planning and conduct of 
JUBILEE. During preparations for RUTTER/JUBILEE RAF reconnaissance aircraft 
were involved in gathering intelligence of the positions in and around Dieppe. It was 
responsible for discovery of caves in the cliff faces of the two headlands either side of 
the town. This enabled target identification for the destroyers offshore.375 
Reconnaissance also informed planners of the suitability of the area designated as a 
sanctuary for landing craft and that in the opinion of both the pilots and Leigh-Mallory 
the size of the anchorage needed to be reduced in order to present it as a target for 
bombers.376 In light of this information, Baille-Grohman examined the possibility of 
modifying the plan. During the course of JUBILEE, it was planned to make use of Tac R 
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through the communication tentacle in HMS Calpe to co-ordinate air support. Some 
seventy-one sorties were flown. In a report written after JUBILEE this was considered 
lavish.377 There is justification to this claim because when compared to the number of 
operations conducted by the Western Desert Air Force (WDAF) at the same time the 
number of sorties for one day equalled half of those being flown by WDAF in support 
of Eighth Army.378 Thus, by the time of the issuing of operational orders to squadrons in 
mid-August the RAF had overcome issues relating the effective use of air power. 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has sought to examine the development of Fighter Command operations 
from the perspective of Combined Operations doctrine. It has explored the various 
campaigns that it was involved in from 1940 to 1942 and these illustrate the degree to 
which air superiority is vital to the success of any planned combined operation. This 
coupled with the offensive action conducted during 1942 and 1942 lay the context for 
the air operations over Dieppe. The force structure deployed and choice of RAF 
commanders illustrates the importance placed upon air cover during JUBILEE. It has 
also examined the degree to which the RAF, despite its prevailing operational 
responsibilities, was involved in the Combined Operation programme. The appointment 
of Willetts as AACO represented a key turning point for the RAF as it gave them a 
chance to represent their views on Combined Operations. The willingness of the various 
commands to rotate squadrons through a training programme on Combined Operations 
also illustrates their readiness to train for what Harris described as a hypothetical 
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operation. While the planning for Dieppe has been contentious in the historiography this 
chapter has examined the degree to which the RAF worked with the framework laid out 
by the 1938 MCO. While Montgomery was critical of the framework, operations had 
been planned up until 1942 in this way. The decision to use a joint system of command 
meant that the joint commanders decided on issues such as aerial bombardment. Thus, 
attributing blame to Leigh-Mallory shows a lack of awareness of the nature of the 
command arrangements. In addition, the decision in the light of contemporary evidence 
suggests that the concern over French casualties and the lack of tactical surprise were the 
main issues that led to its cancellation. The concerns expressed by Leigh-Mallory over 
command and control of close support was to one of the key lessons to come out of 
JUBILEE and in explored more fully in Chapter three. Overall, the planning process was 
from an air power viewpoint based on the prevailing doctrinal views and fitted in with 
the overriding operational objective of Fighter Command. 
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Chapter 3 
Operational Analysis of Operation JUBILEE and ‘Lessons Learnt’ 
 
The previous chapters have sought to explain the planning and doctrinal context of 
JUBILEE. They highlighted the importance of the issue of air superiority as being a 
prerequisite for the success of any Combined Operation. They illustrated the importance 
of air superiority through the discussion of several key examples that illustrate the impact 
that air power had upon the course of various campaigns that could be described as 
Combined Operations. They also examined training policy for the RAF in Combined 
Operations and planning for RUTTER/JUBILEE and highlighted the point that 
JUBILEE must be viewed through the RAF’s battle for air superiority over Northern 
France in line with the key tenants of the MCO.  
Much has been made of the RAF’s performance during JUBILEE in the 
historiography. A great deal of this has centred on the issue of the perceived failure of 
the RAF hierarchy to acquiesce to the use of strategic bombers in support of 
JUBILEE.379 This assertion has become dogma and is flawed as it misinterprets the 
nature of strategic bombing forces and their use. Gooderson has highlighted the 
problems of the use of this weapons platform using operational research reports.380 
Thus, the claims by revisionist historians that the failure to use Bomber Command in a 
more central role during JUBILEE was the key to the RAF’s failures during is flawed. 
This interpretation misinterprets the role of air power in Combined Operations. The 
RAF, as illustrated in Chapter one, saw as its first priority as the attainment of air 
superiority over the battlespace and by 1942, this was linked to the use of fighter aircraft 
in an offensive role. 
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Thus, the operational effectiveness of the RAF needs to be analysed within the 
context of the offensive fighter sweeps that it was conducting from late 1940 onwards. 
This was how Fighter Command considered its role in Combined Operations. Leigh-
Mallory was quite right to interpret his role in JUBILEE as to be that of seeking to attain 
air superiority over the area of the operation using the methods he was already utilising. 
He saw the job of the forces under his command as primarily offensive in nature and in 
particular, the majority of the squadrons seconded to the operation were tasked with a 
fighter patrol role. This gave them a two fold role; first, at a strategic level, to bring the 
Luftwaffe to battle in order to wear down its strength in the west in preparation for any 
future invasion of France. Second, at an operational and tactical level, the RAF was to 
provide air cover for the naval and land forces involved in JUBILEE. This second role 
would also aid the primary mission of Fighter Command in 1942 of battling the Luftwaffe. 
In understanding this nature of the RAF’s role during JUBILEE, we can start to 
appreciate and understand its success during JUBILEE. This is not to argue that aerial 
bombardment had not been considered but for a raid of JUBILEE’s nature, its use was 
considered surplus to requirements. Therefore, attempts at a retrospective and 
teleological view of JUBILEE, and to compare and contrast OVERLORD and 
JUBILEE, are not helpful in understanding of the RAF’s effectiveness at Dieppe as they 
were very different operations with different aims and objectives. 
In order to ascertain the effectiveness of air power during JUBILEE this chapter 
will endeavour to take a progressive and pluralistic view of Dieppe’s impact upon the 
progress of Combined Operations thinking in 1942 and 1943. It will start with an analysis 
of the cost of JUBILEE to RAF and illustrate the cost and effort in providing cover 
during JUBILEE. This will highlight the costly nature of a battle for air superiority but 
illustrate why this rather than bomber support was more advantageous to the assaulting 
forces during JUBILEE. It then deals with the contentious issue of ‘lessons learnt’ during 
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JUBILEE. This will include an analysis and discussion of the decision to continue the 
policy of raids as a method of attempting to bring the Luftwaffe to battle. It will also 
examine issues such as problems in overcome the difficulties encountered in the 
development of Fighter Control Ships for future Combined Operations in order to 
facilitate command and control of air operations. The chapter will then deal with the 
controversial issue of bombardment for Combined Operations by examining the findings 
of the Graham Report of 1943. 
 
3.1 Contemporary Qualitative Analysis of Air Power at Dieppe 
 
The ability to analyse events from a retrospective standpoint has led some historians to 
assume that there is a direct linear link between JUBILEE and OVERLORD without an 
attempt to contextualise development in the intervening years. Undoubtedly, this has 
been because of Mountbatten’s concerted efforts in the post-war years to claim that there 
was ‘Lessons Learnt’ from Dieppe by claiming a direct link to OVERLORD.381 He was 
assisted in this by Hughes-Hallett, who had written the ‘Lessons Learnt’ report that laid 
the basis for Mountbatten’s claims.382 This, along with the issue of the cancellation of the 
pre-bombardment, has clouded and mythologized the historiography of Dieppe and has 
not allowed an objective analysis of whether any lessons were truly learnt.  
In 1942, Hughes-Hallett wrote the dispatch on Dieppe for the London Gazette. He 
claimed simply that ‘The fighter cover afforded by No. 11 Group was magnificent and 
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the…loss of one ship…should be regarded as…fortunate.’383  While it is possible to 
question Hughes-Hallett’s objectivity, because of his close association with Mountbatten, 
other contemporary sources illustrate the degree to which JUBILLE was conceived as a 
success from an air power perspective. At a meeting of the War Cabinet on 25 August, 
the Chiefs of Staff commented that ‘From an air point of view, the Dieppe Raid had 
achieved complete surprise.’384 This further reinforces the view of Anthony Eden, who at 
a War Cabinet meeting on 20 August, claimed that the operations of the RAF had been 
the ‘most encouraging aspect of the operation.’385 While Eden’s claims of the Luftwaffe 
having been ‘roughly handled’ were over-optimistic, it does illustrate the view that the 
RAF operations had been successful.386 Discussions by the War Cabinet were sent 
immediately to the Joint Staff Mission in Washington and they claimed that the ‘Support 
afforded by air forces was faultless…’387 Thus, in the immediate aftermath of JUBILEE 
it was perceived that the RAF had won a significant victory. 
                                                
At an operational level, it became obvious that the air effort had some impact on 
the Luftwaffe in Northern France. An RAF Air Intelligence report from 27 August 
claimed that a significant number of Luftwaffe units had been engaged in the largest battle 
since 1940 and that heavy losses had been inflicted upon them.388 However, the report 
concluded that the impact of the RAF upon the Luftwaffe could have been greater had 
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JUBILEE lasted for a period of up to three days.389 Encouraged by the RAF’s effort, 
after Dieppe, Leigh-Mallory urged that similar operations be mounted.  For example, on 
22 August Leigh-Mallory wrote to Mountbatten claiming that ‘In my mind the most 
important result of Dieppe is that we made the Germans fight in the air.’390 Leigh-
Mallory claimed that in conjunction with raids such as No.4 Commando’s assault on the 
Hess Battery the Luftwaffe could be enticed into battle and that this would aid in the 
destruction of the Luftwaffe .(The use of raiding as the basis of an intruder strategy will be 
discussed below).391 Leigh-Mallory’s letter to Mountbatten would eventually form the 
basis for the stillborn Operation AFLAME. Thus, it can be assumed that the key result 
of air operations during JUBILEE was to convince Leigh-Mallory of the suitability of 
Dieppe type operations as a means of bringing the Luftwaffe to battle for air superiority, 
still the key mission of Fighter Command in 1942.  
While at a political and command level it can be argued that RAF’s operations 
over Dieppe were viewed as a success, it is useful to see how those on the beach and on 
the supporting ships viewed it. Given that the RAF’s primary mission was air cover, their 
opinion helps to frame whether or not that support was successful from their 
perspective. The CMHQ reports compiled by C P Stacey form a useful basis for such an 
analysis.392 In terms of air power, the views are mixed, varying from negative opinions on 
the issue of supporting bombardment to positive views on the overall impact of air 
power. For example, Captain G A Browne of the Royal Canadian Artillery, who served 
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as a Forward Observation Officer (FOO) with the RRC, commented on the cancelling of 
the aerial bombardment to preserve the element of surprise that: 
Further, is surprise easier to obtain, than the preparatory heavy air bombardment which in 
our case would quite probably have succeeded where surprise, or rather the hope of surprise, 
failed?393 
 
This rather negative view can be contrasted with that of Lieutenant J E R Wood of the 
Royal Canadian Engineers, who was captured on RED/WHITE beach, commented after 
the war that: 
Some of our people later claimed they never saw the Air Force. Of course they didn't. They 
were too busy up top keeping the Luftwaffe off us. I can truthfully say we were not machine 
gunned on that beach except by our own people after we'd folded up. That means the 
R.A.F. did its stuff.394 
 
Two accounts highlight one of the key problems found during JUBILEE; the 
identification of friendly aircraft and friendly fire due to issues of command and control. 
Both Captain James Runcie of the QOCHC and Private Maier of the Essex Scottish both 
discuss the issue of friendly fire on Canadian positions on RED/WHITE beach.395 
However, neither account is critical of the RAF; for example, Maier noted that a late-
arriving Landing Craft Tank caused the incident he witnessed, in his opinion.396 All the 
force commanders in their reports highlighted the issue of recognition with Roberts 
noting that ‘A much higher standard of air recognition is required.’397 This was reiterated 
by Hughes-Hallett in the ‘Lessons Learnt’ report.398 The problem of control was noted in 
an army report in December, which praised the directing of close support aircraft, but 
noted that the delay imposed by the system then in place needed work.399 
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German accounts of the air action are confused, with their view of the purpose 
of the operation distorting their opinions of the effectiveness of the air efforts over 
Dieppe. For example, early German accounts view JUBILEE as an attempt at launch a 
Second Front.400 This view of the nature of JUBILEE means that the overall view given 
in captured documents is one of disbelief in the nature of support provided for the 
assaulting troops. For example, report from the HQ of the 302nd Infantry Division states: 
The English higher command considerably underestimated the strength in all weapons 
required for such an attack. The strength of air and naval forces was not nearly sufficient 
to keep the defenders down during the landings and to destroy their signal communications. 
It is incomprehensible that it should be believed that a single Canadian Division should be 
able to overrun a German Infantry Regiment reinforced with artillery.401 
 
A persistent source of surprise amongst German reports, despite their experience at 
Crete in 1941, was the lack of airborne troops to support the operation. A report by 
LXXXI Corps noted that had airborne troops been used in the assault against Puys then 
in all probability the town would have been taken.402 The Germans also expected more 
accurate support from the RAF against the coastal defences in the area claiming, contrary 
to the British reports, that smoke laying may have been the cause of this.403 These views 
present two contrasting interpretation of the effectiveness of air power at Dieppe. Each 
one is dependent on what view is taken of the nature of the operation. For the Germans 
the operation was an attempt at a lodgment on the continent, therefore, it appears 
illogical for allies not to utilise all methods at their disposal. However, for the British the 
operation was a raid, therefore, the use of air power followed the prevailing doctrinal 
view and that the nature of the operation, in their opinion, did not require these 
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methods. German and Allied reports have one area of contention in common, that of 
losses; this will be discussed below. 
In general, contemporary accounts of the RAF during the Dieppe Raid are 
positive. It was one of the few aspects of JUBILEE to be praised in the Combined 
Report and by the various participants. This is not to say that there were not problems 
and as noted, various participants highlighted some of these. These areas were 
highlighted by the ‘Lessons Learnt’ report that noted that the following areas needed 
further examination: first, the scale of air support in relation to the land operation, 
second, the use of airborne troops, third, aircraft recognition and command and control; 
and finally the use of smoke.404 These will be examined in more detail below with the 
exception of the second point, which falls outside the scope of this thesis. It is interesting 
to note that the lack of aerial bombardment is not a lesson that Hughes-Hallett deemed 
noteworthy. While qualitative analysis illustrates that air power at Dieppe was a success it 
is useful to examine some of the pertinent quantitative sources in order to understand 
the effectiveness of the RAF during the operation with relation to the issue of losses. 
 
3.2 Quantitative Analysis of Air Power at Dieppe 
 
To further analyse and understand RAF operations during JUBILEE we must turn to the 
quantitative data from JUBILEE. Modern analysis has led to the conclusion that the 
RAF suffered greater losses than the Luftwaffe, one hundred and seven to forty-eight, 
and this has often led to claims that the RAF was defeated.405 However, much 
information can be gathered from a statistical analysis of the losses Fighter Command 
suffered during JUBILEE. They offer an insight into many hitherto misunderstood 
                                                 
404 TNA, ADM 239/350, Lessons Learnt, passim 
405 Campbell, Dieppe Revisited, pp. 187-188. 
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aspects of JUBILEE. For example, the data provides answers to the question of which 
was the most hazardous type of mission performed during JUBILEE and which aircraft 
suffered the highest loss rate. Thus, this section will look at the statistics gathered in the 
aftermath of JUBILEE. Much of the information used in this section comes from the 
excellent work done by Norman Franks on Fighter Command losses and the associated 
work on Bomber Command by W R Chorley.406 There are also several other sources for 
this section such as Operational Research (OR) reports from the Fighter and Bomber 
Commands OR Sections (ORS).407 
The subject of claims over losses and kills made by the RAF during JUBILEE is 
contentious. Franks, in his history of the air battle over Dieppe, has noted that it was 
initially assumed that the honours between the RAF and Luftwaffe were even and this 
assumption is supported by Eden’s protestations at the War Cabinet meeting on 22 
August about the Luftwaffe having been roughly handled.408 However, further analysis of 
claims and post-war access to Luftwaffe records has changed the balance of the claims. 
For example, Leigh-Mallory claimed that ‘Reports since received indicate that the 
German Air Force…lost between 150 and 200 aircraft.’409 The report breaks down 
enemy losses as shown in chart 3.1. 
                                                 
406 Norman Franks, Royal Air Force Fighter Command Losses of the Second World War: Volume 2 – Operational 
Losses: Aircraft and Crews, 1942-1943 (Leicester: Midland Publishing Limited, 1998); W R Chorley, Royal Air 
Force Bomber Command Losses of the Second World War: Volume 3, 1942 (Leicester: Midland Publishing Limited, 
1998). Both of these works are based upon archival sources such as Form 540s and 541s from Operational 
Records Books of participating squadrons and various operational reports. 
407 For a history of OR in the RAF see Anon, The Origins and Development of Operational Research in the Royal 
Air Force (London: HMSO, 1953) passim. 
408 Norman Franks, The Greatest Air Battle: Dieppe p. 189; TNA, CAB 65/31/18 ‘Minutes of War Cabinet 
115 (42)’ p. 2. 
409 TNA, AIR 20/5186 ‘Appendix C to Report by the Air Force Commander’. 
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(Source: TNA, AIR 20/5186 ‘Appendix C to Report by the Air Force Commander on the Combined 
Operation against Dieppe – August 19th 1942’) 
 
These figures compare favourably with the claim figures put together by Franks and 
illustrated in chart 3.2. This chart has broken down the claims into the type of aircraft 
claimed. 
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(Source: Norman Franks The Greatest Air Battle: Dieppe, 19th August 1942 (London: Grub Street, 1997) 
pp.239-245) 
 
However, recent research by Franks and Donald Cauldwell claim that Luftwaffe records 
show that losses totaled no more than forty-eight airframes and that records for no more 
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than twenty-one fighter pilot losses can be found.410 However, the issue of over claiming 
kills was not just limited to the RAF, as an examination of the claims listed by Cauldwell 
for JG26 appears to be over zealous as illustrated in Chart 3.3. 
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Chart 3.3 - JG26 Claims during Operation JUBILEE, 19 August 1942 
 
(Source: Donald Cauldwell The JG26 War Diary: Volume One, 1939-1942 (London: Grub Street, 1996) pp. 
278-279) 
 
JG26’s claims are interesting as they claim to have shot down thirty-five Spitfires during 
the course of the operation. This appears to be a high score and accounts for half of the 
Spitfires lost during the operation despite the fact that a significant number were also lost 
to AA fire. The claims also include an erroneous Bell Airacobra (this was a type that had 
left RAF service by March 1942). Chart 3.4 illustrates the aircraft lost by the RAF by 
type. It clearly illustrates that sixty per cent of losses sustained by the RAF were of the 
various marks of the Spitfire, which was at the time the mainstay of Fighter Command 
and constituted sixty-four percent of the force committed to JUBILEE.  
                                                 
410 Franks, The Greatest Air Battle, pp. 237-238; Donald Cauldwell, The JG26 War Diary: Volume One, 1939-
1942 (London: Grub Street, 1996) pp. 277-278. 
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Chart 3.4 - Types of Aircraft lost during Operation JUBILEE, 19 August 1942 
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(Source: Norman Franks Royal Air Force Fighter Command Losses of the Second World War: Volume 2 – 
Operational Losses: Aircraft and Crews, 1942-1943 (Leicester: Midland Publishing Limited, 1998) pp. 56-62) 
 
Chart 3.5 illustrates the nature of Spitfire losses during JUBILEE. It shows that thirty-
eight per cent of the losses suffered by the Spitfire squadrons were caused by combat 
with enemy aircraft; this totals only twenty-six airframes. This on its own does not 
account for the claims of JG26; however, another twenty-one per cent are listed as pilots 
having baled out. Within reason it can be assumed that some of these losses were caused 
by combat with enemy aircraft, however, this only amounts for another fifteen airframes. 
Considering that the German fighter force deployed during JUBILEE came from the 
two Kanalgeschwader, JG2 and JG26, that operated in Northern France and that based on 
the available figures it can be assumed that a maximum of forty-one Spitfire airframes 
were lost due to the action of the Jagdwaffe. Therefore, it can be assumed that the claims 
submitted by JG26 are an overestimation of its impact upon Fighter Command during 
JUBILEE. 
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Chart 3.5 - Nature of Spitfire Losses during Operation JUBILEE, 19 August 1942 
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(Source: Norman Franks Royal Air Force Fighter Command Losses of the Second World War: Volume 2 – 
Operational Losses: Aircraft and Crews, 1942-1943 (Leicester: Midland Publishing Limited, 1998) pp. 56-62) 
 
Chart 3.5 illustrates some interesting points, which is further highlighted by Chart 
3.6 below. The most notable is that of seventy Spitfires lost in action, twenty per cent 
were classed as either Category A or Category B damage. Category A damage was 
defined as ‘repairable on site’ by the aircrafts’ operating unit.411 Thus, for example, No. 
19 Squadron repaired the Spitfire MkVb, BL573, of Sergeant J W Foster after being 
damaged by a Focke-Wulf FW190, at RAF Southend.412 Category B damage was defined 
as repairable but not by the operating unit, thus, the airframe would be sent to a 
maintenance unit for repair.413 Thus Spitfire MkVb, AB199, of Pilot Officer W B 
Morgan from 71 Squadron, which made a forced landing at RAF Friston, was repaired 
and served with the United States Army Air Force (USAAF) and then supplied to the 
French Air Force in 1945.414 Thus, some fourteen airframes were returned to service. On 
top of this are aircraft that were classed as having either crashed or forced landed back in 
                                                 
411 Franks, Fighter Command Losses, p. 9. 
412 Franks, Fighter Command Losses, p. 56; TNA, AIR 20/5186, Appendix A to Report by the Air Force 
Commander. 
413 Franks, Fighter Command Losses, p. 9. 
414 Franks, Fighter Command Losses, p. 5.7 
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Britain, nine per cent or six airframes. Therefore, out of seventy Spitfires that are claimed 
as losses during the operation nearly a third could be returned to service. 
                                                
Chart 3.6 - Cause of Aircraft Losses during Operation JUBILEE, 19 August 1942 
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(Source: Norman Franks Royal Air Force Fighter Command Losses of the Second World War: Volume 2 – 
Operational Losses: Aircraft and Crews, 1942-1943 (Leicester: Midland Publishing Limited, 1998) pp. 56-62) 
 
Chart 3.6 supports this picture with the overall figures for RAF losses. Overall, 
some twenty-seven per cent of aircraft losses were in a position to be returned to service. 
Thus while the overall pictures would appear to favour the Luftwaffe, in terms of claims it 
can be surmised that in just the case of airframes the RAF was able to cope with the 
losses and, by efficient maintenance system, return damaged airframes to service. It is 
important to note that aircraft classified as losses due to the pilot baling out were hit by 
either enemy aircraft or by AA fire, which was during the course of JUBILEE a key 
threat to direct support Hurricanes and smoke laying Bostons. AA fire accounted for at 
least thirteen percent of the losses suffered by the RAF during JUBILEE. AA fire also 
accounted for at least five of the twenty-two aircraft classified as bale outs.415 Of twenty-
six Hurricanes lost during JUBILEE, twenty-three were lost to AA fire illustrating the 
 
415 Franks, Fighter Command Losses, p. 56-62; TNA, AIR 20/5186, Appendix A to Report by the Air Force 
Commander. 
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cost of direct support operations in an area with high-density AA defences.416 Hurricane 
pilot losses in direct support operations amounted to an average of 1.87 pilots per 
squadron. This was the second highest of the operation with only Army Co-Operation 
Command Mustangs on Tac R missions suffering higher with 2.25 casualties per 
squadron.417 Thus, squadrons flying support missions for the army suffered highest due 
to their proximity to AA fire. This illustrates the advantage of the mission profile of the 
RAF during JUBILEE, in that while the largest proportion of the RAF’s force structure 
was directed towards an air superiority battle this allowed squadrons tasked with support 
operations to operate relatively free from interference from enemy aircraft. It was 
expected that when operating in a hot environment these aircraft would suffer unduly, 
for example, in the aftermath of JUBILEE Air Commodore Whitworth-Jones, DFO, 
wrote ‘that we must be prepared for a heavy damage rate in units used for Army support 
duties.’418 
In late 1942, Fighter Command’s ORS drew up a short report that examined the 
relative casualties suffered by the command during JUBILEE.419 Unlike the more 
detailed classification of losses utilised above the report broke down the report broke 
down RAF losses into Category A/B losses and Category E damage, which was defined 
as written off, therefore, the breakdown of losses above that were not A or B would be 
Category E.420 For the purposes of comparison the report also had to reclassify the 
Luftwaffe claims from the intelligence definitions of destroyed, probable and damaged. 
The results as given in the report are given in Table 3.1. The table expresses RAF losses 
                                                 
416 Franks, Fighter Command Losses, p. 56-62; TNA, AIR 20/5186, Appendix C to Report by the Air Force 
Commander, 
417 TNA, AIR 20/5186 Appendix C to Report by the Air Force Commander. 
418 TNA, AIR 20/5186, DFO to DAT, 24 September 1942. 
419 TNA, AIR 16/1044, Operational Research Section, Fighter Command, Report No. 395 – Operation 
“JUBILEE” (Dieppe), 19th August 1942: Relative Casualties by Type of Fighter Sortie, 3 December 1942. 
420 TNA, AIR 16/1044, ORS Report No. 395,p. 1; Franks, Fighter Command Losses, p. 9. 
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in terms of the duties undertaken by Fighter Command and by the number of sorties 
flown. Therefore, Spitfires flying on patrol over the sea and beaches during the operation 
suffered a Category E loss rate of 3.1 per cent out of one thousand and nine sorties.421 
This loss rate compares favourably with the loss rates incurred on aircraft flying in direct 
support of the ground forces, who on average suffered a loss rate of 8.3%. The 
Hurricane MkIIbs of Nos. 174 and 175 Squadron suffered most during the operation; 
they incurred a loss rate of 9.7% for just sixty-two sorties.422 The most likely reason for 
this is the fact that when equipped with bombs the Hurricane lost its manoeuvrability 
and was more susceptible to ground fire. In conjunction both Chart 3.6 and Table 3.1, 
describe a picture of the most costly operations undertaken during the course of 
JUBILEE, direct support missions. However, analyses of the nature of the losses reveal 
that the main cause of these losses was AA fire. Therefore, it can be assumed that had 
Fighter Command not been providing air cover then the loss rate could have been 
higher. 
Table 3.1 – Summary of Relative Casualties by Typ e e of Sorti
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421 TNA, AIR 16/1044, ORS Report No. 395, p. 2. 
422 TNA, AIR 16/1044 ‘ORS Report No. 395, p. 2; Gooderson, Air Power at the  Battlefront, p. 59. 
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other aircraft 
against sea 
targets 
Spitfires 
attacking 
ground 
targets with 
cannon 
14 1 0 0 1 1 
+/- 
0.5 
1 0 0 7.1 7.1     
Hurricanes 
attacking 
ground 
targets with 
cannon 
194 17 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 8.2 10.3     
Hurricanes 
attacking sea 
targets 
24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0       
Hurribombers 
attacking 
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targets 
62 6 0 0 0 1 
+/- 
0.5 
1 1 0 9.7 9.7     
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0.5 
0 2 
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0 0.9 0.9     
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(Source: TNA, AIR 16/1044 ‘Operati ighter Command, Report No. 395 – 
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onal Resear h Section, Fc
ation “JUBILEE” (Dieppe), 19th August 1942: Relative Casualties by Type of Fighter Sortie’ 3 
December 1942, p. 2) 
The OR report also examined the details of the battle casualties suffered and 
inflicted upon the Luftwaffe. The report details when and where this occurred, if possible 
by the type of sortie being flown by the RAF. However, a more useful aspect of the table 
is that it gives an indication of the intense effort that was put in by the RAF during 
JUBILEE and this is illustrated in Chart 3.7. The periods were based upon the sortie 
times flown by Spitfires flying air cover over the beaches. This provides the table with 
structure as on average each sortie lasted thirty minutes with the first patrol at 04:50. 
However, the first fighter sortie flown was the attack by No. 43 Squadron on the beach 
defences at approximately 04:40.423 Chart 3.7 illustrates that the number of sorties were 
stable throughout the period of the operation until the time came to cover the 
withdrawal of forces from the beach. Roberts issued the order to withdrawal at 
approximately 09:50 after the suggestion of Hughes-Hallett at 09:00.424 The withdrawal 
 
423 Franks, The Greatest Air Battle, pp. 44-46. 
424 Neillands, The Dieppe Raid, p. 248. 
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was due to begin at 10:30 but put back until 11:00 to allow the RAF to lay smoke and 
cover the withdrawal. During this phase of operations there was a great deal of activity 
from the both the Bostons of No. 2 Group and the direct support Hurricanes.425 In total, 
Hurricanes attacking ground targets flew one hundred ninety-four sorties with one 
hundred eleven occurring during the withdrawal.426 A similar pattern can be seen in the 
number of sorties flown by Spitfires on cover duties. Of seventeen hundred and nine air 
cover sorties, nearly half were flown during the withdrawal; some eight hundred and 
forty-four sorties.427 
 
(Source: TNA, AIR 16/1044 ‘Opera ghter Command, Report No. 395 – 
 
                                                
Chart 3. 7 - Relative Casualties and No. of Sorties by Time Period during Operation 
JUBILEE, 19 August 1942
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Thus, it must be noted that the most difficult period for the RAF came in the final, and 
most difficult, phase of JUBILEE. The need to increase the number of sorties flown 
illustrates the importance of air cover in both providing cover for the withdrawing forces 
 
425 TNA, DEFE 2/551, Annex 7 – Report by the Air Force Commander in The Dieppe Report 
(Combined Report), October 1942, p. 147. 
426 TNA, AIR 16/1044 ‘ORS Report No. 395, p. 4. 
427 TNA, AIR 16/1044 ‘ORS Report No. 395, pp. 1-2. 
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but also to provide support for the squadron that were providing direct support to the 
ground forces and Roberts noted in his report that the Hurricane direct support 
squadrons were constantly called upon.428 Presumably, this was because of the morale 
impact 
                                                
that this form of weapon had upon soldiers.429 
Fighter Command’s ORS was not the only one to take interest in the results of 
the operation. Bomber Command’s ORS produced two reports on the role of the 
Boston Squadron of No. 2 Group, which was primarily tasked with smoke laying 
operations during JUBILEE.430 Roberts stated that overall the support given by this form 
of operation was valuable but that there was a need to expand the availability of this 
resource.431 This is echoed by Leigh-Mallory in his report.432 However, despite the 
positive support for this form of operation, as well as the support made by the RAF as a 
whole, it was labour intensive and Bomber Command’s ORS stated that if the operation 
were to continue for a prolonged period the effective force that was able to be deployed 
would diminish rapidly.433 The report stated that of fifty-two Bostons available at the 
start only thirty-two were available by nightfall; an attrition rate of nearly forty per cent, 
though, it did admit that many of the aircraft had only suffered minor damage and could 
be returned to service within a few days.434 However, this would not have been useful 
had the operation been planned for longer and eventually the forces available to No. 2 
Group would have been drastically diminished and the force virtually immobilized. This 
high attrition rate, much like that of the direct support single-engined aircraft, was caused 
 
428 TNA, DEFE 2/551, The Dieppe Report (Combined Report), p. 143. 
429 This is a theme picked up by Ian Gooderson in Air Power at the Battlefront . 
430 TNA, AIR 14/1809, File 1A – Day Raid Report No. 76: Bomber Command Report on Operations – 
Day 19th August, 1942, 6 September 1942; AIR 14/1809, File 3A – A Note on Losses Sustained at Dieppe, 
12 October 1942. 
431 TNA, DEFE 2/551, The Dieppe Report (Combined Report), p. 143. 
432 TNA, DEFE 2/551, The Dieppe Report (Combined Report), p. 148. 
433 TNA, AIR 14/1809, File 1A, p. 4. 
434 TNA, AIR 14/1809, File 1A, p. 4. 
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primarily by AA fire, again highlights the advantages of effective air cover and the report 
remarks on the effectiveness of the cover provided.435 It was predicted that in a period of 
sustained operations a force of fifty airframes would drop to just ten after sustained 
operations of thirteen days. It claimed that this figure would not be aided by reinforced 
maintenance. In fact, the figures for a second week of operations noticeably dropped off 
due to the lack of returning aircraft from Category A or B damage.436 However, the ORS 
states, much like the prevailing opinion at Fighter Command, that the losses incurred by 
No. 2 Group during JUBILEE and in any future similar operation would have to be 
expected no matter how inefficient maintenance was due to the effectiveness and 
desirability of providing smoke screens to landing forces.437 The ORS, however, did 
suggest that in the future, some modification should be made to the way in which the 
smoke screen is delivered and to examine whether aircraft were the most efficient 
method in delivery that form of support.438 
 
(Source: TNA, AIR 14/1809 ‘File 3A – A Note on Losses Sustained at Dieppe’ 12 October 1942, p. 1) 
                                                
Chart 3.8 - Predicted losses to No. 2 Group Squadrons over a sustained period 
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 439
440
441
The Bomber Command ORS reports make some interesting points about the 
effectiveness of the bombing of No. 2 Group. This is particularly interesting considering 
that the main claims over the lack of Bomber Command support. In reconnaissance 
undertaken in JUBILEE’s aftermath it was observed that of the two hundred and sixteen 
bombs dropped by No. 2 Group one hundred and ninety-six were observed to have 
‘burst’. Of these, eighty were dropped across a housing estate and the rest fell in open 
country, the nearest target was reported as three hundred yards away.  The sorties 
flown were conducted at low level, about four thousand feet, therefore, they achieved 
very inefficient results for the expended force. Had heavier bombers been used the 
impact upon civilian targets may well have been greater, thereby, negating any possible 
tactical use they may well have had. Bomber Command had been criticised in the 1941 
Butt Report for its accuracy when attacking German cities with the claim that only one in 
five crews put a bomb within five miles of the target.  Therefore, based on this and the 
ORS report it appears that any use of heavy bombers would have been highly inefficient 
and in the political realm, it may have actually been extremely damaging. Even in 1944, 
the issue of French casualties from bombing would still be a divisive issue in planning 
military operations, for example, it was an issue in the planning for Operation 
ASTORIA, the assault on Le Havre in September 1944.  
An area where the RAF had a relative advantage over the Luftwaffe was in the area 
of pilot losses. Chart 3.9 illustrates the fate of the RAF pilots lost in the course of 
JUBILEE. The pertinent point is that it illustrates is that thirty-three percent of RAF 
                                                 
439 TNA, AIR 14/1809, File 1A, p. 2. 
440 Biddle, Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare, p. 1. 
441 On the use of heavy bombers in support of ground operations see, Gooderson, Air Power at the 
Battlefront, pp. 125-164. On the role of bombers during the assault on Le Havre see Andrew Knapp, ‘The 
Destruction and Liberation of Le Havre in Modern Memory’ War in History, Vol. 14, No. 4 (Winter 2007) 
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pilots were classified as safe. This means that they managed to bale out of their aircraft, 
were picked either by friendly craft or by the air/sea rescue (ASR) organisation. Leigh-
Mallory in his report’s covering letter to the Secretary of State for Air praised the work of 
the ASR organisation and lamented on the loss of several of the Dover station’s craft 
that were operating outside of the range of the air cover umbrella.442 It is a testimony to 
the crews of the ASR craft that they were the last vessels to leave the battle area and that 
some of the last operations performed by the RAF during JUBILEE was to provide air 
cover for these vessels that provided sterling work and rescued numerous pilots from the 
channel during the operation.443 
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Chart 3.9 - Pilot Losses during Operation JUBILEE, 19 August 1942 
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rce: Norman Franks Royal Air Force Fighter Command Losses of the Second World War: Volume 2 – 
onal Losses: Aircraft and Crews, 1942-1943 (Leicester: Midland Publishing Limited, 1998) pp. 56-62) 
As well as pilots classified as safe another thirteen per cent were classified injured 
or wounded, therefore, able to be return to service later. However, Luftwaffe fighter pilot 
losses illustrate a similar story with thirty-eight per cent killed during the operation, as 
shown in Chart 3.10. Another twenty-nine percent were classified as missing. Assuming 
 
442 TNA, AIR 20/5186, Covering Letter to Report by the Air Force Commander, p. 2 
443 Franks, The Greatest Air Battle, pp. 170-172 
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that these pilots were either captured or killed, which are the most likely explanations, 
then the Jagdwaffe suffered attrition of sixty-seven per cent, a rate that would be deemed 
unacceptable for the return that occurred during JUBILEE. From 1942 onwards, there 
was a general decline in both the quality and quantity of German fighter pilots; therefore, 
a high attrition rate exacerbated the problem. 444 
 
(Sour th
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Overall, a more detailed analysis of the quantitative data available on JUBILEE 
reveal a more complex picture than the hitherto expressed. It highlights the high cost of 
providing assaulting forces with direct air support in the form of bombing, smoke laying 
and strafing. It should also be noted that there was little experience of this form of action 
in the aerial campaign over Northern France and in Combined Operations in general. 
That they were costly was a risk that it appears that both Fighter and Bomber Command 
were willing to take in future operations. It also reveals that in performing such costly 
operations the key threat came from AA fire, not enemy aircraft. Therefore, the decision 
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to provide overwhelming air cover not only reduced losses to the direct air support 
squadrons down but also blunted the Luftwaffe’s attempt to interfere with operations on 
the ground. The Luftwaffe’s only major success of the day was the sinking of HMS 
Berkeley, which was sunk by bombs from attacking Dornier DO217s.445 The key reason 
for this loss was that once German aircraft penetrated the fighter screen they became the 
responsibility of the RN’s AA gunners in order to avoid friendly fire incidents, the air 
plan called for aircraft not to fly below three thousand feet.446 Bomber Command’s OR 
reports also highlighted the issue of providing heavier support from bombers and that 
will be picked up upon later in this chapter. When attacking a well-developed command 
and control system, as the Luftwaffe had deployed in Northern France by 1942, then it 
was expected that the attacking force would incur losses. The nature of the offensive 
helps explain the nature of the losses incurred by the RAF. However, the ability of the 
RAF to fix and replace losses and retrieve stranded pilots gave them a quantitative and 
qualitative edge over the Luftwaffe in battle, as they were able to recover experience pilots 
who were of much more use than the recruits the Jagdwaffe would begin to rely upon. 
From 1942 onwards, the Luftwaffe simply could not afford similar losses to those that 
were now being incurred by the RAF. It would be further weakened by the US 8th 
Fighter Command in 1944, thus, helping to gain air superiority over France in 
preparation for OVERLORD. Therefore, at a tactical and operational level it can be seen 
that the decision to structure the RAF with an overwhelming predilection for fighter 
squadrons was arguably the right decision from both a doctrinal and operational 
perspective. The beginnings of this drain on Luftwaffe resources can be seen in JUBILEE. 
However, the limitation of RAF aircraft and the Luftwaffe’s decision to move aircraft back 
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to Germany in order to defend it airspace meant that from late 1943 the battle for air 
superiority would be taken over by the 8AAF with its long-range fighters.  
 
3.3 Raiding as an Intruder Strategy, 1942-1943 
 
The perceived success of JUBILEE would lead to the belief that raids would bring the 
Luftwaffe to fight, therefore, producing the means to battle them for air superiority over 
Northern France. In many respects, the emergence of this strategy, at the behest of 
Leigh-Mallory who in November 1942 replaced Douglas as AOC-in-C of Fighter 
Command, can be seen as a continuation of the offensive fighter sweep policy that was 
Fighter Command’s main role in 1941-1942. This scheme of combining raids with an 
attempt at offensive air action would become an element of Operation COCKADE; the 
elaborate camouflage and deception plan aimed at keeping the German guessing as to 
when and where an invasion would take place.447 In the year after JUBILEE, there were 
various attempts at launching such a scheme with varying degrees of success. Two 
operations made it as far as the planning stage, AFLAME and COLEMAN, and one 
would take place, albeit in a slightly different form, Operation STARKEY. 
As early as 22 August 1942 Leigh-Mallory wrote to Mountbatten saying that ‘I 
feel that we might profitably conduct a future operation on rather different lines.’448 In 
terms of ‘different lines’ Leigh-Mallory suggested the use of commandos as the assaulting 
force, citing the tactical success of Lord Lovat’s No. 4 Commando against the Hess 
Battery during JUBILEE as a possible blueprint.449 Leigh-Mallory contended that one of 
the disappointing aspects of JUBILEE was the paucity of opportunity for his direct 
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support squadrons to attack German reserves, as they were not thrown into the battle. 
He argued that if a small force were landed on a quiet stretch of coast then this would 
force the Germans to utilise reserves, therefore, allowing his direct support squadrons 
the opportunity to inflict ‘heavy casualties’ upon the enemy.450 He noted that this type of 
operation would also aid in the general degradation of the Luftwaffe’s striking force and 
would contribute to its final defeat.451 Since they were based upon information then 
available to Leigh-Mallory, these conclusions are hard to fault. However, in order to 
reproduce the effect that he was thinking about then a larger fighter force relative to the 
size of the operation would have to be provided to protect the direct air support that was 
to support the assaulting force. He also failed to appreciate the sheer size of the 
assaulting force necessary to draw in German reserves. Considering that this did not 
occur at Dieppe it is hard to see what effect a single commando would have upon 
German reserves in order to achieve the effect that Leigh-Mallory sought. 
However, despite this failure to understand the military requirement of such an 
operation it received the support of Mountbatten who convened a meeting on 7 
September at COHQ to examine the feasibility of such an operation.452 At this meeting, 
it was outlined that the primary purpose of the operation was to bring the Luftwaffe to 
battle. It was proposed that a similar number of Hunt class destroyers as used at Dieppe 
be utilized as naval support; however, there was no discussion of ground forces to be 
used. It was decided that the plan appeared sound and that planning should proceed with 
the plan put to the Chiefs of Staff and another meeting to be held on 17 September.453 
Mountbatten submitted a minute to the Chiefs of Staff on 16 September outlining the 
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operation. In this minute, Mountbatten claimed that it might not even be necessary to 
land any troops in order to bring the Luftwaffe to battle.454 Again, from the experience of 
JUBILEE, it is hard to see the reasoning behind this claim. Despite this, Mountbatten 
also claimed that AFLAME might have a larger strategic role to play as part of Operation 
OVERTHROW, the deception plan for Operation TORCH, assuming that approval was 
forthcoming in order to allow the operation to take place in October.455 
From an air power perspective, it is hard to ignore the fact that it appeared that 
Dieppe had been an unqualified success as Leigh-Mallory received reports stating that 
the Germans were in the process of reinforcing certain positions along the French and 
Norwegian coastline.456 However, by the time of the second planning meeting 
Mountbatten decided that no military force would be landed and that he was seeking the 
use of a light cruiser from the Admiralty in order to add to the deception. This raised 
concerns from Leigh-Mallory’s representative, Air Commodore Harcourt-Smith, who 
stated that the deception had to be strong enough to bring the Luftwaffe to battle; this was 
the primary objective of the operation.457 In order to aid the deception plan it was 
decided to make use of a small force of bombers on the night preceding the operation 
and to make use of dummy parachutists in order to convince the Germans of the 
operation’s veracity.458 In terms of the support to be provided by Bomber Command, 
Harris was sympathetic but asked that the targets be both more realistic considering the 
lack of success during JUBILEE, and also less politically sensitive. Harris pointed out to 
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Douglas that his operational directive from the War Cabinet dictated that only strictly 
military targets are attacked in occupied territory.459 Douglas passed on these comments 
to Leigh-Mallory who responded that the suggestions made by Harris had already by 
considered and rejected. In particular, the bombing of docks was something to which the 
Germans were used to, and unlikely to achieve the results desired.460 It is evident that 
despite Harris’ rational objection the nature of the deception, bombardment did not 
change and the town of Berck remained its target.461 On this issue, Harris received the 
support of Douglas blamed Mountbatten’s over-zealous attitude for this situation and 
hoped that Harris would still ‘play.’462 AFLAME was scheduled to take place between 4 
and 16 October depending on the weather and it was seen as a repeat of JUBILEE 
without the ground forces.463 Eventually the weather played its part and ALFAME was 
postponed indefinitely. It is hard to see how the force involved could have induced the 
Luftwaffe to come to battle with the RAF given the lack of assault forces involved. 
However, this did not stop planning for a similar operation taking place. 
By early October, Mountbatten was again seeking authorisation to launch an 
operation, COLEMAN, with the objective of inducing an air battle on terms favourable 
for Fighter Command.464 In his covering letter to the Chiefs of Staff, Mountbatten 
admits to the operation being similar in conception to AFLAME, and therefore 
JUBILEE, and that it were complementary to the ongoing CROSSBOW deception for 
TORCH.465 In effect, many elements that were prevalent in the planning for AFLAME 
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re-appear in COLEMAN such as Mountbatten’s insistence that night bombing was vital 
to the operation’s success. In preparation for the Chiefs of Staff meeting on 22 October 
to consider the plan, ACAS (P) was asked to prepare a summary of the viability of the 
operation. To enable this to be pursued both the DFO and DBO were asked for their 
comments on the plan.466 These memoranda illustrate the difficulties of inter-service co-
operation as the DFO commented that the plan produced by Mountbatten illustrated the 
usual ‘hurried sort of operation’ that Mountbatten was known for.467 DFO noted that in 
Mountbatten’s covering letter to the Chiefs of Staff he claimed to have had discussions 
with the heads of Fighter and Bomber Command about the operation. However, DFO 
noted that this was certainly not the case with Harris who had first heard of the plan on 
19 October when he was asked to examine the outline plan.468 DFO does not refer to 
Douglas or Leigh-Mallory, who due to their involvement with AFLAME, were most 
likely aware of plans to re-launch it. The tone of the memorandum is one of frustration 
at Mountbatten’s tactics in trying to force the operation through the planning process 
without due diligence, an issue that was prevalent during the decision to re-launch 
RUTTER.469 DFO noted that if Mountbatten wanted the support of the RAF he should 
be careful to work within the appropriate channels.470 DBO backs this up by confirming 
that until 19 October no one at Bomber Command had seen the plan. In veiled terms, 
DBO claimed that Mountbatten lied to the Chiefs of Staff.471 This was of course a major 
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issue for commands who were involved in constant operations. This was not the first 
time Mountbatten had attempted to circumvent the system. However, the opinions of 
the DFO and DBO would be brought forward to the Chiefs of Staff through the 
memorandum prepared by ACAS (P).472 
At an operational level both DFO and DBO were concerned about the timings 
and appropriateness of the operation. Indeed, DFO noted that from Fighter Command’s 
perspective the decision to seek a battle for aerial superiority was a good idea. However, 
prevailing weather conditions for November, when the operation was due to take place, 
would not aid the aim of the operation.473 DFO was particularly concerned about the 
affect the weather would have on issues such as bombing accuracy and the fact that 
cloudy conditions would hinder offensive fighter operations because of the enemy’s 
ability to use cloud cover to escape.474 DFO was also concerned about the level of 
support that Mountbatten was expecting from No. 2 Group and it was pointed out that 
support from the Americans would be needed and that even if this was forthcoming high 
casualties were to be expected.475 This was supported by DBO who pointed out that at 
Dieppe the limited actions of No. 2 Group had caused a high rate of wastage and that if 
the required numbers could be collected then the same would occur.476 On the issue of 
night bombing, the DBO re-iterated the concerns that Harris had raised during 
AFLAME over the issue of accuracy and civilian casualties. DBO contended that given 
the probable weather conditions night bombing should be considered incidental to the 
operation.477 These views were summarised by ACAS (P) and submitted to the Chiefs of 
                                                 
472 TNA, AIR 20/4529, Memorandum by ACAS (P) on Operation “COLEMAN” for the Chiefs of Staff 
Meeting on 22 October 1942, 20 October 1942, p. 1. 
473 TNA, AIR 20/4529, DFO to ACAS (P) reference Operation “COLEMAN”, 19 October 1942, p. 2 
474 TNA, AIR 20/4529, DFO to ACAS (P) reference Operation “COLEMAN”, 19 October 1942, pp. 1-2. 
475 TNA, AIR 20/4529, DFO to ACAS (P) reference Operation “COLEMAN”, 19 October 1942, p. 1. 
476 TNA, AIR 20/4529, DBO to ACAS (P) reference Operation “COLEMAN”, 19 October 1942, p. 2. 
477 TNA, AIR 20/4529, DBO to ACAS (P) reference Operation “COLEMAN”, 19 October 1942, p. 2. 
 131
Staff for consideration with the caveat that the plan was a weak one given the prevailing 
operational issues that faced the RAF.478 In the aftermath of this appreciation and the 
Chiefs of Staff meeting of 23 October Mountbatten was ordered to re-evaluate the plan 
in light of the navy’s decision not to provide him with six Hunt class destroyers and 
Portal’s decision to not allow fighter aircraft for direct support operations to 
participate.479 Therefore, by late 1942 the attempt to draw the Luftwaffe to battle using 
raiding as bait for air action had ended. In many respects it highlighted a strategic dead-
end, although one that was worth examining. Dieppe was in many respects the intruder 
strategy of 1941 writ large; therefore AFLAME and COLEMAN can be considered 
Dieppe writ large. However, they illustrate the degree to which Dieppe had been a one 
shot operation and that the likelihood of success a second time was unlikely especially so 
soon after Dieppe and given the prevailing operational conditions of the time. 
Despite the apparent failure of using raiding as a means to bring the Luftwaffe to 
battle this strategy would receive renewed vigour under the auspicious of the planning 
for the invasion of Europe during 1943. At the Casablanca Conference in January 1943, 
discussions took place concerning the nature of operations during the forthcoming year. 
A report by the British Joint Planning Staff to the Combined Chiefs of Staff decided that 
there were three possibilities for cross-channel operations during 1943. These were 
categorised as raids; operations with the purpose of seizing a bridgehead; and an 
uncontested return to the continent.480 The purpose of any future raids was described as 
provoking a major air battle and inflicting causalities on the enemy, therefore, a degree of 
continuity can be seen in the planning of raids in late 1942 and in 1943.481 These 
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proposed operations would eventually evolve into Operations COCKADE, 
OVERLORD and RANKIN.482 It was assumed that by August 1943 there would be 
sufficient air power resources for the purpose of either of these operations, however, it 
was noted that the home based operational commands of the RAF would require re-
organisation in order to make offensive air operations more effective.483 This re-
organisation, based upon lessons from Europe and the Mediterranean, would lead to the 
formation of the RAF’s 2nd Tactical Air Force (2TAF). In a report by the Combined 
Commanders to the Chiefs of Staff, it was made clear that from an air power perspective 
it was crucial that sufficient aircraft were available for maintaining air superiority.484 
A key element in the preparations for the invasion of Europe was COCKADE, 
which was conceived as a deception plan with the purpose of pinning German forces in 
the west for fear of a possible large-scale operation against the continent.485 COCKADE 
consisted of three subsidiary operations, STARKEY, WADHAM and TINDALL. Both 
STARKEY and WADHAM were inter-dependent, with STARKEY acting as the main 
assault and WADHAM as a follow-on force landing on the Brittany peninsula.486 Of the 
operations STARKEY is most important for consideration in this thesis as inherent to its 
planning was the desire to draw the Luftwaffe to battle.487 The outline plan for STARKEY 
noted that it was ‘primarily designed to compel the German Air Force over a prolonged 
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period to engage in air battles of attrition.’488 Thus, it is apparent that in terms of 
effectively deceiving the German of the Allies’ intentions in 1943, raiding with the 
purpose of forcing an air battle had become an important element of preparations for the 
invasion. In its basic conception, STARKEY sought to feign the movement of a large 
number of troops and suggest to the Germans that a major operation was to take place 
in the area of Boulogne. As these movements took place, a crescendo of air operations 
would take place in the vicinity in an attempt to bring the Luftwaffe to battle. Then in the 
final phase of the operation, it was intended to demonstrate with amphibious forces off 
the French coast but not to actually land them. The operation was to last for a period of 
three weeks with air operations reaching their peak by early September 1943.489 As with 
JUBILEE Leigh-Mallory was to take control of the RAF during the operation. Because 
of the scale of STARKEY, planning was spread over several months from March to 
August 1943. The air plan called for the use of a significant amount of Allied air power 
from both the RAF and the USAAF. In this respect General Ira Eaker, commander of 
the 8AAF, aided Leigh-Mallory in the planning process.490 From an air power 
perspective, the planning for STARKEY was similar in many respects to the operations 
that had gone before it. This should come as no surprise given the involvement of Leigh-
Mallory. However, one area where it did divert from previous operations was in the use 
of large numbers of bombers. Previously issues over accuracy and civilian casualties had 
led to the abandonment of their use. However, at the time of JUBILEE, this was not 
considered a major issue due to the factor of tactical surprise. Yet for STARKEY their 
use was considered vitally important to the deception plan. However, questions were 
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raised over their use. Harris again questioned their viability noting that the initial level of 
bomber support to be provided was ‘just the sort of thing an idol [sic] army dotes on.’ 
Eaker, who was not willing to waver from the Pointblank Directive that had been issued 
to both himself and Harris, supported him in this view.491 Thus, while bomber forces 
were to be used they were not used on the levels intended. The Pointblank Directive had 
called for the Allied bomber forces ‘to impose heavy losses on German day fighter force 
and to conserve German fighter force away from the Russian and Mediterranean theatres 
of war’ and was issued at the Casablanca Conference.492 
The air plan called for three phases of operations. First, the preliminary phase 
was to call for the reinforcement of Fighter Command’s No. 11 Group between 16 and 
24 August. Second, the preparatory phase called for an increase in operations with 
reconnaissance over the target area and bombardment of key installations between 25 
August and 7 September. Finally, the culminating phase called for attacks on vital 
installations, such as coastal batteries in preparation for the demonstration by the naval 
force off Boulogne. The naval force was to be protected by air cover in an attempt to 
lure the Luftwaffe up.493 Significant forces were tasked to take part in STARKEY with No. 
11 Group reinforced to seventy-two squadrons. For the culminating phase 8AAF and 
Bomber Command promised three hundred sorties each when available.494 The issues of 
availability came around because Bomber Command had just begun its assault upon 
Berlin, thus Harris complained to the Chiefs of Staff that this interfered with his primary 
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mission. However, he was ordered to make a portion of aircraft available for STARKEY, 
thus illustrating the importance placed on this operation.495 
In general operation proceeded as planned over the period of the operation and 
during the period of D-Day, 7/8 September, Fighter Command flew some seventeen 
hundred sorties on air cover duties. Despite the air effort the Germans did not respond 
in the manner hoped for with only small forces engaging the attacking bombers and 
fighters. By this time, the Luftwaffe in northern France had standing orders to avoid 
combat where numbers were unadvantageous and the AHB narrative commented that 
this was probably a lesson learnt from Dieppe.496 However, despite this apparent 
disappointment, lessons were learnt and they were able to be refined in preparation for 
the invasion in 1944. Much like at Dieppe concerns were still being uttered concerning 
the command and control of forces during the operation. It was noted that the HQS was 
not positioned advantageously for the control of fighters and that communications with 
airfields was far from good. This was an issue, as seen below, that was already being 
examined in light of Dieppe and operation elsewhere. It was also noted that in terms of 
strategic reconnaissance for the operation had been inadequate had this been an active 
operation.497 
In other areas, STARKEY aided allied preparations for Normandy. For example, 
Campbell has argued that the deception lessons learnt during STARKEY affected 
FORTITUDE SOUTH. It had been intended that FORTITUDE SOUTH take a similar 
form to STARKEY but upon examining the results of STARKEY this plan was 
revised.498 The issue of bombing during STARKEY has remained a point of contention 
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with Cumming’s work concentrating on this aspect of the operation.499 Considering the 
similarities between JUBILEE and STARKEY and the issues raised by Villa over the 
lack of aerial bombardment for JUBILEE, it is interesting to compare this with a work 
that is at odds with the efficacy of bombing. A possible explanation for this divergence 
arrives from the issue that, unlike JUBILEE, STARKEY did not actually land any troops; 
therefore, it is difficult to understand their use. However, despite this, there is a link 
between doctrine and attempts to consider the use of bombing in raids such as 
STARKEY after Dieppe. STARKEY, however, did help shake the belief that air 
superiority could be won over the invasion area during the operation, a belief that had 
existed since Dieppe and exemplified in the operations planned for autumn 1942.500 This 
led to the requirement that air superiority was a direct prerequisite for OVERLORD’s 
success. Thus, it can be contended that by 1943 attempts at combining feint raids with 
the desire to engage the Luftwaffe had not had the effect of drawing down German 
strength but had instead aided in learning lessons in the area of deception and the 
necessity of air superiority. In many respects, the issue of air superiority had long been 
understood and that operational experience brought home the realties of inter-war 
doctrine of its importance in Combined Operations. For example, the MCO had noted 
that where possible advanced landing ground and air superiority should be gained in 
advance of any planned operation.501 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
499 Cumming, The Starkey Sacrifice, passim 
500 Campbell, ‘Operation STARKEY’ p. 107. 
501 TNA, AIR 10/1437, Manual of Combined Operations (1938), p. 121. 
 137
3.4 Command and Control of Air Power during Combined Operations 
 
Air operations over Dieppe illustrated the efficacy of providing overwhelming air cover 
as in pre-war doctrine. For example, Admiral Sir Dudley Pound in December 1942 noted 
that ‘One of the most important requirements for an opposed landing is the provision of 
adequate fighter support during the assault.’502 While this memorandum on Fighter Support 
for Assault in Combined Operations was concerned primarily with future operations against 
Japan and the use of fighters in long-range operations, it does make clear the importance 
that was now to be place upon fighter support.503 Pound clearly noted that in support of 
continental operations the RAF would provide fighter support, much as at Dieppe and 
that this would be the most economical use of air power.504 This is, however, where 
several developmental paths begin to converge with their experience building up 
throughout 1943 and feeding into OVERLORD in 1944. While Dieppe clearly illustrated 
certain lessons, many were also being learnt in the Mediterranean with the experience 
being built up by the WDAF and other forces in theatre in support of Operations 
TORCH, HUSKY, and AVALANCHE. For example, an undated paper from 1943 
stated that lessons on the effect of tactical employment of air power were being learnt 
from various sources places such as Britain, France and Egypt.505 Despite the plurality of 
lessons being drawn from various campaigns on the importance of air superiority there 
remained the issue of command and control of these forces in Combined Operations. In 
a paper written by Mountbatten on fighter direction, he commented that there was a 
need for Fighter Direction Ships (FDS) to co-ordinate the use of fighters in Combined 
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Operations.506 This need was nothing new. In the planning for RUTTER/JUBILEE 
Leigh-Mallory had voiced concerns that communications between Uxbridge and the field 
headquarters during YUKON II had not been satisfactory. He was concerned that these 
problems would re-appear during RUTTER though it was noted that this was already 
being examined at the time.507 However, despite this Leigh-Mallory noted that the use of 
the two HQS proved satisfactory and that the control system in place proved 
acceptable.508 Leigh-Mallory also noted the similarity of the system to one being used in 
support of ground forces in North Africa.509 It would be these two sources of experience 
that would see the evolution of more effective HQS and the development of Fighter 
Direction Tenders (FDT). They would aid in the command and control of air support 
during Combined Operations in 1943.510 
During JUBILEE, it was not possible to utilise the HQS that were then under 
development so two of the Hunt class destroyers, Calpe and Fernie, had been equipped as 
HQS with VHF and HF radio equipment. They were noted to have served effectively 
but the conditions in these ships were cramped and that further development was 
required.511 The problems of communication had already been highlighted earlier in 1942 
and upon taking up the post of ACO in late 1941 Mountbatten had set up an inter-
service committee to examine this issue. During the course of late 1941 to May 1942 the 
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committee drafted six reports dealing with various issues relating to communication.512 
Of particular importance was the second report, which dealt with support 
communications in Combined Operations.513 This report led to the ordering and 
development of HQS and the FDS in 1942 and it was noted that in particular the control 
of air units was difficult without the facilities that could be deployed in these vessels.514 
Concerning HQS, HMS Bulolo was built by June 1942 and HMS Largs was commissioned 
later in the year, but neither was ready for use at Dieppe.515 These ships were to allow 
effective control and overview of forces involved in Combined Operations. From the 
RAF’s perspective, they were to enable maximum flexibility to deal with changing 
requirements during the assault phase by reducing the time lag between requests for air 
support.516 
For the development of HQS, JUBILEE represents a test of the system then 
being put in place. It would appear from the various reports on the raid that Calpe and 
Fernie served well in a role for which they were not intended. However, the loss of the 
Berkeley and the persistent attacks at low level by German bombers does raise the 
question of their effectiveness in calling upon low-level air support. This does not mean 
that air power failed at Dieppe but it does illustrate some of its limitations inherent 
during JUBILEE; for example, the coordination between low-level air cover and 
weaknesses in the provision of AA defence for the fleet.517 However, after JUBILEE, 
there was to be continued development and refinement of the HQS concept as a 
command and control system for Combined Operations. Both Bulolo and Largs served at 
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Normandy supporting Anglo-Canadian forces. However, the development of these 
vessels did not fully deal with the operational problems of controlling air power during 
Combined Operations. This was because the HQS had too many functions with which 
to contend and the control of air power needed a specialised support vessel of its own; 
this had been recognised during JUBILEE and reinforced by the experience of TORCH 
where Bulolo served. It had been noted that Landing Ships Tank (LST) could be used to 
mount ground-control interception (GCI) radar for controlling aircraft.518 Thus, HQS 
gained a co-ordinating function for the newly developed FDT by the time of 
Normandy.519 
Discussions on the need for a new type of vessel to control air power during 
Combined Operations emerged in late 1942 with the recognition that the specialist 
equipment needed to control air power effectively did not fit easily into a HQS.520 
Initially discussions focussed on the types of operations to be supported and how best to 
support them. Questions were raised over the suitability of various RN ships for the role 
such as escort carriers, however, it was recognised that large fleet units would suffer the 
same problems as smaller vessels such as Calpe, in that they were already tasked for 
specialised work and to add another responsibility would require additional Fighter 
Direction Officers (FDO).521 Discussions steered towards the development of three 
proposals: first, use of a suitable warship; second, conversion of further convoy vessels 
like Bulolo; third, conversion of a landing ship.522 Discussions in January 1943 led to the 
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decision that the most practical solution to the provision of a FDT was with an LST 
Mk.II. It was argued that it offered the advantage of being able to move with the fleet 
and had the necessary space to mount the equipment needed.523 It was noted that the 
vessels would have to carry a GCI system and associated R/T, W/T and ‘Y’ facilities in 
order to control aircraft during Combined Operations.524 
The inclusion of ‘Y’ signals intelligence in the requirements for FDTs highlights 
the use of this important source of information in the conduct of air power operations.525 
During JUBILEE, much use was made of the RAF’s ‘Y’ network, especially the station at 
Cheadle, which had been informed of the raid before its launch.526 It would appear that 
the effectiveness of ‘Y’ material during JUBUILEE was mixed. This was for two key 
reasons: first, the time taken to analyse the material coming through the ‘Y’ system; 
second, the physical operational issues at No. 11 Group where it was difficult to pass 
information along the command chain.527 The system also suffered from not being told 
by No. 11 Group as to what type of information was needed during the course of 
operation, thus, leading to an overloading of the system.528 During JUBILEE, an 
improvised reporting system was used whereby information from the Observer Corps, 
RDF and fighter R/T traffic was decoded at Cheadle. Bomber W/T was also decoded at 
Cheadle but high priority material was transferred through to No. 11 Group when 
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necessary.529 It was found that there were faults in this system and that priority 
information could not be supplied to Leigh-Mallory. This reduced its impact upon 
operations. For example, security issues over the use of RDF traffic negated its use as no 
preparation was made for it.530 It was suggested that in order to overcome this problem 
the type of information wanted from the RDF system should be requested in advance 
and that a new system of reporting be set up with controller at group headquarters.531 In 
light of the experience gained during JUBILEE it was also recommended that a new 
organisation be superimposed upon the normal reporting system and that officers trained 
in Combined Operations be used to support the system in place.532 The posting of 
specialist officers for decoding ‘Y’ intelligence would influence the development of FDTs 
where a proportion of the crew was dedicating to support this form of information and 
discussions in late 1943 established the strength required to operate the FDTs; for the ‘Y’ 
section, this would consist of one officer and eight other ranks.533 By the time of 
OVERLORD the crew, staffing the ‘Y’ system on the FDTs that were working in 
conjunction with the GCI system provided excellent support for the air forces operating 
over the beachhead.534 
Development and discussion of the FDT concept continued and by March 1943 
LST 301 had been fitted with equipment for trials off Portland. In this series of tests in 
was recognised that there were several technical problems that would need to be dealt 
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with before FDTs could be deployed.535 These trials were to test the applicability of the 
concept, how GCI radar could be used and whether or not it could be mounted on a 
mobile platform with the purpose of offloading the equipment during an assault.536 The 
possibility of using mobile GCI equipment faced severe practical problems. For example, 
the vehicles used to transport the equipment were too high to fit through the LST’s bow 
doors and had to be craned on board. It was also found that the lorries that carried that 
equipment suffered from mechanical stress when tied to the decks. This meant that they 
could not be used effectively.537 Problems with the mounting of equipment also impeded 
the detection of aircraft during the trials; aircraft from RAF Middle Wallop were detailed 
to support these. It was found that issues relating to the height of the GCI mount meant 
that detection was often a thousand feet out. The key issue for the trials was the problem 
of mounting the RAF GCI equipment to a ship, a role for which it was not envisaged.538 
It was decided that the GCI equipment needed some modification and that to 
supplement it with a naval set to provide full coverage.539 In May, trials of the MkIV GCI 
equipment took place using LST 305 in the Clyde area. The trails of this equipment 
proved positive though similar technical issues as encountered in testing LST 301 were 
experienced.540 Despite these issues, the operational testing of the system was useful and 
it was noted that the effectiveness of the layout was similar to that supplied by the Chain 
Home Low system.541 However, identification, often a problem on land, was difficult at 
sea and it was suggested that while the theory of the system appeared sound the 
                                                 
535 TNA, DEFE 2/954, Trials of GCI Equipment fitted in LST 301, Portland, 27  Feb. to 14th th Mar. 1943 
– Report by Sub. Lt. D. Alford, 17 March 1943. 
536 TNA, DEFE 2/954, Trials of GCI Equipment, p. 1. 
537 TNA, DEFE 2/954, Trials of GCI Equipment, p. 1. 
538 TNA, DEFE 2/954, Trials of GCI Equipment, pp. 3-5. 
539 TNA, DEFE 2/954, Covering Letter to Trials of GCI Equipment, 17 March 1943. 
540 TNA, DEFE 2/954, Trials of GCI Equipment fitted in LST 305, 30 May 1943, pp. 2-5. 
541 TNA, DEFE 2/954, LST 305, p. 5. 
 144
equipment would need to be calibrated in the LST and the crews trained in interception 
methods while at sea.542 
While there were teething problems in the installation of GCI equipment, LST 
305 and two more LSTs, 407 and 430, were utilised in HUSKY and AVALANCHE 
where they proved invaluable in control air assets over the beachhead.543 This success led 
to a request from Leigh-Mallory for the further development of FDTs for OVERLORD 
as he argued that these ships had proven their capabilities in the Mediterranean.544 This 
opinion was reinforced by the views coming out of the Mediterranean with discussion 
occurring in the aftermath of AVALANCHE about the need for specialised FDS to free 
up the HQS in theatre.545 This was also backed up by calls being made for these vessels 
from South-East Asia Command (SEAC).546 Leigh-Mallory’s request was noted, although 
Mountbatten pointed out that the vessels used in HUSKY, while suitable for the 
Channel, would not be for long-range operations in SEAC.547 Here is where the 
divergence between requirements for FDTs in coastal areas and FDS for long-range 
operation emerges. However, despite this divergence the decision to convert LSTs into 
FDTs was taken on 13 November 1943. These ships were completed by February 
1944.548 The LST’s converted were Nos. 13, 216 and 217 and they were fitted out in the 
same manner as LST 305 with GCI, RDF and ‘Y’ equipment.549 
One problem that emerged once the decision to create the FDTs was one of 
staffing. The ships were operated by the RN but the equipment came from the RAF. 
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This created issues on inter-service co-operation and in the trials in early 1943, it had 
been noted that the conditions at sea meant that any crew would require specialist 
training to be able to cope with changeable conditions that would affect both crew and 
equipment.550 The controlling formation for controllers attached to the FDTs was No. 
105 Wing, which was based at the CTC and emerged out of the formations founded in 
early 1942. In December, No. 105 Wing raised the question as to the establishment 
needed for the ships and who was to supply the crews.551 It was estimated that the crews 
would be supplied by the Allied Expeditionary Air Force (AEAF) and trained through 
the administration of No. 105 Wing. The requirements were set at sixty officers and three 
hundred and fifty-six other ranks for the four FDTs. 552 On 20 December, a meeting was 
held to discuss the personnel requirement for the FDTs. At this meeting, the 
requirement for four vessels was reduced to three and it was noted that it would be 
difficult for the RAF to supply the needed controllers for each FDT.553 It was decided 
that it would be best if the set comprised of a ‘mixed team’ of naval FDO and RAF 
Controllers. It was necessary that the RAF controllers receive specialist training as noted 
earlier.554 It was also decided that each ship have ten controllers for the GCI system and 
that each of these gain experience at sea. By early January 1944 plans were put in place 
for RAF Controllers to attend a short course at the Fighter Direction Centre at RNAS 
Yeovilton in order to familiarise themselves with naval procedures.555 While training was 
dealt with, Leigh-Mallory raised questions of manning, arguing that his command should 
not bear the brunt of supplying airmen, as the need for the vessels was not peculiar to 
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AEAF.556 As can be seen the requirement was to be shared between the RN and RAF 
and manning levels were constantly being adjusted as airmen went through the training at 
Yeovilton and experienced was gained.557 Manning was also aided by the fact that by May 
1944 it was decided to remove unnecessary RAF personnel from HQS and hold them in 
reserve at No. 105 Wing as replacements.558 Training remained ongoing, because of the 
proposed future use of the FDT/FDS concept in SEAC, and discussion as to setting up 
permanent crews emerged, as well as debate on whether or not RAF personnel should be 
transferred to the RN – a good illustration inter-service parochialism. It was felt that 
crews should be keep together in the preparation for OVERLORD. However, after their 
training most crews were dispersed to train and keep in touch with technical 
developments while the vessels remained in port.559 By the time of OVERLORD the 
crews were proficient in the systems they were to use and capable of working at sea due 
to the training that they had received.560 
The removal of the air control function for the HQS led to a rationalisation of 
the command and control systems for Combined Operation. The development of FDTs 
would eventually affect the control of air power during OVERLORD and the 
subsequent development of FDS would have been useful in the planned Combined 
Operations in SEAC. What emerged in the aftermath of JUBILEE and the experience of 
the Mediterranean was a synergetic command and control system that worked effectively 
in Combined Operations. It also saw the effective co-operation of two of the services to 
solve the problem of control that had persistently been a point of controversy in the 
inter-war years. A report on the use of HQS and FDTs produced by AEAF and 
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published in September 1945 is glowing in its praise on the use of these vessels. On the 
use of FDTs it remarks that they were a great success especially given the ‘rush job’ of 
producing them in late 1943.561 However, the report remarked on the problem of fitting 
the technical equipment in the FDTs, which had been noted throughout the trials in 
1943. This was undoubtedly an outgrowth the unorthodox mating of two dissimilar sets 
of equipment.562  
During OVERLORD, the HQS were responsible for the co-ordination of 
fighter-bomber support concentrating on controlling aircraft with pre-arranged target 
sets and squadrons on stand-by. In this role, they served well and information filtered 
through to the HQS was useful to the commanders on board in planning operations 
though the use of ‘Y’ intelligence. The report did note that the development of the FDT 
had reduced the usefulness of the HQS.563 Given the problems of co-ordination 
experienced at Dieppe, this development had a positive impact. The primary reason for 
the loss of HMS Berkeley had been the problem of the calling down low-level cover 
through the HQS. In removing this function, the HQS was free to concentrate on other 
areas. The transfer of control of air cover to the FDTs was to show its worth during 
OVERLORD where effective air cover was maintained, something that was vital for an 
operation of the size of OVERLORD. Each low cover squadrons deployed during the 
assault was to call up its representative FDT and liaise with it while in the battlespace in 
order to receive control instructions when necessary.564 In this, they were successful 
though it should be noted that operation were aided by the lack of Luftwaffe operations 
on the day.565 Thus, the FDTs did not have to contest intense air operations as had been 
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experienced at Dieppe. Thus, by examining the experience of Dieppe and subsequent 
operations in the Mediterranean an effective system evolved to control air forces in the 
assault phase of a Combined Operation using HQS and FDTs. While the FDT was a 
hasty expedient it would continue to be developed with plans to enlarge it to an ocean-
going vessel for the support of long-range operation in SEAC. 
 
3.5 The Graham Report and Aerial Bombardment 
 
Perhaps the most contentious issue in the historiography of JUBILEE has been the 
subject of the lack of pre-bombardment as a prelude to the operation. This thesis has so 
far shown that in doctrinal terms this was not an issue with it not being considered a 
necessary pre-requisite for Combined Operations in this period, the preference being for 
air superiority. It has also shown that while bombardment had been part of the original 
planning for RUTTER, its cancellation on the grounds of the loss of tactical surprise was 
not unreasonable on the part of Leigh-Mallory. Thus, the contentions of historians such 
Villa and the Whitakers, that lack of this element effectively damaged any possible 
chance for success, needs to be re-examined.566 Villa contends that the lack of ‘fire-power 
proved fatal to the Canadian and British invaders.’567 Given the nature of the positions 
that were being attacked and problems highlighted during 1943 and 1944 it is dubious 
that it would have been of much use. However, despite this the question of 
bombardment in general and aerial bombardment in particular was not ignored in the 
aftermath of JUBILEE. In Hughes-Hallett’s Lessons Learnt summary, he noted that 
JUBILEE highlighted the need for fire support and that from the RAF it was needed 
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when and where the limits of time and space allowed.568 While some research has been 
done on issues of naval bombardment little has been done on the issue of aerial 
bombardment.569 
As early as 15 September 1942 COHQ prepared a paper that dealt with the issue 
of fire support during an assault. However, it failed to deal adequately with air support as 
this fell outside of its remit.570 By October, an Assault Committee that was formed at 
COHQ to examine the problems associated with bombardment and to produce a report 
with proposals on new methods and requirements based upon recent experiences. 
However, air power was not fully explored as it was stated simply in the committee’s 
conclusion, submitted on 6 December, that ‘In all stages of the action all forms of air 
support would be an urgent requirement.’571 This was hardly an informed assessment of 
the air requirements for support any Combined Operation. However, as a result of a 
memorandum submitted by CCO to the Chiefs of Staff on 16 November and discussed 
on 2 December it was decided to set up a Technical Sub-Committee to report on 
‘Whether the requirements of fire support in assaults could be met by bombing, gunfire 
from ships, or a combination of both.’572 The RAF’s representative on the committee 
was the DBO, Air Commodore J W Baker, thus highlighting the importance of the need 
for a discussion on aerial bombardment.573 There was at this time two bodies that were 
seeking to examine the problems of bombardment in Combined Operations. While the 
initial results of the Assault Committee were disappointing this was not rectified by the 
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Technical Sub-Committee that only explored the provision naval support.574 While it is 
clear that Dieppe had an impact on the planning for close support, these early efforts 
appear not to have explored aerial aspects in any meaningful manner.575 Despite these 
difficulties it was recognised by the Assault Committee that any future exploration of the 
problems of close support was ‘fundamentally a joint naval and air problem’ and that for 
effective fire that was balanced there was a need for a ‘plan in which naval, military and 
air action must all play their parts.’576 
While the Assault Committee and its investigations continued in early 1943, in 
general the question of support remained moot until planning for OVERLORD 
increased in the summer of 1943. During June 1943 a conference, RATTLE, was held to 
examine the problems facing OVERLORD’s planners. One of the early issues for 
discussion was air support. This meeting was to be chaired by Leigh-Mallory and was to 
examine in particular the issues of bombing and airborne forces.577 Included for 
discussion was a paper on neutralising gun batteries. It summarised possible sources of 
contention that surround the use of aerial bombardment, for example, the physical 
impact that bombardment may have on ground force’s ability to move and the problem 
of providing adequate cover over all the proposed invasion beaches.578 The 
memorandum also explored the question of why bombardment was desired and it 
questioned whether it was being used a tool for morale of troops or for military 
expediency.579 The other question raised was what lessons were going to be learnt from 
                                                 
574 TNA, AIR 20/9503, History, p. 121; DEFE 2/1024, Short History, pp. 3-4. 
575 TNA, AIR 20/9503, History, p. 119. 
576 TNA, DEFE 2/1024, Appendix A – Summary of Findings of COHQ Assault Committee 
(November/December), 30 August 1943, p. 1. 
577 TNA, AIR 20/5229, RATTLE Programme, 23 June 1943, p. 1. 
578 TNA, AIR 20/5229, Air Bombardment – The Problem of Neutralising Coast Defences, 24 June 1943, 
pp. 1-2. 
579 TNA, AIR 20/5229, Air Bombardment, p.2. 
 151
air operations in the Mediterranean, in particular Operation CORKSCREW, the 
occupation of Pantelleria on 10 June 1943, which had been preceded by a ten day 
preliminary bombardment.580 It is here that we start to see a divergence from the lessons 
from Dieppe in that it highlighted the need for some form of support but did not 
provide practical experience and that would be gained from other theatres of operation. 
It should also be noted that Fergusson credits Leigh-Mallory with playing a leading part 
and ensuring RATTLE occurred at all.581 
With it becoming clear to the planners of OVERLORD and the various 
Mediterranean Combined Operations, that bombardment was a subject that needed a 
more rigorous investigation. Mountbatten submitted a paper to the Chiefs of Staff 
entitled Considerations governing the support of a seaborne assault against a heavily defended coast, 
which led to the proposal of the setting up of an inter-departmental committee to 
investigate the problem of bombardment.582 The First Sea Lord at the Chiefs of Staff 
meeting on 17 August 1943 where it was agreed to set up the committee tabled this 
proposal.583 It was agreed that the committee be set up and that a chairman be provided 
by COHQ. Sir Douglas Evill, VCAS, suggested that fire support should include all forms 
including aerial bombardment.584 The decision to appoint the chairman was left to 
COHQ and it was decided to appoint an airman to the position, Air Vice-Marshal 
Ronald Graham.585 Graham was a suitable choice for this position as he was currently 
serving as the Chief of Staff (Air) at COHQ and during the interwar years, he delivered 
                                                 
580 For details of CORKSCREW see, Fergusson, The Watery Maze, pp. 237-240; Ian Gooderson, A Hard 
Way to Make War: The Allied Campaign in Italy in the Second World War (London: Conway, 2008) pp. 76-78. 
581 Fergusson, The Watery Maze, pp. 273-274. 
582 TNA, AIR 20/9503, History, p. 122. 
583 TNA, AIR 20/9503, History, p. 122; DEFE 2/1024 ‘Extract from COS (43) 190th Meeting regarding 
Fire Support of Seaborne Landings against a heavily Defended Coast’. 
584 TNA, DEFE 2/1024, Extract from COS (43) 190  Meeting. th
585 TNA, DEFE 2/1024, Chief of Staff to CCO to Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee, 19 August 1943. 
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numerous lectures on the subject of Combined Operations at the RAF Staff College. The 
committee was made up of various representatives from each of the services and with 
relevant members from the forces preparing for OVERLORD attending most of the 
meetings.586 At the first meeting, 4 September, of the committee it was agreed that the 
method for approach the problem should be split into: 
(i) Destruction or neutralisation of the coast defences. 
(ii) Destruction or neutralisation of beach defences. 
(iii) Tactical fire support of landings.587 
  
In discussing these key areas for examination, the first meeting spent much time 
considering the various forms of defences that would be encountered in each case. It was 
noted that the broad responsibilities of the three services in this form of action fell into 
two categories. First, on land, fire effect was an army requirement and that it should 
provide its own support; second, during the assault phase of any operation it was an air 
and naval problem to produce the required effect. Thus, there was an attempt to divide 
responsibility into spheres of operations.588 
Whilst outside of the scope and remit of the committee, Graham made it clear to 
the committee of the possible limitation of aerial bombardment by pointing out that it 
would only be effective in an operation where air superiority had been achieved.589 It was 
also pointed out by Professor Solly Zuckerman that there was a need to assess the 
cumulative effect of naval and air bombardment in order to consider appropriate 
methodologies.590 The Air Ministry’s representatives, Air Vice-Marshals Coryton and 
Breakey, ACAS (Ops) and ACAS (T) respectively, to prepare preliminary answers to 
                                                 
586 TNA, AIR 20/9503, History, p. 123. 
587 TNA, DEFE 2/1024, Minutes of the 1st Meeting of the Interservice Committee to Consider Provision 
of Fire Support on a Heavily Defended Coast, 4 September 1943, p. 2. 
588 TNA, DEFE 2/1024, Minutes of the 1st Meeting, p. 2. 
589 TNA, DEFE 2/1024, Minutes of the 1st Meeting, p. 3. 
590 TNA, DEFE 2/1024, Minutes of the 1st Meeting, p. 3. 
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these issues, agreed concerning the three main problems facing the committee.591 By the 
time of the second meeting of the committee, the Air Ministry had prepared two papers 
dealing with the issues of the destruction of coastal and beach defences by aerial 
bombardment.592 On the issue of coastal defences, singled emplaced guns and batteries 
in open pits, it was generally concluded that attacks would be successful from high level 
but that attacks on concreted defences would have little, except moral, effect.593 The 
investigation examined the practical implications attacking such positions and through 
comparison with CORKSCREW, it was agreed that in attacking this form of target 
bombs greater than 500lbs should be used and that the attack altitude was dependent on 
the intensity of AA defences in the area.594  
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591 TNA, DEFE 2/1024, Minutes of the 1st Meeting, passim. 
592 TNA, DEFE 2/1024, Fire Support for an Opposed Landing statement by the Air Staff on the 
Destruction or Neutralisation of Coast Defences, 16 September 1943; DEFE 2/1024, Fire Support for an 
Opposed Landing statement by the Air Staff on the Destruction or Neutralisation of Beach Defences, 16 
September 1943. 
593 TNA, DEFE 2/1024, Destruction or Neutralisation of Coast Defences, p. 6. 
594 TNA, DEFE 2/1024, Destruction or Neutralisation of Coast Defences, p. 2. 
 154
(Source: TNA, DEFE 2/1024 ‘Fire Support for an Opposed Landing statement by the Air Staff on the 
Destruction or Neutralisation of Coast Defences’ 16 September 1943, p. 5) 
 
Chart 3.11 illustrates the predictions made by the Air Ministry on the weight of effort 
needed to reduce coastal defences. As can be seen the most economical methods would 
appear to be with blind bombing Avro Lancasters equipped with Oboe. These figures 
were extrapolated from data acquired from CORKSCREW.595 The paper not only 
considered the impact of bombardment but also examined the use of rocket-armed 
fighter-bombers in attacks against coastal defences. It was concluded that fighter-
bombers were most effective against sandbagged emplacements and that 60lb high 
explosive rockets in a salvo of eight at an angle of twenty-five degrees was the most 
effective use of this weapon.596 The paper was discussed at the second meeting of the 
committee on 18 September where Rear Admiral Patterson questioned the bombing 
accuracy figures supplied in the report. Coryton explained that the figure were the result 
of considering all factors and were based on the experience of highly trained crews, as 
were the Admiralty’s. However, Graham highlighted that accuracy was a key issues and 
based upon the problems of getting bomber support in earlier operations this was an 
issue that had to be kept in mind by the committee.597 
In addition to the paper on coastal defences, the Air Ministry also prepared a 
similar paper on how to deal with beach defences. The scope of this report examined 
attacks on numerous and scattered targets such as minefields and wire that would be 
present on any beach defence.598 The paper concluded that because of the dispersed 
nature of the targets the most useful method of attack would be through the use of area 
                                                 
595 TNA, DEFE 2/1024, Destruction or Neutralisation of Coast Defences, p. 5. 
596 TNA, DEFE 2/1024, Attacks on Gun Emplacements with R.P. - Appendix E to the Destruction or 
Neutralisation of Coast Defences’, p. 1. 
597 TNA, DEFE 2/1024, Minutes of the 2nd Meeting of the Inter-Service Committee to Consider Provision 
of Fire Support for a Landing on a Heavily Defended Coast, 18 September 1943, p. 4. 
598 TNA, DEFE 2/1024, Destruction or Neutralisation of Beach Defences, p. 1. 
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bombing from medium or high altitude though it was noted that attacks on minefields 
were still be investigated and it was unsure what effect bombardment would have on this 
form of defence.599 In terms of the effort, require to neutralise beach defences it was 
assumed that the most effective method was by Lancasters bombing with 500lb medium 
capacity and 20lb fragmentation bombs on targets marked by the Pathfinder Force as 
illustrated in Chart 3.12. It was also assumed that the proportion would be sixty per cent 
fragmentation bombs to forty per cent medium capacity bombs.600 
 
(Source: TNA, DEFE 2/1024 ‘Fire Support for an Opposed Landing statement by the Air Staff on the 
Destruction or Neutralisation of Beach Defences’ 16 September 1943, p. 2) 
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Both papers were discussed at the second meeting of the committee where it was agreed 
that due to the nature of conflicting figures on the weight and type of bombardment 
used by each of the services a technical sub-committee was to be set up to settle issues 
relating to the weight of bombardment.601 However, Zuckerman pointed out to the 
committee that it was wrong to assume a commonality of power relating to similar 
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weighted shells and bombs as they both had different ballistic and explosive properties, 
bombs having a higher explosive content than shells. He noted that during 
CORKSCREW a smaller weight of effort had been used and achieved good results in 
disrupting the ground around the beach defences.602 Graham noted that because of the 
weight of work that had been completed by the time of the committee’s second meeting 
an interim report would be produced by the time of the third meeting, which was 
scheduled for 9 October.603 
In the time between the second and third meeting of the main committee the 
technical sub-committee met to discuss the issues raised over the weight of 
bombardment used by each services. Through the mechanism of this committee, the Air 
Staff refined their paper on attacks against coastal positions. However, in principle they 
reaffirmed a commitment to high and medium altitude bombing as the most appropriate 
method of attack.604 In essence, it contained many of the recommendations that were in 
their previous papers on the subject and along with the previously prepared documents, 
would provide the basis of the appendices of the main report and are reproduced in 
Appendix 2 and 3. It reiterated that in order to have any effect on coastal positions any 
medium capacity bombs used must be greater than 500lbs and issues relating to altitude 
and prevailing weather conditions degraded that accuracy with such weapons. While 
stating the bombing was more efficient from altitudes above eight thousand feet the 
reason given for this was to counteract the impact of AA defences. The Air Staff argued 
that out of the impact zone of AA defences bombers were more accurate.605 The report 
outlined four methods to be used in attacks, which were the standard methods then in 
                                                 
602 TNA, DEFE 2/1024, Minutes of the 2  Meeting, p. 3. nd
603 TNA, DEFE 2/1024, Minutes of the 2  Meeting, pp. 5-6. nd
604 TNA, DEFE 2/1025, Appendix II to the report of the Technical Sub-Committee: Attack on Coastal 
Defence Guns, p. 12. 
605 TNA, DEFE 2/1025, Appendix II, p. 12. 
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use by the RAF and offer little real insight into the effectiveness they might have. The 
methods were listed as: 
(i) Visual day – level, glide or dive bombing. 
(ii) Visual night – by flare illumination. 
(iii) Bombing visually on target indicator bombs dropped by radio aids. 
(iv) Blind bombing using radio aids.606 
 
However, some indications of their effectiveness can be assembled from the figures 
given for the effort required to neutralise a target in report. It covers numerous scenarios 
where either individual aircraft or formations of aircraft may be used with the figures 
quoted being derived from experience in the Mediterranean and in bombing over 
Germany.607 An overview of the figures provided can be seen in Table 3.2. 
Table 3.2 – Effort Required by Sorties 
Sorties to be Dispatched against a: 
12 Battery Sector 3 Battery Sector 
 Bombing 
Conditions 
Aircraft and 
Load 
12.5% 25% 50% 12.5% 25% 50% 
Day – Visual Avro Lancaster 
(18 Bombs) 
 
310 675 1625 80 170 400 
Day – Visual Boeing B-17 
Flying Fortress (12 
Bombs) 
470 1010 2440 120 250 600 
Individual Aircraft 
Night – Pathfinder 
Force (Target 
indicator bombs) 
Avro Lancaster 
(18 Bombs) 
710 1520 3670 180 380 920 
Blind Bombing with 
Oboe 
De Havilland 
Mosquito (4 
Bombs) 
625 1390 3350 160 350 840 
Blind Bombing with 
Oboe608 
Avro Lancaster 
(18 Bombs) 
 
140 310 740 35 80 190 
Individual Aircraft (Blind 
Bombing) 
Blind Bombing with 
G-H609 
Avro Lancaster 
(18 Bombs) 
 
(310) (675) (1625) (80) (170) (400) 
Day – Visual Boeing B-17 
Flying Fortress (12 
Bombs) 
810 1750 4200 200 440 1080 
Day – Visual Martin B-26 
Marauder (6 
Bombs) 
1630 3500 8400 400 990 2100 
Formations 
Day – Target 
obscured (Oboe 
leading) 
Boeing B-17 
Flying Fortress 
(540) 91170) (2800) (140) (290) (700) 
                                                 
606 TNA, DEFE 2/1025, Appendix II, p. 12. 
607 TNA, DEFE 2/1025, Appendix II, p. 15. 
608 At the point at which this report was prepared Lancasters were yet to be fitted with Oboe.. 
609 Figures in brackets are tentative figure provided by the Air Ministry. 
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(Source: TNA, DEFE 2/1025 ‘Appendix II to the report of the Technical Sub-Committee: Attack on 
Coastal Defence Guns’ p. 17) 
 
The table illustrates that even under obscured conditions aerial bombardment had an 
effective chance of knocking out the target. Time was an issue raised by the sub-
committee’s report by pointing out that to achieve the higher rates of effort it would be 
necessary for aircraft using navigational aids to fly more than once and that the 
turnaround time would extend the period of operation. For this reason, it was considered 
that the effort required to achieve a twelve and a half per cent success rate against targets 
would be sufficient as it would destroy targets, maintain tactical surprise and decrease the 
time required over targets.610 The acceptability of twelve and half per cent was discussed 
at the committee’s third meeting where Major General Eldridge, the Director of the 
Royal Artillery, questioned the viability of this margin. However, Zuckerman noted that 
this margin was thoroughly discussed by the sub-committee and that it was considered 
that in order to offset this margin drenching fire from ships and support craft would 
mask the fire from surviving coastal guns; the committee accepted the margin as the 
basis for success.611 The question of timing was an issue that had been raised in the 
planning for Dieppe and had accounted towards the cancellation of the bombing from 
the original plan. However, it is evident that even with the experience of Sicily the 
question of timing was still a moot point, with Coryton noting that going in early would 
not have much effect as troops could be replaced and that going in too late would 
denude the assaulting troops of effective support and this was noted in the final report 
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611 TNA, DEFE 2/1025, Minutes of the 3rd Meeting of the Inter-Service Committee to Consider the 
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where it was concluding that air attack should not impact on the issue of tactical 
surprise.612  
In finalising the report for submission to the Chiefs of Staff during November, it 
was circulated to the relevant heads of operational commands that would be involved in 
Combined Operations. For the RAF this primarily meant Fighter and Bomber 
Commands and the newly formed 2TAF under the command of Air Marshal Sir John 
D’Albiac. At this time, a report was submitted to Graham by the Director of Aerial 
Tactics (DAT) on the results of the bombing operation conducted during STARKEY. 
Thus, it can be seen that an operation with similar pretensions to JUBILEE fed into the 
process of considering the issues surrounding bombardment.613 The report reaffirmed 
many of the recommendation made in the Graham Report with regard to the preferred 
use of heavy and medium bombers for this type of operation. Perhaps the most telling 
element of the report is the description of the results achieved by fighter-bombers 
against airfield targets and the recommendations made. It was noted that fighter-
bombers and medium bombers caused repairable damage and that in order for these 
targets be rendered inoperable a force of one hundred thirty medium and heavy bombers 
would be required.614 The general conclusion was reaffirmed in the analysis of attacks on 
coastal defence positions where fighter-bombers were described as not seriously 
damaging their targets with medium bombers being most successful in this operation.615 
D’Albiac’s only concerns related to the final phase of operation and were linked to well 
known concerns of direct air support such as attacking too close to friendly troops and 
                                                 
612 TNA, DEFE 2/1025, Minutes of the 3rd Meeting, p. 3; DEFE 2/1025 ‘Report by the Inter-Service 
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613 TNA, DEFE 2/1026, DAT to Graham, 9 November 1943. 
614 TNA, DEFE 2/1026, Preliminary Summary of Bombing Attacks – Operation Starkey, p. 5. 
615 TNA, DEFE 2/1026, Summary of Bombing Attacks, p. 4. 
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strict fire control from AA gunners offshore; an issue raised and considered during 
JUBILEE.616  
Perhaps the most vociferous attack on the report came from Harris at Bomber 
Command who described the committee’s findings as ‘exceedingly questionable.’617 
Harris was critical of the many assumptions that had been used in the compilation of the 
report although many of these assumptions were based upon operational experience in 
Europe and the Mediterranean. Harris was overly concerned as to what would happen to 
the Combined Bomber Offensive if his bombers were expected to support such 
operations.618 It should be noted that in mid-November 1943, Harris was about to 
launch his ill-fated attacks against Berlin. He attacked assumptions relating to air 
superiority and argued that this should be taken into consideration. Harris was wrong to 
point this out the problems of air superiority as it was outside of the committee’s remit 
to consider this point. This is despite the fact that at the committee’s first meeting 
Graham had clarified that air superiority was naturally a prerequisite for operations.619 
His opinions again illustrate the single-mindedness of Harris and his desire not to see his 
command used for any operation other than the bombing of Germany; this would be an 
issue that became a serious concern in the planning for OVERLORD. 620 
                                                
Graham took many of the relevant points under consideration and submitted the 
final report to the Chiefs of Staff on 23 December 1943. It was then issued as a Cabinet 
Paper on 7 January 1944 and distributed to the relevant departments planning Combined 
Operations such as COSSAC.621 With the effort provided by all service ministries and the 
technical sub-committee, Graham produced an outline report that, with the exception of 
 
616 TNA, DEFE 2/1026, D’Albiac to Leigh-Mallory, 9 November 1943. 
617 TNA, DEFE 2/1026, Harris to DCAS, 10 November 1943, p. 1. 
618 TNA, DEFE 2/1026, Harris to DCAS, p. 1. 
619 TNA, DEFE 2/1024, Minutes of the 1st Meeting, p. 3; DEFE 2/1026, Harris to DCAS, p. 1. 
620 TNA, DEFE 2/1026, Harris to DCAS, p. 2. 
621 TNA, AIR 20/9503, History, p. 123. 
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minor corrections, outlined the key factors determining effective fire support for 
Combined Operations. For the purpose of the report, Combined Operations were split 
into four phases, first, the preparatory phase, second, the approach, third, the assault and 
establishment of a beachhead, finally, the advance inland.622 It was noted that all action 
would be joint, and that the effort fell into three tasks. First silencing coastal defences; 
second, drenching fire during the assault; finally, provision of support during the build 
up of the bridgehead.623 The report concluded that in terms of the application of air 
power a success rate of twelve and half per cent would render coastal defence inoperable 
using the various methods discussed above. For drenching attacks on beach defences, it 
was agreed that a mixture of fragmentation and medium capacity bombs would produce 
the best result and that in an average bomb density of quarter of a pound per square mile 
would achieve advantageous results for the assault. For the final task, it was noted that 
the methods and density would be similar to the period of drenching fire, however, air 
support in this task would be based upon carefully prepared bomb lines in order to 
reduced friendly fire incidents.624 The committee’s responsibilities did not end with the 
report submittal but they were devolved onto one of the sub-committees of the Joint 
Technical Warfare Committee who widen the scope of information to include material 
coming out of operations in the Far East.625 Thus, Dieppe began a process with the 
formation of the Assault Committee that was to continue through OVERLORD to the 
end of the war. Many sources were considered in the compilation of the report and it 
became one of the sources that added planning of the fire support plan for 
bombardment during OVERLORD. 
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3.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has sought to highlight some of the key issues raised by the use of air power 
during JUBILEE. It has shown that early accounts about the efficacy of the RAF during 
the raid are too simplistic in that they rely on unclear loss figures. Analysis of the RAF’s 
losses reveals a much more complex picture of the aerial battle. It clearly shows that 
while losses were higher than the Luftwaffe’s many of these were incurred by aircraft flying 
direct support missions and being shot down by AA fire. It also shows that many of the 
aircraft were damaged and able to make it back to Britain, so pilots and airframes were 
saved. By contrast, the Luftwaffe suffered losses that they could ill-afford. Thus, 
considering that offensive forces tend to suffer more than forces on the defensive, it can 
be said that in general the RAF’s performance at Dieppe was more useful than previously 
assumed. The loss of HMS Berkeley would appear to suggest that not all was right for the 
RAF. There is some truth to this claim as the loss was caused by problems in calling 
down air cover during a German raid. However, this highlights a problem in the system 
and not the doctrine of air superiority. In addition, there were concerns over friendly-fire 
incidents for low flying aircraft. Contemporary accounts also highlight the perceived 
success of the RAF during the raid. Therefore, it led to discussion of further raids with 
the primary aim of bringing the Luftwaffe to battle. While this was a strategic dead end, it 
does illustrate the impact that the raid had upon the RAF. The majority of contemporary 
accounts, while not having access to fully accurate figures, talk of the successful role the 
RAF played during the raid. This was also back up by intelligence reports that Fighter 
Command was receiving. Based upon this it is, therefore, easy to understand why Leigh-
Mallory sought similar operations over the French coast; whether similar success would 
have been achieved it open to conjecture. 
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The qualification of the ‘Lessons Learnt’ produces a more nuanced and varied 
picture of the RAF at Dieppe. However, this chapter has shown that JUBILEE certainly 
had an impact on RAF thinking but it should be assessed in line with developments in 
other theatres of war. JUBILEE facilitated the discussion of FDTs and command and 
control, but these ships had been on the cards since the start of 1942. The practical 
experience of Calpe as a HQS illustrated the need for a separate ship for the role of 
directing air power. However, it would be during 1943 that these ships gained practical 
experience. Much the same can be said for aerial bombardment. JUBILEE acted as an 
enabler for change but did not provide practical experience. This would come in the 
Mediterranean especially at Pantelleria. However, this experience was in line with 
JUBILEE, and would feed into the Graham Report, which alongside with practical 
experience provided a framework for the pre-bombardment utilised during 
OVERLORD. 
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Conclusion 
 
This thesis had as its central aim an examination of the effectiveness of the RAF during 
Operation JUBILEE. In order to do this the thesis has examined the doctrinal and 
operational context of the RAF’s actions during the raid in order to understand why the 
RAF fought the air battle that it did. It has then examined the impact that JUBILEE had 
upon various aspects of the mechanics of Combined Operations. In particular, it 
examined the impact JUBILEE had upon the development of an effective command and 
control system for air power during Combined Operations and the discussions that 
occurred concerning the use of aerial bombardment in support of the assault against an 
opposed landing. This thesis has, through extensive analysis of contemporary and non-
contemporary sources, sought to make a perceptive examination of the RAF’s role 
during JUBILEE. 
However, in order to assess the operational effectiveness of the RAF it is worth 
returning to the key issues discussed in the introduction. These issues can be summed up 
as service integration, flexibility, strategic context and operational evaluation. Each area 
highlights how effective was the RAF participation in JUBILEE. At the end, there will be 
some general remarks that will illustrate some of the key factors relating to the use of air 
power in Combined Operations, and how this thesis has contributed to our 
understanding of JUBILEE and, more widely, Combined Operations during the Second 
World War.  
In the build up to and during JUBILEE, the RAF showed the degree to which as 
a service it was willing to integrate into Combined Operations. The fact that in the inter-
war years the RAF called for a holistic Combined Operations doctrine illustrates that the 
RAF was aware of the need to consider inter-service cooperation on operations. That 
this did not happen was largely down to the other services, especially the RN, which 
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wished to keep the focus on amphibious operations. The RAF was aware of the key role 
it was to play in any Combined Operation and by the start of the war; the pre-requisite of 
air superiority was accepted by all the services. By 1942, the RAF had made a vigorous 
attempt to integrate itself into the Combined Operations organisation with the setting up 
of No. 1441 Flight at the CTC. This would eventually become No. 105 Wing, which 
would have an important role in controlling the crews required for the HQS and FDTs 
from 1943 onwards. This organisation from 1942 onwards would train squadrons from 
Fighter, Bomber and Army Co-Operation Commands in the principles relating to the 
support of Combined Operations. This occurred alongside their normal operations with 
which they were tasked. That this occurred despite the protestations of Harris, illustrates 
the importance that the Air Staff placed upon integration and co-operation.  
During the course of JUBILEE Leigh-Mallory, as the senior RAF officer played a 
full part in the advising and operational decision-making process and during the course 
of the battle sought to control air operations with a representative onboard the HQS. 
That Leigh-Mallory was not on board himself highlights the difficulty of commanding air 
power and the need to be at a central command node to effectively control air assets. 
This would still be the overall situation in 1944, though eased by the development of the 
FDT. Leigh-Mallory also illustrated a willingness to work with Mountbatten on future 
operations when it showed the opportunity to attain his primary goal of air superiority, 
even though these would become strategic dead end.  
The parallel development of Combined Operation doctrine and the operational 
objectives of Fighter Command merged to give that command its primary mission during 
JUBILEE. Normally viewed as a selfish act by the RAF, an understanding of Combined 
Operations doctrine shows that the opposite is actually the case. That the RAF’s view of 
the role of air superiority had developed to include fighter operations by the time of 
JUBILEE helps to explain its role. The fact that it aided its Fighter Command’s role in 
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1942 should not be seen negatively. It illustrates the flexibility of air power in the face of 
changing operational conditions. The need for air superiority from fighter aircraft had 
been illustrated in numerous campaigns before JUBILEE, prevented German attempts 
to gain air superiority in 1940.  
That the RAF’s modus operandi during JUBILEE fitted in with Fighter Commands 
role should as be noted viewed positively. The RAF was seeking to do its best to prevent 
the Luftwaffe from interfering with the operation. In this, it was generally successful. That 
the RAF suffered more than the Luftwaffe is not an indication that it was out fought on 
the day as the detailed analysis above illustrates that many of the airframes were returned 
to service and many pilots were rescued. This would be a telling factor for the Luftwaffe 
whose inability to replace losses would cost them in the air battles of the 1943 and 1944. 
However, the RAF was able to maintain and effective strength in 1943 with a well-
trained cadre of pilots. The Luftwaffe was not able to do from 1942 onwards due to poor 
training and the high rate of losses it was suffering on all fronts.  
Possibly the one area where problems occurred in the aftermath of JUBILEE 
was in the belief held by Leigh-Mallory and Mountbatten that a similar operation could 
be launched in order to wear down the Luftwaffe by forcing it to fight, even the RAF was 
forced to admit that the method was a one shot strategy and without the actual landing 
of significant forces there was unlikely to be a repeat performance. However, given the 
strategic situation of late 1942 and early 1943 it was perhaps not wrong for it to be tried. 
Both AFLAME and COLEMAN were strategic dead ends and this was realised by 
members of the Air Staff who vetoed the operations as far as they could. That they 
stayed on the agenda may well be explained by Mountbatten’s attempts to garner more 
power for COHQ, as was seen in the preparation for JUBILEE. However, Leigh-
Mallory must not be excused for not seeing the fallacy of this strategy. Despite the 
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failures of late 1942 the strategy was revived as part of deception plans in 1943, however, 
once again it did not succeed in the aim of bringing the Luftwaffe to battle. 
In terms of the direct impact of air power on JUBILEE, it can be argued that 
with the exception of the loss of HMS Berkeley and some landing craft the cover provided 
by Fighter Command was useful in preventing the full weight of the Luftwaffe attacking 
the beaches. It was noted by eyewitness that some of the losses, while regrettable, were 
not the fault of the RAF as in the midst of battle craft were arriving late and caught in 
the maelstrom. The loss of HMS Berkeley was primarily the fault of the failure of 
command and control systems then in place to deal with RAF aircraft flying below three 
thousand feet. This meant that Luftwaffe aircraft under this height became the RN’s 
responsibility, therefore, the loss must be put down to the RN’s AA defences. In general, 
the direct support provided was very useful. For example, the attacks on the Hess Battery 
aided No.4 Commando’s operation. Smoke laying was found to be very useful and was 
most welcome in the withdrawal phase of JUBILEE. The most disappointing aspect was 
the provision of Tac R, which were left with little to do, as the Germans did not send in 
reserves. However, the battle was costly for the RAF, with aircraft on the direct support 
mission suffering the most. Nevertheless, the RAF was willing to accept these losses. 
Traditional arguments relating to the effectiveness of JUBILEE usually relate to 
its importance in providing lessons that contributed to the success of OVERLORD. 
This is certainly the argument made by Mountbatten in his later life and supported by 
Hughes-Hallett. From an air power perspective, it is hard to support this position. That 
JUBILEE served a purpose is certainly true. It fitted in with the prevailing view of air 
power in support of Combined Operations and aided Fighter Command’s key 
operational objectives; however, these lessons did not last into 1944. By 1943, it became 
apparent to the Allies that the battle for air superiority in preparation for OVERLORD 
 168
would have to be fought closer to Germany and due to the technical limitation of Fighter 
Command’s equipment; this battle would be primarily fought by the 8AAF.  
Therefore, if the lessons of JUBILEE were not important in the preparation for 
OVERLORD, were they as useful elsewhere? The answer to this is that JUBILEE’s 
importance lay in the impact it had upon events in 1943. JUBILEE acted as an enabler of 
change. It illustrated problems that had to be resolved if air power was to be fully 
effective in Combined Operations. The problems the occurred in the command and 
control of air power during JUBILEE, noticeably the loss of HMS Berkeley, led to the 
development and refinement of a command and control system that played a useful role 
in the Mediterranean and come to fruition at Normandy. Had the war gone on beyond 
1945 it is also likely that the further development of the FDT concept into ocean going 
FDS would have been useful to SEAC. The ability to control air power within the area of 
fleet AA defence during OVERLORD overcame the primary problem encountered 
during JUBILEE. 
JUBILEE also illustrated the need for some form of aerial bombardment in 
support of Combined Operations, though its exclusion was for valid reasons. In order to 
deal with this contentious issue, as illustrated by Harris’ unwillingness to allow Bomber 
Command aircraft to bomb civilian targets in France, the formation of the inter-service 
committee on fire support was encouraged by discussions emanating from JUBILEE. 
This committee, led by the RAF examined the issue and made suggestions that would aid 
the planners of OVERLORD where aerial bombardment was used fully. Indeed the 
choice of Graham as chair was a perceptible one due to his pre-war experience in 
Combined Operations doctrine. However, as JUBILEE was an enabler it should be 
recognised that much practical experience in this issue and the development of the FDT 
concept came from the Mediterranean, which proved to be a training ground for ideas 
being developed. The Graham Report that appeared in December 1943 would form one 
 169
source of information for the planners of OVERLORD. In providing this source of 
information, the RAF illustrated its flexibility and willingness to work with other services 
on joint issues. 
The thesis has sought to re-frame the debate surrounding the RAF at Dieppe by 
taking a progressive examination of both its operational and doctrinal context. Then it 
has sought to examine what impact JUBILEE had on air power in Combined 
Operations. Generally, it can be argued the RAF performed well on the day and that 
while losses were high these were either replaceable or repairable. Its impact upon on the 
Luftwaffe is more difficult but it can be said that their losses were more difficult to replace. 
While losses to the assault force occurred, it can be argued that had the RAF not been 
fighting for air superiority, thus, providing air cover, they would have been worse. The 
impact of JUBILEE on future operations is more difficult to assess. Certainly JUBILEE 
enabled discussions to occur but whether this had a direct link to OVERLORD is 
debatable given the vast amount of experience be gained in the Mediterranean. Thus, this 
thesis has hopefully refocused the debate on JUBILEE to an examination of the 
operational effectiveness of the RAF and the impact on developments in 1943 not 1944. 
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Appendix 1  
 
Air Force Order of Battle for Operation JUBILEE, 19 August 1942626 
 
Royal Air Force Units 
 
Sector No. of 
Squadrons 
Primary 
Role 
Squadron Base Aircraft 
Air Cover 111 Kenley Supermarine 
Spitfire Mk. 
Vb 
Air Cover 611 Kenley Supermarine 
Spitfire Mk. 
IX 
Air Cover 308 (Eagle) Kenley Supermarine 
Spitfire Mk. 
Vb 
Kenley 4 
Air Cover 402 Kenley Supermarine 
Spitfire Mk. 
Vb 
Air Cover 350 Redhill Supermarine 
Spitfire Mk. 
Vb 
Air Cover 310 Redhill Supermarine 
Spitfire Mk. 
Vb 
Kenley 3 
Air Cover 312 Redhill Supermarine 
Spitfire Mk. 
Vb 
Air Cover 306 (Polish) Northolt Supermarine 
Spitfire Mk. 
Vb 
Air Cover 317 (Polish) Northolt Supermarine 
Spitfire Mk. 
Vb 
Air Cover 308 (Polish) Heston Supermarine 
Spitfire Mk. 
Vb 
Northolt 4 
Air Cover 302 (Polish) Heston Supermarine 
Spitfire Mk. 
Vb 
Northolt 1 Air Cover 303 (Polish) Redhill Supermarine 
Spitfire Mk. 
Vb 
Tangmere 2 Air Cover 131 Merston Supermarine 
Spitfire Mk. 
Vb 
                                                 
626 TNA, AIR 20/5186, Appendix A to Report by the Air Force Commander; Franks, The Greatest Air 
Battle, pp. 222-225; Franks, Fighter Command Losses, pp. 56-62 
 171
  Air Cover 412 Merston Supermarine 
Spitfire Mk. 
Vb 
Tangmere 1 Air Cover 309 (Eagle) West 
Hampnett 
Supermarine 
Spitfire Mk. 
Vb 
Air Cover 129 Thorney 
Island 
Supermarine 
Spitfire Mk. 
Vb 
Tangmere 2 
Air Cover 130 Thorney 
Island 
Supermarine 
Spitfire Mk. 
Vb 
Air Cover 66 Tangmere Supermarine 
Spitfire Mk. 
Vc 
Air Cover 118 Tangmere Supermarine 
Spitfire Mk. 
V 
Air Cover 501 Tangmere Supermarine 
Spitfire Mk. 
Vb 
Tangmere 4 
Air Cover 41 Tangmere Supermarine 
Spitfire Mk. 
Vb 
Close 
Support 
43 Tangmere Hawker 
Hurricane 
Mk. IIc 
Tangmere 2 
Close 
Support 
87 Tangmere Hawker 
Hurricane 
Mk. IIc 
Close 
Support 
3 Shoreham Hawker 
Hurricane 
Mk. IIc 
Tangmere 2 
Close 
Support 
245 Shoreham Hawker 
Hurricane 
Mk. IIc 
Close 
Support 
32 Friston Hawker 
Hurricane 
Mk. IIc 
Tangmere 2 
Close 
Support 
253 Friston Hawker 
Hurricane 
Mk. IIc 
Direct Air 
Support 
174 Ford Hawker 
Hurricane 
Mk. IIc 
Tangmere 2 
Direct Air 
Support 
175 Ford Hawker 
Hurricane 
Mk. IIc 
Tangmere 2 Bomber 88 Ford Douglas 
Boston Mk. 
III 
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  Bomber 107 Ford Douglas 
Boston Mk. 
III 
Smoke 
Laying  
13 Thruxton Bristol 
Blenheim 
Mk. IV 
Smoke 
Laying 
614 Thruxton Bristol 
Blenheim 
Mk. IV 
Tangmere 3 
Smoke 
Laying 
226 Thruxton Douglas 
Boston Mk. 
III 
Tangmere 1 Bomber 418 Bradwell 
Bay 
Douglas 
Boston Mk. 
III 
Tangmere  1 Bomber 605 Ford Douglas 
Boston Mk. 
III 
Air Cover 232 Gravesend Supermarine 
Spitfire Mk. 
Vb 
Air Cover 71 Gravesend Supermarine 
Spitfire Mk. 
Vb 
Debden 3 
Air Cover 124 Gravesend Supermarine 
Spitfire Mk. 
VI 
Air Cover 616 Hawkinge Supermarine 
Spitfire Mk. 
VI 
Debden 2 
Air Cover 416 Hawkinge Supermarine 
Spitfire Mk. 
Vb 
Air Cover 121 Southend Supermarine 
Spitfire Mk. 
Vb 
North Weald 2 
Air Cover 19 Southend Supermarine 
Spitfire Mk. 
Vb 
Air Cover 242 Manston Supermarine 
Spitfire Mk. 
Vb 
Air Cover 331 Manston Supermarine 
Spitfire Mk. 
Vb 
Air Cover 332 Manston Supermarine 
Spitfire Mk. 
Vb 
North Weald 4 
Air Cover 403 Manston Supermarine 
Spitfire Mk. 
Vb 
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Air Cover 64 Hornchurch  Supermarine 
Spitfire Mk. 
IXc 
Air Cover 122 Hornchurch Supermarine 
Spitfire Mk. 
Vb 
Hornchurch 3 
Air Cover 340 Hornchurch Supermarine 
Spitfire Mk. 
Vb 
Air Cover 81 Fairlop Supermarine 
Spitfire Mk. 
Vb 
Hornchurch 2 
Air Cover 154 Fairlop Supermarine 
Spitfire Mk. 
Vb 
Air Cover 485 West 
Malling 
Supermarine 
Spitfire Mk. 
Vb 
Air Cover 610 West 
Malling 
Supermarine 
Spitfire Mk. 
Vb 
Hornchurch 3 
Air Cover 411 West 
Malling 
Supermarine 
Spitfire Mk. 
Vb 
Air Cover 602 Biggin Hill Supermarine 
Spitfire Mk. 
Vb 
Air Cover 307 (Eagle) Biggin Hill Supermarine 
Spitfire Mk. 
Vb 
Biggin Hill 3 
Air Cover 222 Biggin Hill Supermarine 
Spitfire Mk. 
Vb 
Air Cover 165 Lympne Supermarine 
Spitfire Mk. 
Vb 
Biggin Hill 2 
Air Cover 401 Lympne Supermarine 
Spitfire Mk. 
IX 
Air Cover 65 Eastchurch Supermarine 
Spitfire Mk. 
Vb 
Biggin Hill 2 
Air Cover 133 Eastchurch Supermarine 
Spitfire Mk. 
Vb 
Biggin Hill 1 Air Cover 91 Hawkinge Supermarine 
Spitfire Mk. 
Vb 
Gatwick 4 Tac R 26 Gatwick North 
American 
Mustang 
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Mk. Ia 
Tac R 239 Gatwick North 
American 
Mustang 
Mk. Ia 
Tac R 400 Gatwick North 
American 
Mustang 
Mk. Ia 
Tac R 414 Gatwick North 
American 
Mustang 
Mk. Ia 
Air Cover  56 Duxford Hawker 
Typhoon 
Mk. I 
Air Cover 266 Duxford Hawker 
Typhoon 
Mk. I 
Duxford 3 
Air Cover 609 Duxford Hawker 
Typhoon 
Mk. I 
 
United States 8th Army Air Force Units 
 
Higher Formation Squadrons Base Aircraft 
340th  Polebrook Boeing B-17 Flying 
Fortress 
341st  Polebrook Boeing B-17 Flying 
Fortress 
342nd  Grafton 
Underwood 
Boeing B-17 Flying 
Fortress 
97th Bomber 
Group 
414th  Grafton 
Underwood 
Boeing B-17 Flying 
Fortress 
 
Totals 
 
Mission Aircraft Total 
Air Cover Supermarine Spitfire (All 
Marks) 
48 
Air Cover Hawker Typhoon 3 
Smoke Laying Douglas Boston 1 
Smoke Laying Bristol Blenheim  2 
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Bomber Douglas Bomber 4 
Direct Air Support Hawker Hurricane 2 
Tac R North American Mustang 4 
Close Support Hawker Hurricane 6 
Diversionary Bombing Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress 4 
                                                                                  Total 74 
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Appendix 2 
 
Fire Support for an Opposed Landing: Statement by the Air Staff on the 
Destruction or Neutralisation of Coast Defences, 16 September 1943627 
 
 
                                                 
627 TNA, DEFE 2/1024, Fire Support for an Opposed Landing statement by the Air Staff on the 
Destruction or Neutralisation of Coast Defences, 16 September 1943 
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Appendix 3 
 
Fire Support for an Opposed Landing: Statement by the Air Staff on the 
Destruction or Neutralisation of Beach Defences, 16 September 1943628 
 
 
                                                 
628 DEFE 2/1024, Fire Support for an Opposed Landing statement by the Air Staff on the Destruction or 
Neutralisation of Beach Defences, 16 September 1943 
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